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Chapter I
Introduction
The prospect of job loss has always been an alarming one,
both for individual workers and for society as a whole. Job loss
can be devastating not only to a worker's ego and emotional sta-
bility, but also to family finances. The purpose of this thesis
is to examine the claim that job separations lower workers'
wages. In particular, we test the following hypotheses:
(1) Layoffs are more harmful to wages than quits. We expect
layoffs to decrease future wages. Superficially, at least, it
seems that quits would tend to increase wages. Since they are
voluntary, they should not be undertaken unless they imply a move
to a preferred state for the job changer. There are, however,
forms of compensation other than monetary remuneration, e.g., job
satisfaction, relationships with co-workers, etc. Therefore, a
worker may be willing to change jobs even if it does not increase
his earnings, provided that total psychic compensation increases.
Further, a quit may be prompted by dissatisfaction with the
old job rather than by the promise of a new "better" job. In
this case, the worker may not know, at the time of the quit, the
conditions of his next job (and whether they will be better or
worse than that of the old job). Some quits are not even easily
distinguishable from layoffs. Conceivably a worker might quit
because he knows he is about to be fired.
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We conclude that the circumstances under which a worker
quits determine the outcome of the quit. The theoretical effect
of a quit on wages is positive, but the empirical effect of a
quit on wages (with no information about these circumstances) is
ambiguous.
On the other hand, we expect layoffs to have a negative
impact on wage growth. By definition, layoffs are involuntary.
If a worker expected a job change to be lucrative, he would have
quit (setting aside non-pecuniary considerations). Of course, as
stated above, a worker's expectations may be incorrect. Further,
some workers are discharged for cause. (We shall refer to both
discharges for cause and discharges due to shifts in demand for
labor as layoffs). A discharge for cause, or firing, is a black
mark on an individual's record and may lower his future wage
rate.
(2) The less recent the turnover, the weaker its effect on
current wages. In other words, individuals "recover" from any
effects of turnover (e.g., loss of firm specific on-the-job
training and negative signalling, both discussed below) given
sufficient time.
(3) Some demographic groups are more vulnerable than others
to the effects of turnover because they acquire more firm speci-
fic on-the-job training. The more firm specific training a
worker has, the higher his current wage compared to his alter-
native wage with other firms, and the larger the wage loss
expected following turnover.
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(4) The more tenure a worker has on the current job just
prior to a job change, the greater the amount of OJT accumulated
specific to the current job, and thus the greater the potential
loss from a job change.
Testing these hypotheses is of interest because of the
importance of job mobility in American society. This is
illustrated in Table I. This table demonstrates the percentages
of males in the University of Michigan "Panel Study of Income
Dynamics" data set who were laid off and quit at least once
during the decade 1969-1979. (We shall discuss this data set in
greater detail in Chapter 4.) Note that the layoff and quit
rates both decline monotonically with age.
For the group as a whole, more than 3 out of 10 men in this
survey experienced at least one layoff during the period and
almost half experienced at least one quit. For good or for ill,
a considerable proportion of males (particularly young males)
experienced turnover at some point during the decade.
According to classical economic theory, labor mobility is
necessary for efficient allocation in the job market. If,
however, job changing proves to be harmful for certain groups, we
may want to consider active measures to prevent these groups from
the consequences tif frequent turnover. For instance, if we find
that older workers suffer heavy financial losses from layoffs, we
may target income supports to this group.
There are several mechanisms by which quits and layoffs can
decrease the future wage:
'fAl:iLI:. 1
Layott and Quit Incidence by
Ago tor All Males
P~ID [)ata
Aye 14-23 24-33 34-43 44-53
----- ----- ----- -----
% with at least 1
layott 1969-79 42.U% 37.4% 35.2% 31.0%
% wIth at least 1
qUlt 1969-79 73.7% 52.8% 48.6% 43.6%
54-63
19.4~
32.6%
All Ayes
31.5%
45.5%
I
~
I
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First, the worker may have training which makes him highly
productive on the current job but which is irrelevant to work
with any other firm. This is what we mean by specific on-the-job-
training (henceforth referred to as specific OJT or as specific
training). The existence of specific OJT with an individual's
current firm tends to increase his current wage relative to his
potential wage with other firms.
Second, layoffs could be perceived by prospective employers
as a sign of worker inferiority and thus lower the alternative
wage offer to the job changer. Likewise frequent quitters may
have lower wages than less mobile individuals. This effect is
called "negative signalling".
Third, the worker will, in general, need to spend time and
money in job search whenever he changes jobs. It presumably takes
more time and money to find a high-paying job than a low-paying
job. Each additional job change takes place at a later period in
an individual's life. Therefore, each time job search takes
place, the stream of potential benefits are smaller, cet. par.,
because there is less time until retirement. Therefore, each
time a job change takes place, we expect the individual to invest
less in job search and therefore gain less from the change.
Further workers who tend to have frequent job changes would be
expected to invest less in job search for each job change (and
in less specific OJT) than less mobile individuals and therefore
have lower wages.
In testing these proportions, we use a sample of males,
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23-53 years old (in 1968) from the Michigan Panel ~tudy of Income
Dynamics. This study traces individuals' work histories from
1968 to 1981. It contains information on quits and layoffs be-
tween these two dates as well as 1968 levels of other relevant
variables and changes in these variables between 1968 and 1980.
We restrict our sample to males because many females, par-
ticularly married females, tend to have fluctuations in labor
force participation due to family responsibilities. This means'
that any study of effects of turnover on females requires a model
of female labor force participation decisions since labor force
~xit is a more frequently used option for female workers. Such a
study would be extremely interesting but is beyond the scope of
this thesis.
The variable of interest in this thesis is the hourly wage
rate rather than total yearly earnings. In focusing on the wage
rate, we avoid the problem of labor supply determination. Hours
of work is, to some extent, a choice variable for the worker. We
wish to examine the effects of layoffs and quits on the wage
faced by the worker in a future period apart from the labor
supply decisions the worker makes in that period.
General Design of This Thesis
In Chapter II, we review the existing theoretical literature
on human capital and OJT accumulation and turnover (Part A) and
the empirical literature relating wage rates and growth in wage
-7-
rates to past layoffs and quits (Part B).
Part A further divides into two sections. Section 1 in-
cludes models of OJT investment. Only one of these {Bartel-Borjas}
considers the impact of firm specificity and layoff and quit pro-
babilities on OJT. As we will see in the theoretical literature
and in Chapter III, firms sometimes pay for part of firm specific
OJT and therefore have some control over the quantity of an
individual's specific OJT investment. However, the OJT models in
Part A ignore the firm's role in the OJT decision. Section 2 (of
Part A of Chapter II) reviews articles that model the layoff and
quit decisions by firms and individuals, respectively. Each
article considers the influence of specific OJT on these layoff
and quit decisions and concludes that the returns to quits and
layoffs are inversely related to specific OJT accumulated by the
worker on the job.
In Part B of the literature review, we discuss the empirical
literature on wages and job turnover. Many of these models fail
to incorporate the existence of specific OJT into their analyses.
Some, however, recognize not only the connection between job
mobility and specific training loss, but also the connection be-
tween job tenure and specific training. Individuals who never
acquire long tenure on a job because of frequent turnover should
be those who acquire, cet. par., less specific OJT than immobile
individuals. For such individuals, it is the lack of OJT that is
the direct cause of low wages (if turnover is negatively related
to low wages) rather than the job changes themselves. In fact,
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job changes may do little to harm those who acquire little speci-
fic training; those who acquire long job tenure, however, poten-
tially acquire large amounts of specific training which increases
vulnerability to turnover.
In Chapter III, we construct a model of OJT investment 'which
incorporates both the literature on both individual OJT decisions
and firm OJT decisions. We consider specific OJT investment
decisions to be made jointly by both the worker and the firm. In
particular, the relationship between specific OJT and likelihood
of layoffs and quits is considered as a factor in the OJT model.
The worker recognizes that an increase in specific OJT investment
decreases his layoff probability as well as increasing his wage
rate; the firm recognizes that an increase in specific OJT
investment decreases the quit rate as well as increasing worker
productivity. A unique feature of our model is that both the
worker and the firm consider the decrease in turnover resulting
from an increase in OJT investment as part of the marginal bene-
fit from such investment. This decrease in layoff/quit probabi-
lity will, therefore, be an argument in the worker/firm OJT
investment function. After deriving a specific training invest-.
ment function, we hypothesize that its arguments are functions of
observable, measurable variables for the individual, e.g.,
tenure, age, education, race and occupation. Therefore, these
variables are the ultimate determinants of specific OJT invest-
ment.
Since the quantity of this investment is positively related
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to loss from a layoff or quit, we conclude that this loss will be
a function of tenure, age, education, occupation and race of the
job changer.
In Chapter IV, we empirically test the proposition that the
loss in wages from a layoff or quit depends on the variables that
proxy OJT, i.e., tenure, age, education, occupation and race.
This tests the third of the four hypotheses with which we began
this chapter.
The dependent variable will be the log of 1980 average
hourly earnings minus the log of 1968 average hourly earnings.
We hypothesize that the dependent variable is a function of the
proxy variables discussed above, turnover variables describing
quit and layoff behavior and other control variables. To esti-
mate the influence of the proxy variables on the effect of
layoffs and quits on the dependent variables, we could interact
the proxy and turnover variables. Alternatively, we disaggregate
our regressions by the proxy variables which is equivalent to
interacting them with each variable in the regression. The turn-
over variable will be geared as closely as possible to testing
the other three hypotheses posed at the beginning of this
Chapter. In other words, we differentiate job changes by whether:
(1) they are quits or layoffs
(2) they are before 1974 or after 1974
(3) amount of tenure prior to the job change.
The Chapter concludes with a discussion of the results.
In Chapter V, we summarize our findings and suggest further
avenues of research.
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Chapter II
Literature Review
In Section A of this Chapter, we summarize some of the
theoretical literature on human capital/OJT investment. This
literature is the basis for our model in the Theory Chapter which
will show (1) that the gain from a job change is inversely
related to amount of specific OJT a worker has on the current
job, and (2) that the amount of OJT investment the worker accumu-
lates is related to cost of OJT to both the individual and firm
and to the expected increase in productivity and wages from
another unit of investment. We will show that age, education,
job tenure, occupation and race are proxies for these factors and
therefore are good proxies for OJT.
In Section B of ths chapter, we shall discuss efforts in the
literature to measure OJT empirically and to explain the effects
of turnover on wages and on wage growth of various populations.
In our empirical work, we will extend the existing litera-
ture by demonstrating how the effects of layoffs and quits vary
by age, education, race, job tenure and occupation. Our basic
hypothesis is that those with personal characteristics associated
with greatest specific OJT investment should lose the most, cet.
par., from layoffs and quits. We will also try to discern how
the layoffs and quits differ in the effect on wage growth and how
timing of turnover influences wage growth.
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We can separate the literature reviewed in Section A into
that which models quantity of OJT investment from the point of
view of the individual and that which discusses the relationship
of specific OJT to quits and layoffs. Here, we briefly compare
the articles in both groups.
Gary Becker examines the market an individual faces for
human capital without regard to whether it is general or firm
specific. His supply curve depends on the individual's ease of
access to funds with which to purchase human capital and his
demand curve depends on the individual's ability to learn. We
will borrow his idea that the quantity of human capital invest-
ment is a function of ability.
Knapp and Hansen model K(t), the ratio of expenditure on OJT
to potential earnings in time t. They suppose K(t) to be a
decreasing function of work experience (t), with K(o) (ratio of
OJT expenditure to potential earnings at start of work life) a
function of one's personal characteristics. This is consistent
with Becker's notion that a worker's characteristics affect the
positions of demand and supply curves for human capital.
Knapp and Hansen's 'OJT function:
K(t) = K(o) _ t K(o)
T
is somewhat restrictive. It implies that the OJT ratio, K(t),
declines by exactly the same amount in each year, ignoring the
possibility of job change and consequent commencement of new
training programs.
Brown does not consider the possibility of job changes
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either, but his model of OJT investment is quite stylized. It
specifies the marginal cost function of post school investments,
and recognizes that the rate of return MG-l grown over time and may
depend on the individual's cohort.
These three authors model OJT investment, but they never'
consider how the prospect of a layoff or quit affects the invest-
ment decision or even recognize that some OJT is specific.
Bartel and Borjas fill this gap to some extent. They suppose
that a proportion, 1, of each unit of human capital investment is
firm specific and find that y is positively related to the
expected remaining job duration. Further, their results imply
that the amount of human capital investment is positively corre-
lated with amount of time the worker expects to remain with the
firm after the investment and therefore is negatively related to
the likelihood of a layoff or quit. The structure of their model
implies that the amount of general human capital investment as
well as specific human capital investment increases with expected
remaining duration of the job. Theoretically, there is no reason
this assumption should be true. We can avoid it by allowing spe-
cific OJT investment and general investment to increase in dif-
ferent proportions, i.e., by allowing the specific and general
OJT investment decisions to be made separately.
Our model will go even further in incorporating turnover
into the OJT model than Bartel's and Borjas'. We show that the
recognition of the effect of specific OJT on quit and layoff pro-
babilities will influence the OJT decision. Decreased layoff
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probability is one of the benefits to a worker from additional
OJT investment, and decreased quit probability is a benefit to
the firm.
Becker, Hashimoto and Parsons deal explicitly with the rela-
tionship of specific OJT to layoffs and quits.
Becker lays the ground work. He argues that firms will be
willing to pay for part of specific training only if they expect:
(a) that the worker will remain with the firm for at least
some specified time period,
(b) that the worker's future marginal revenue product will
be greater than the future wage. (Parsons refers to the gap
between the two as firm-owned specific capital.)
If (b) holds, firms have an incentive to minimize layoffs
and quits. In order to minimize quits, they may pay the worker a
wage higher than his alternative wage. (Parsons refers to the
gap between the two as worker owned specific capital.)
Hashimoto points out that the worker's post-training wage
with the firm is often determined before post-training MRP and
alternative wages are known to the firm and worker, respectively.
If the post-training wage is rigid, non-optimal quits and layoffs
may take place. We will borrow the idea that the post-training
MRP and the alternative wage are unknown at time of the training
and that the period 2 wage with the firm is set in period 1.
Parsons discusses the relationship of quits and layoffs to
firm-owned and worker owned specific human capital.
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Section A
Theoretical Literature
Part 1. Models of OJT
Beckerl (1975) adapts the traditional models of investment
in nonhuman capital to the determination of the amount invested
in human capital by a "representative" person. He therefore
posits a supply and demand curve for human capital. Further, he
discusses how an individual's characteristics shift these curves.
This discussion will be particularly relevant to our model of OJT
investment which concludes with an equation that posits that the
level of OJT accumulation is a (reduced form) function of an
individual's characteristics.
The supply curve for human capital investment in Becker's
model is upward sloping because investment (above a certain
level) requires the individual to borrow at interest rates that
increase with amount borrowed.
The demand curve is downward sloping because an individual's
intellectual and physical capacities are limited so that even-
tually diminishing returns set in to human capital investment.
Obviously, a worker's supply curve for human capital depends
on his family background, race, access to financing, etc. The
worker's demand curve for OJT depends much more on his abilities,
and more specifically, on his capacity to lear. The abler the
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worker is, the higher his increase in earnings given that he
invests in an extra unit of human capital.
Supply of Funds
Marginal Benefit
Marginal Cost
Units of Human
Capital
Graph 2.1 - Demand-Supply for Human Capital
The diagram shows that an increase in ability (to benefit
from any level of human capital investment) will increase optimal
investment. This supports our contention (in the next chapter)
that the more able a worker, cet. par., the more OJT he will
acquire.
Knapp and Hansen2 (1976) explicitly take into account the
tendency to concentrate human capital investment at the beginning
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of work life in their model. They also test empirically the
hypothesis that OJT varies with education. Their basic model
measures intensity of OJT investment in time t by
(2.1) K(t) = C( t) = 1 _EITf
y ( t)
E( t)
where C(t) = investment costs in time t
E(t) = potential earnings in time t
yet) = actual earnings in time t
y(t)=E(t)-C(t)
t = years of work experience =
age - years school - 5
The OJT model is
( 2. 2) K ( t) = K (0) - (t) [K ( 0) IT]
where K(o) = investment ratio at the beginning of work life.
T is length of work life.
This model implies that K{t) declines linearly with time through
work life until retirement (t=T)
with K(T) = 0
This investment function is rather restrictive. Although it
appears reasonable that K{t) should, in general, decline with t,
there is no reason it should decline by the same amount in each
year. Also, other non-constant factors besides t should affect
K(t). For instance, the individual may leave a job which
involved no investment for one which requires much OJT, in which
case there may be periods in which K(t) rises with t. Knapp and
Hansen extend this model to hypothesize that K{o) for a par-
-17-
ticular individual is:
where K(o) is the mean of K(o) for the individual i's age/education
group, and
K(o)i* is the deviation of K(o)i from the mean, with an
expected value of 0,
.*K(O)l is hypothesized to be a function of schooling and
K(o). In order to test this hypothesis empirically, Knapp and
Hansen must estimate K(o)i for the members of their sample which
is the Johns Hopkins Retrospective Life History Survey of males
30-39 years of age in 1968.
Their method 3 is as follows.
Assume K(o)i > 0, and therefore yeo) < E(o), i.e., actual
earnings at beginning of worklife are less than potential ear-
nings. If we can find E(o), the level of income an individual
would have had at the start of his work life if he had conducted
no post school investment, we can find K(o) since yeo) is
available in the data set used.
Since K(t) declines with t and this model has no depre-
A
ciation, there will be a value of t > 0, (call it t) at which
A
yet) = E(o), i.e., when actual earnings catch up with initial
potential earnings. If it were true that C(t) was the same for
A
all t, t could be found by the following:
-18-
~ t.( 2 • 3) Le t y ( t i) = E( 0) + r L 1t=l
where E(o) and C(t) are as defined above
y ( t i ) is actual income in t i (i=O ••• T)
r = the return to post-school investments
let t. =" t
1
then
,.
(2.4) yet) = E(o) + r
,.
t
E
t=l
A
C(t) - C(t)
..
Since by definition, yet) = E(o),
(2.5) r
A
t
i:
t=l
"C(t) = C(t)
Supposing (as suggested above) that C(t) is the same for all t,
then
A
t
(2.6) r i:
t=l
'" ~ A
C(t) = r t C(t) = C(t)
" 1and t = -
r
If we can somehow find r, the return on human capital, we
can find t.
equals E(o).
""Then, from available data we can find Yet), which
Finding yeo) from the data, we can compute for each
individual i,
and thus
K(o)i= C(o)~
E(O)l
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Knapp and Hansen use estimates of r for different
demographic groups from T. Johnson's4 (1970) article. From this
,. i
they find t for each group, yet) for each individual i (reported
income in time t), then E(o)i and finally K(o)i for each individual
and K(Q0 for each demographic group.
0. °
K(O)l can be calculated from K(O)l and K(O). Although it
••
seems that K(O)l must, on average be 0 within every demographic0.
group, Knapp and Hansen hypothesize that K(O)l is a function
of K(o) as well as education. OLS regressions are run for all0.
demographic groups pooled with K(o)l as the dependent variable,
K«(0 and education as independent variables. The results show
- i· i*that K(o) affects K(o) positively, and education affects K(o)
negatively. Neither coefficient is significant at the 10% level.
These results suggest that typical wage regressions give biased coef-
ficients of education because education is actually picking up
the effects of OJT on wages.
A problem with this ~nalysis is that t equals l/r only if
C(t) is constant over time. There is no reason this should be
true. In fact, it seems more likely that total post-school
investment (and not just rate of investment) declines over time.
"In this case, t < l/r (see Mincer, p. 17) and if income continues
A-
to grow past the true t, income in t = l/r will be an overesti-
mate of E(o) and K(o) will be overestimated. Our assumptions will
be less. restrictive than Knapp and Hansen's regarding the timing
of investment.
Y{t){l+r)-t
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Charles BrownS (l976) presents an elaborate model of human
capital investment. He actually specifies a cost function for
human capital, and considers rate of growth in both returns to
and costs of human capital over time and cohort effects on OJT
determination. Finally, he attempts to estimate the parameters
of his model.
In this model, the worker maximizes the present value of
earnings.
N
(2.8) V = L
t=O
y{t) = net earnings at working at t
N is length of working life-
r is rate of interest, and
(2.9) Y{t) = R{l+g)t K{t) - C{t) gives net earnings in time t
where K{t) is the stock of human capital at age t
R is the rental price of human capital at time t=O
g is the rate of growth in the rental price of human capi-
tal due to labor and human capital augmenting technical progress,
price inflation, etc.
Rand g are assumed independent of hours worked by the
individual.
C{t) is the cost of investment
Investment is I(t) = K(t+l)-K(t)
B > 1
Equation 2.8 can be rewritten substituting 2.9 and 2.10 and
the resulting equation can be maximized with respect to I(t).
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Given K(o), this maximization process yields an optimum series of
let) which further implies an optimal path for yet).
(see Brown for intermediate steps):
This is
t-1
(2.11) yet) = (l_g)t{ R K(o)+C[ E
8=0
where
P(N-t) is the present value of a dollar per year for N-t
years
a - 1/B-1
C = R(R/a)a = a{R/a)aB
One more twist is added: K(o) is allowed to be a function
of the individual's cohort (year he started work). Call the
cohort v. Then
R(v) = R{o)(l+g)v
a{v) = a(o){l+g)v
K(o,v) = human capital of cohort v in t=O
K{o,v) might increase over v, for example, if skills pre-
viously learned in the labor market came to be learned in school.
On the other hand, in a sample selected by years of schooling,
K{o,v) might decline with v, as average schooling levels
increased throughout the economy, the "ability" range from which
the typical high school graduate is drawn may decline.
Then
t-l
(2.12) Y(t,v)= (l+9)v+t{R K{o,v)+C(o)[ L p{N-S)a - ~p(N_t)aB}
j=O
Using non-linear techniques, Brown estimates B, D, and C
-22-
using a 5225 member sample of the civilian non-institutional male
population age 14-24, originally interviewed in 1966, the sample
members include only those who had completed exactly 12 years of
schooling in 1966, were out of school in 1966 and who reported a
wage in 1966 and each of 3 subsequent survey dates.
Three different alternative assumptions were made about g.
(I) g is .13, the rate of growth in consumer prices between
1966 and 1969.
(2) g = .19, the rate of growth in average gross hourly ear-
nings in the private sector between 1966 and 1969.
(3) g = .32. This is based on the rate of increase of wages
of sample members age 20-24 in 1969 over wages of sample members
20-24 in 1966.
The results are:
Table 2.1 - Estimates of Parameters
Using Different Assumptions About Inflation
B
o
g =.13
1.792
1.010
g =.19
1.468
1.010
g =.32
1.149
1.010
In this model, OJT is completely determined by the parame-
ters. No allowance is made in this model for job change and loss
of specific human capital. 6 Our model will address this issue in
detail.
Bartel and Borjas7 (1977) are the first among these authors
to recognize that the return to OJT depends on the extent to
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which it is firm specific. Their model incorporates the notion
that benefits from specific OJT investment depend on expected
remaining tenure on the job.
In order to derive the optimal quantity of OJT, they first
model marginal cost and marginal revenue functions for OJT and
the expected time remaining on the job at time of OJT accumula-
tion. Total expenditure on OJT by the worker in time t is given
by the cost function:
(2.13) C = aA ~ a > 0, B > at B
where Qt = total number of units of OJT acquired by the workers
in t.
A is the fraction of total cost of OJT investment in time t
paid for by the worker, A~ 1.
A will be less than 1 if the firm pays for part of specific
OJT.
All general OJT will be paid for by the worker (see
discussion of firm investment in OJT below). If y is the propor-
tion of human capital investment which is specific and if a is
the employee's share in the cost of and returns to specific
training,
A = l-y(l-o)
where a is the percentage of specific OJT paid for by the worker.
Then the marginal cost of OJT to the worker is:
-rv
e dv
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( 2 • 14) QA Q B- 1
Let a o = the rental value on each unit of human capital.
Then, marginal return on general human capital is:
T-t
(2.15) a
o
= I
o
where r is the discount rate
t is the year of investment
T is the year of retirement (assumed known).
Before expressing the marginal return on specific capital,
define:
Tt = expected total duration of the current job as of time t
j = current job tenure in time t
So Tt - j is expected remaining job duration. Then the marginal
return on specific OJT is:
T* -j
(2.16) a
o
It e- rv dv
o
Since y of each unit of human capital is specific OJT and l-y
is general capital, the marginal return to an extra unit of human
capital is:
T*-J'
-t
I e -r'\lv+ a 0 yo a
o
Next Tt is modelled
( 2. 18) T* = T* (y, j ,1f , a)t t
1f is the individual's total prior work experience in time t.
y,j,a are as defined above.
(2.19)
aT*t
i] > 0,
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aT*t
chI'
>
< o
aT*
___t > 0 because likelihoods of quits and layoffs in anyay
peri09 are inversely related to proportion of human capital that
is specific.
aT*
aj t > 0 because amount of firm specific OJT is positively
related to tenure already completed on the job and expected
remaining job duration is positively related to specific OJT
already accumulated on the job. Therefore, total expected job
duration is a positive function of already completed job dura-
tion.
aT~
> 0 (with some exceptions discussed below) because
1T
incentives to quit are greater, cet. par., the younger the indi-
vidual. The reason is that the time span over which returns to
mobility are collected is inversely related to age at the times
of job change. So quits will be negatively related to prior work
experience.
aT~
The sign of is ambiguous. In this model, a, the shareaa
of investment for which the individual pays is equal to his share
of the returns, the greater the worker's share of the returns
(argue Bartel and Borjas) the more incentive the worker has to
avoid turnover and the less incentive the employer has to avoid
turnover.
Finally, Bartel and Borjas derive Qt (units human capital
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investment) and show some interesting partial derivatives.
Setting MRt=MC t
(2.20) Q
t
= MR~/B-l (aA) -l(B-l)
Taking partial derivatives with respect to n,j yield impli-
cations relevant to this thesis:
-r(T*-j)
a e 1: ]
+aQ aT·(2.21) t = G[a (y-l) e-r(T-t) + t a y
a11' 0 . a11' 0
where G (aA) -l/B-l ( B:l) • MR ~xp [(2-B)/B-l)]
The first term in equation (5) is the effect of n on the
returns to the general training portion of human capital investment.
It is negative since the older the individual ·is at time t, the
smaller payoff period to general training. The second term
operates through the functional dependence of T~ on n. We
have seen that T~ is likely to depend positively on n since the
gains from mobility decline with age. This result, however, is
limited by the finiteness of work life. Therefore, at younger
ages the effect of n on Qt via Tt is positive and the total
effect of n on 9t is ambiguous. At later stages of life, when
aT*t approaches 0 increase in age will have a negative effect on
aw
°t-
G[a (y-l)
o
-r( T-t)
e +
aT*(~- 1) a yo e-r(Tt -j)
a] 0
Equation 2.22 shows that j also has two opposing effects on Qt.
An increase in j, holding Tt constant, decreases Tt-j or
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expected remaining time on the job held in t. This, of course,
decreases the marginal return to specific human capital.
Further, an increase in j, holding age of retirement constant
increases n which decreases the marginal return to human capital.
This latter effect can be seen in the first term of 2.22 while
the former is incorporated in the second term.
However j may also increase T*. Bartel and Borjas impose
the assumption that for younger workers
aT~ar-- > 1, but
aT*t
aja1T < 0
(that aT*is, t declines as t approaches retirement age).
n-
If aT~ > 1, which is likely for younger workers, the
ar--
second term of 2.22 is positive because j increases expected
remaining job duration.
There are two major respects in which this model differs
from ours.
(1) The proportion of specific to general human capital
investment in any period is the same for every unit of invest-
mente In our model, general and specific OJT investment may take
place separately so that the worker can, in theory, increase spe-
cific OJT without any increase in general OJT and vice-versa.
Thus, we do not have an increase in experience increasing general
human capital through it's (usually) positive effect on Tt as
T~ is, at least, in theory irrelevant to general human capital
investment. In our model, if we were predicting the effect of
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experience on general human capital investment, it would be unam-
biguously negatively. We do recognize that ageing may, in theory,
increase investment in specific OJT.
It is true that, in practice, it is not always possible to
provide specific OJT without general training and vice versa.
However, it seems more unrealistic to impose the condition that
each unit of training is exactly the same mix of general/specific
than to assume they can be acquired separately.
(2) We will not assume that the worker's share of the return
to OJT is the same as his share of the costs. The wage will
depend only on total specific OJT. Therefore, an increase in
total firm specific OJT will decrease the probability of both
quits and layoffs in this thesis, but the division in costs bet-
ween firm and worker is irrelevant. Firms may pay for instance
wage premiums (in our model) above the share of the OJT cost
borne by the worker. The rationale for this is that both workers
and the firm include the probability of turnover as arguments in
their resp~ctive objective functions, and thus regard decrease in
turnover as one of the benefits of additional OJT investment.
Borjas and Bartel make one more important point: that spe-
cific OJT investment will be at a minimum in the last year of a
job (assuming that at that time, the worker knows he is going to
change jobs). At the start of the new job, y may increase
sharply. Therefore, specific OJT investment will not necessarily
decline through life.
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Part 2. Basis in the literature for the connection between
OJT and turnover.
Most articles concerned with OJT are based on Becker's
theory of general and specific on-the-job-training. 8
General OJT increases the future marginal product of workers
not only in the firm providing it, but in other firms as well.
Therefore, if a worker only had general OJT, the firm would have
to pay him at least his marginal revenue product in every period
or lose him to other firms.
Therefore, the firm will be unwilling to pay for general
training. Workers who acquire general training in to will either
,
have to pay for it outright, or accept a wage in t below MP
o 0,
the to marginal product by C (the total cost of the training).
However, not all OJT is general. "Clearly, some kinds of
training increase productivity more in firms providing it than in
other firms.,,9 Training that has no effect on the productivity
of trainees with other firms is called specific training. Firms
often provide OJT that is partly specific and partly genera.
Firms will in general share the costs of specific OJT.
The effect of investment on productivity in other firms
depends partly on regional market conditions. Very strong
monopsonists would be able to regard much of their training as
specific; since they do not compete with other firms for labo~,
workers cannot use training monopsonists provide with other firms
without incurring moving costs.
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If all training were general, turnover would be harmful
neither to the firm or the worker. A worker with only general
training who is laid off can, in theory, get an equally high wage
elsewhere. A firm that has workers with only general training
quit can, at no loss, hire equally competent workers.
However, the existence of specific training renders turnover
less desirable. A worker, to the extent that he pays for speci-
fic training (by accepting initial wages below marginal product)
gets "stuck" with useless firm specific OJT if he is laid off. A
firm, to the extent that it pays for specific OJT gets "stuck" if
a trainee quits, because it cannot replace the trainee without
paying for more training. Employers recognize that the likeli-
hood of a quit is not fixed, but depends on wages. Since it is
in the employer's interest to reduce turnover if he pays for OJT,
he might offer a worker, in whom he has invested, higher wages
than the worker could get elsewhere. This is equivalent to
offering the worker some of the returns from training. The
offering of higher wages would, however, make the supply of
trainees greater than the demand. To remedy this "the final step
would be to shift some training costs as well as returns to
employees, thereby bringing supply more in line with demand."
Thus firms and workers will tend to share specific training costs
and returns. Wages after the training period will be lower than
the current productivity and higher than the worker's alternative
wage, assuming that post-training productivity with the current
job is greater than productivity on alternative jobs.
-31-
Therefore, the more specific OJT a worker has, the less
likely, cet. par., he is to quit or be laid off and the higher
his wage. This assumption will be incorporated in our OJT model.
In a two-period model by Hashimoto (1981), specific OJT
investment is shared by worker and firm. 10 Also, he introduces
the assumptions that in the period in which the investment is
made, post-training (i.e., second period) productivity of worker
with the firm and the worker's alternative wage are unknown. We
shall use these assumptions below (in the Theory Chapter).
The actual value of the marginal product of the trainee, v,
to the firm in the second period is:
(2.23) v = H+(m+n)h = v+ hn
where:
H is units of completely general human capital
m = the average (expected) value of a unit of specific OJT
(done in t l ) to the firm
n is a random component with a density function ~(n)
E(n) = 0
m+n = actual value of a unit of OJT to the firm
h = units of specific OJT
v is the average value of the marginal product of the
trainee in the second period.
The wage of the worker at alternative employment is given by
(2.24) Y= H+£h
where
£ is some random component with a density function of ~(£)
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It seems illogical that h (units of specific OJT) should
A
affect earnings on alternative employment Y. Possibly, Hashimoto
is thinking that not all OJT that firms and workers suppose to be
firm specific is useless with other firms. He does not, however,
elaborate on this point.
The interpretation of a negative value of € is also
questionable. € < 0 implies that the alternative wage is less
than the value of general human capital by some fraction of h.
His model fails to take into account the possibility of ran-
dom shocks in demand by other firms, for workers with general
training (regardless ~f h). In our model, we allow the alter-
native wage to be a random variable even though specific OJT is
constrained to be useful only to the firm with which it was
acquired.
In Hashimoto's model, the wage of the worker who is still
with the firm in period 2 is w, where:
(2.25) w = H+aR
and R = mh
o < a < I
In other words, the increase of the period 2 wage with the
period I firm over the value of general training is some fraction
(a) of the average value of the specific training to the firm or
hm (where m and h are as defined above).
Before the second period, but after training, both the
actual value of the marginal product of the worker to the firm
A
(v+nh) and the true alternative wage of the worker (Y = H+€h)
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become apparent to the firm and the worker, respectively. Prior
to training (and when specific OJT decisions are made) only the
average values of ~ and Y (v = H+mh and Y = H) are known.
A A
When the true values of E and n (and therefore of Y and v)
A
become known, the worker knows the true alternative wage Y, and
the firm knows the employee's true contribution to profit v. The
worker will quit if the alternative wage is higher than w
A
(period 2 wage with the same firm) i.e., if w-Y < 0,
or if
(2.26) E > am = E*
The employer will dismiss the worker when the worker's
A
true MRP is less than w, i.e., if v - w < 0,
or if
(2.27) n < - (l-a)m = n*
These are both different from the jointly optimum separation
rulell or
A(2.28) v - Y < 0, i.e., m < (E-n).
A
V - Y is the difference between the value of the trainee to
the firm in period 2 and the trainee's value to alternative firms
(in perfect competition, his alternative wage) in period 2.
So the parties'may experience separations which would not
occur if a could be costlessly adjusted after the values of € and
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n became apparent. Hashimoto remarks that there is a moral hazard
problem if £ is known only to workers and n to firms; that is,
workers have an incentive to overstate £ and firms to understate
n. The parties may (since a cannot be costlessly adjusted)
impose external effects on each other by unilaterally separating
and cause a partial dissipation of the return from investment.
They will in this model choose a to minimize the dissipation of
the return. Hashimoto shows that the optimum value of a (worker's
share of return to specifit OJT) is equal to workers share in the
cost of specific OJT.
Parsons (1972) recognizes12 that quit and layoff probabili-
ties are inversely related to specific OJT accumulation. He esti-
mates the relation between these probabilities and variables
related to specific OJT. He hypothesizes:
(a) that both firm specific and general human capital are a
function of a worker's characteristics
(b) that industry layoff rates are a negative function of
employer owned firm specific human capital investment (i.e., gap
between marginal revenue product and wages) and
(c) that industry quit rates are a negative function of
employee owned specific human capital investment (i.e., net value
of the sum of the difference between wages in each year with the
current firm and the alternative wage).
The firm maximizes the present value of profit over two
periods, although it exists before and after these two periods.
It faces the constraint that once a trainee is laid off, any
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training benefits to the firm may be unrecoverable even should it
be profitable to rehire the worker; only a certain percentage of
the pool of laid off trainees, a, will remain unemployed and
available for rehiring in future periods.
The max problem for the firm is
(2.29) L= 22t-l (P Q - W - W S - e •t t It 2t 2t t-l
where: Pt = price of product in t
Qt = output in t
WIt = wage of trained workers in tl
W2t = wage of trainees in t
SIt = number of trained workers in t
S2t = number of trainees in t
e is the direct cost of each layoff to the firm
(consisting of severence pay, increased contributions
to unemployment insurance and processing costs of each
layoff)
lyt = number of layoffs in t
=
Il+r (r is the discount rate)
R2 is the number of workers rehired in t2 from the pool
of laid off workers
D2 is a non-negative slack variable
Z2 is the rehire pool in t2
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where ZQ is the pool of trainees available for rehire in time Q
and e is the per period retention rate of workers in the pool.
e < 1.
In other words, out of the original pool from time 0, ZO~
e2zo are still unemployed in t2. This is part of the rehire pool
in t2 (i.e., Z2). Workers who were laid off in tl (if any) and
who have not found other jobs are another part of the rehire pool
in t2. There are elYl of these. On the other hand, if rehires
rather than layoffs took place in tl, Z2 is decreased by eRl.
Note that only laid off workers can be rehired. No one who
quit can come back to this firm even if he is laid off by the new
firm(s).
All tl trainees still with the firm in t2 are considered
trained workers in t2 so:
(2.31) SIt = 51, t-l + S2,t-l - qt - lYt + Rt
qt = quits in time t
Parsons implicitly assumes all trainees are identical and all
trained workers are identical; there are no discharges for cause,
only layoffs due to "insufficient" demand. No mention is made of
the decision of which particular trainees or trained workers to
layoff.
The quit function for trainees in tis:
(2.32) qt = q(w ,
2t
+
w ,
3t
w
1, t+l
+
w
3t+l
+
I
Y
t+l
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where: W2t is the wage paid to trainees in t
W3t is the alternative wage in t
wI, t+l is the wage paid to trained workers in t+1 (by
which time those who were trainees in time t are
finished with training and considered trained workers)
w3, t+1 is the alternative wage in t+1
(Assume wI, t+1 and w3, t+l are known with certainty)
lyt+1 is the expected number of layoffs in period t+l.
Industries in which workers believe there will be many future
layoffs will have a high quit rate.
The signs over the variables denote the signs of the respective
partial derivatives.
The supply schedule of trainees takes a similar form:
(2.33) S
2,t
+
= S(w ,
2,t
+
w , w ,
3,t I,t+l
w ,
3,t+1
I
Y
t+l
w = wage in t for trainees
2t
The Lagrangian (2.29) is maximized substituting in equations
(2.30) to (2.33).
The firm's choice variables are WI,t, WI,t+l, W2,t, lYt'
lyt+I,R2, D2. Since corner solutions for a number of these
variables are possible (i.e., D2 = 0, lYt+1 = 0), non-linear
programming techniques are appropriate.
Parsons derives the Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions for a
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profit maximum (not reproduced here). They imply that if the net
marginal contribution of trained workers to profit in t2 times the
proportion of trained workers who would be lost forever if laid
off (I-e), is positive, layoffs in tl will not be non-zero unless
the loss in tl 'profit from keeping a marginal worker on is nega-
tive and large enough in absolute value to offset future losses
from current layoff.
After setting down this basic model, Parsons derives industry
quit rates and layoff rates as a function of observable values in
the following manner:
(2.34) ly = f(Sf)
where ly is the industry layoff rate
SF is average industry quantity of firm owned
specific OJT MP-W
ly/ Sf < 0
( 2 • 35 ) q = q ( SW)
where q is the industry quit rate
Sw is worker owned specifit OJT
Sw = W - (WA - Te)
W is the wage with the current firm
WA is the highest wage with alternative firms
TC is transfer costs of a job change to the individual
aq/ Sw < 0
Parsons hypothesizes that:
(2.36) W = alG + a2SW
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where G = general human capital of the worker
Rearrange terms:
W-a G
1
8 = a
w 2
Parsons assumes that al a2' i.e., that general and specific
human capital investments are about equally profitable. (This
seems questionable, due to the extra risk involved in worker
investment in specific capital, specific capital investors should
require a premium, i.e., a2 > aI, unless they are risk lovers.)
If a ~ a ,
1 2
W
8 = a - G Further,
W 2
G _ T - S
where T = total human capital and 8 = specific human capital
W
(2.37) 80 8 = a - T + 8
W 2
For a particular industry, T and 8 are hypothesized to have the
following functions
+ + +
mean mean
(2.38) 8 = 8(wage, Education, %managers in industry, mean job
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+ + + +
tenure, capital-labor ratio, %rural, industry unioni-
+
zation index, industry concentration ratio, %young,
+ ? ?
%old, %white, %female)
+ + +
(2.38A) T = T(mean education, %professional, %managers, mean job
+ + +
tenure, capital-labor ratio, %south, union index, con-
+ + ?
centration ratio, %white, %female, %young, %old)
(2.39) Since (MP-W) = SF = S - SW,
SF = S + T
aSf 1 aT
and + -, if X w= ax 1 =aXC a2
aSF 3T
otherwise =
aXi aXi
From (2.37)
(2.40) ~=
3SW
for all X' but W1
and from (2.39' )
dl 1 T
(2.41) = r )
dXi) Sw Xc
Using 47 Census Bureau 3 digit manufacturing industries,
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Parsons regresses quit and layoff rates on these Xi variables and
w. The dependent variables are quits per 100 workers and layoffs
per 100 workers.
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Table 2.2 - Regressions Results Effects of Personal
Characteristics on Industry Quit & Layoff
Rates
A. Quit Rate Regressions
1959 1963
+
Coefficient Value
+
Coefficient Value
Constant 5.00 5.10 4.8290 4.17
Income -.0004 -2.63
Education .0799 .80 -.0111 - .12
Capital/Worker -.0179 -3.13
%Managers -.0424 -1.70 -.0166 - .58
%Professionals .0247 2.67 .0227 2.10
Tenure .0258 1.09 .0368 1.33
%Younger .0368 1.96 .0289 1.47
%South -.0030 -1.40 -.0022 - .65
%Rural -.0080 -1.76 -.0026 - .49
Concentration
ratio -.0135 -4.38 -.0152 -4.25
White -.0268 -3.36 -.0181 -1.98
Female -.0054 -1.34 -.0067 -1.68
1959
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B. Layoff Rate Regressions
1963
+ +
Coefficient Value Coefficient Value
Constant 4.9360 1.19. 1.5160 .44
Income .0015 3.71
%Production
Workers .0419 3.73
Education -.8373 -2.60 -.6440 -2.63
%Professional .1461 4.00 .1431 5.00
Capital/
Worker -.00005 -1.97 -.0003 -2.26
%Younger .0932 1.52 .0602 1.18
%01der .1263 2.28 .1230 2.66
Tenure .0896 1.09 .1610 2.37
%White -.0579 -2.18 -.0266 -1.14
Union .0146 1.17 .0041 .42
Concentration
Ratio -.0380 -3.06 -.0230 -2.44
-44-
The results for the quit regressions are as expected. An
increase in earnings decreases the quit rate, but only very
slightly (by .0004).
Industry quit rates in 1959 decline by .0424 for each
increase in the proportion of workers who are managers and
increase by .0247 for each incr€ase in the proportion who are pro-
fessionals. This suggests a strong correlation between percent
managers and specific OJT and a correlation between percent pro-
fessionals and general OJT. An increase in the percent rural
workers decreases the quit rate by .008. As Parsons suggests,
percent rural may have a negative coefficient because rural
workers are isolated and have limited access to information about
alternative jobs.
An increase in the concentration ratio decreases the quit
rate by .0135 and an increase in percent white decreases the quit
rate by .0268. Results for the 1963 regressions are s1milar
except that the coefficients of percent managers and percent rural
are insignificant.
For the 1959 layoff regressions an increase in earnings
increases the layoff rate slightly by .0015 consistent with the
hypothesis that earnings are positively related to worker owned
specific OJT. An increase in mean education decreases the layoff
rate by .8373. An increase in percent professionals increases
lyt by .1461, but an increase in the capital worker ratio
decreases the layoff rate. The industry layoff rate is positively
related "to the percentage older workers, possibly because "sunset
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industries" have a large proportion of older percent workers. An
increase in the percent of older workers by 1, decreases the
layoff rate by .1263 and a 1% increase in the concentration ratio
decreases the layoff rate by .0380.
Parsons does not allow the future alternative wage or the
post-training marginal revenue product to vary. (We will assume
both are random variables.) His model, however, is very similar
to ours in spirit. Layoff and quit rates are a function of speci-
fic capital which in turn is a function of individual charac-
teristics. His interest is in the effect of average industry
levels of various personal characteristics on industry layoff and
quit rates, and it is layoffs and quits that are the decision
variable for the firm rather than OJT investment.
Our contribution will be a model of specific OJT investment
considering the interests of both the firm and the worker. In
particular, we examine how theses interests are affected by the
effect of specific OJT on layoffs and quits.
section B. Empirical Literature
The relevant empirical literature can be divided into
two parts: 1) articles presenting wage (or wage growth)
regressions that include layoffs and quits among the
independent variables1 and 2) articles presenting empirical
evidence on the relation of level of human capital
investment to job tenure.
The first article in part 1 by Black, makes no
distinction between workers by age, race or occupation. By
including all sample members in each regression, he appears
to assume that turnover affects workers of all ages, races
and occupations equally. Cooke, on the other hand restricts
his sample to a specific occupational group, scientists and
engineers. In chapter 3, we will show that such a
restriction should improve the results; how much one has to
lose from a layoff or quit depends on one's occupation.
The Cooke article, however, is flawed in the use of
level of yearly earnings as the dependent variable. It is
possible that low earnings individuals get laid off more
than high earnings individuals; if so, Cooke's results that
those with past layoffs earn less than immobile individuals
may be due to spurious correlation between earnings and
layoffs.
Jacobsen also runs regressions with the level of yearly
earnings as the dependent variable. His contribution is
recognizing that loss from leaving an industry varies by:
a) how recent the departure was;
b) which industry the worker left.
The Blau and Kahn article uses the difference in the log
wage between t 1 and t 2 as the dependent variable. This
(unlike the methods used by Cooke and Jacobsen) takes into
account differences in the individuals' wages prior to the
layoff and can thus more closely estimate the true loss from
a layoff.
Blau and Kahn also recognize that the effect of a
layoff may differ between males and females and between
whites and blacks; they disaggregate their sample
accordingly. Further, they restrict their sample to workers
age 14-24, recognizing that age may affect a worker's
resiliency after a layoff.
In part 2, Borjas attempts to measure the OJT
accumulated by older men on past jobs and to relate the
quantity of the OJT to past job mobility.
Borjas and Bartel investigate the relationship between
turnover and previous wage growth in order to shed light on
the relationship between OJT and the tendency to change
jobs. Lastly, Bartel regresses growth of earnings on the
job and between job on dummies denoting job mobility
patterns. This yields further information about the
relationship of OJT and job mobility.
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PART 1
Wage Regressions Using Turnover Variable
Matthew Black, 13 (1980) discusses the effects of quits on
the ratio of log of 1973 wage rate to log of 1971 wage rate
using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics from the University
of Michigan. He hypothesizes that:
1. Returns to quitting are increased by prior on-the-job
search, i.e., effort to find a new job while still
employed on the old job.
2. Returns to quitting are limited by exploitable market
wage opportunities specific to a worker's skills,
i. e., by how much he is being underpaid on his current
job relative to the average worker with his skills.
This is measured by ~Wt where:
Wm t is the predicted value obtained from regressing the
1971 wage rate against human capital, local wages for
unskilled labor, personal background characteristics and all
of the above interacted with a race dummy, and Wt is the
actual wage in 1981. ~Wt is a proxy for the opportunity
cost of staying with one's 1971 job. Therefore gains from
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"quitting should be directly related to 6Wt.
"
unfortunately, Wrn t may be a flawed measure of what an
individual is "worth" in the market; if Wt is <Wrn t , it may
be because of unmeasured characteristics rather than
placement in the wrong job.
Returns to quitting are limited by the number of
vacancies which is related to the local unemployment rate.
Black's model is:
where:
In (Wt +2 /Wt ) = log of ratio of wage rate in time
t+2 to wage rate in time t.
EXP t = years work experience in time t.
HS t = health status in time t
6U t +2 = change in local unemployment rate between time
t and time t+2.
POP t = population in time t
EDt = education in time t
rOt = TQ in time t
Z = is the product of a column vector which is equal to
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the transpose of [1, S, Q, S.O] and a row vector
A
[1, ~Wt' Ut ' ~Wt Ut ]
where
Ut = unemployment rate in time t in local labor market
S = 1 if person conducted on the job search but did not
quit, 1971-1973
Q = 1 if person quit without prior job search, 1971-
1973
S·Q = 1 if person conducted OJS and then quit, 1971-
1973.
Those who quit after OJS are presumably better informed
than those who quit without prior search, so we expect the
coefficient of S.Q to be greater than that of Q. The higher
the rate of unemployment in one's local labor market, the
less the return from quitting, so the coefficient of O.u
should be less than that of Q. The higher ~Wt' the higher
A
should be the returns from quitting so Q.~Wt should have a
higher coefficient than Q.
Black uses a data source of 425 black and 1084 white
males. Although he does not say he has eliminated workers
who were laid off between 1971 and 1973, he calls workers
who did not quit "immobile" which suggests those laid off
were excluded from the sample.
Regressions are run using different combinations of Z,
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~Wt and Ut to denote quits and market opportunities.
The results for selected variables in 2 of the
equations are.
Table 2.3: Regression REsults for Search and Ouite
variables
I. Variable
Q
s
Q x S
Coefficient (t ratio)
-.187 (4.64)
-0.56 (2.09)
-.049 (.92)
II 0 -.226 (4.96)
S -.092 (2.97)
0 x S -.166 (2.81)
A
t1W .056 (2.46)
A
S x /lW .170 (2.92)
A
Q x /lW .123 (1.37)
S x Q x ~W .478 (4.26)
Q x Ut .169 (1.63)
S x Ut .074 (1.19)
S x Q x Ut -.307 ( .92 )
Q x /lW x Ut -.287 (-2.40)
A
S x Q x /lW x Ut .555 (1.43)
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Equation I, suggests that those who only quit or only
searched did significantly worse than those who did neither,
while those who both quit and searched had wage growth which
was not significantly different fram immobile workers who
conducted no job search. Black speculates that this bleak
view for quitters was due to the slack labor markets in
1971-1973. It seems odd that those immobile workers who
conducted on-the-job search did worse than immobile workers
who did not. One possible explanation is that immobile
searchers with few skills were induced to search by low wage
growth, rather than hurt by the search per see The low wage
growth searcher who does not find a "better", higher paying
job is stuck with the current, low wage growth job.
A
In equation II,· 6Wt and U are added, both on their own
and interactively with the search and quit variables. Q x S
becomes negative and significant at the 1% level. This
suggests that many people either quit for non-precuniary
reasons or are ill-informed even after on-the-job search.
The impact of quitting and searching seems to be heavily
dependent on 6W as can be seen from the relatively large
and significant coefficient of S x Q x 6W.
The interaction coeffcients of S x 6W x U
and Q x 6W x U are significant and negative with
unreasonably large coefficients. The problem may be with
the interactive inclusion of the unemployment rate, as this
implies that each additional increment of a percentage point
in unemployment decreases the gain to quit/search behavior
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equally, no matter whether the current unemployment rate is
3% or 20%. One possible solution to this would be to use
dummies for different levels of unemployment.
Cooke, 14 (1980) has no formal model but hypothesizes
that voluntary turnover leads to higher earnings as a result
of rational investment decisions. Involuntary turnover, on
the other hand, is presumed to lead to earnings loss because
(a) the decision· to change jobs is not that of the employee,
(b) some discharges act as negative signals to prospective
employers, and (c) permanent layoffs are a function of
unfavorable market conditions which limit re-employment
opportunities.
Cooke also attempts to test whether search unemployment
results in increased earnings or weakens the worker's
bargaining position with prospective employers. He
hypothesizes that long periods of search unemployment are
more likely to depict serious re-employment problems (i.e.,
structural unemployment) whereas short periods may depict
normal search activities (i.e., frictional unemployment).
Thus, long periods of search unemployment are expected to
have a larger detrimental effect on wages than short
periods.
His data came from the National Longitudinal Study of
Scientists and Engineers (NLSSE) and fram a 1% systematic
survey of membership of some professional engineering
societies, henceforth referred to as SEP.
The following model is tested.
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where:
In (E j ) = natural log of gross salary in year j
j = 1972 in NLSSE sample, j=1976 in SEP sample
S = years schooling
EXP = years of professional experience
o = 1 if quit previous job without experiencing search
unemployment
O/Ul = 1 if quit previous job followed by search
unemployment up to 6 months
0/U2 = if quit previous job with search unemployment
greater than 6 months
LO = 1 if laid off from previous job without search
unemployment
LO/Ul = 1 if laid off from previous job with up to 6
months search unemployment
LO/U2 = 1 if laid off from previous job with more than
6 months search unemployment.
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The results for the turnover variables are
Table 2.4: Regression Results for Quit, Layoff and
Unemployment Variables
NLSSE SEP
---------------------- ----------------------
Coefficient t value coefficient t value
0 -.04 8.075 .006 .37
0/U1 -0.21 10.3 -0.36 .565
0/U2 -.33 8.44 -.27 2.45
LO -.13 12.635 -.09 3.03
LO/U1 -.185 15.08 - .18 4.27
LO/U2 -.3934 15.21 -.26 4.47
Superficially these results seem to support the
hypothesis that search employment, particularly of long
duration, is harmful to wage prospects and that the effect
of a layoff is worse than that of a quit.
One possible problem with this analysis is that those
who reported some search unemployment may be more likely,
than others to experience some unemployment (and, cet. par,
a shorter working year than average) in 1972 (NLSSE) or 1976
(SEP). Those who worked fewer than average hours because of
unemployment would be expected to have yearly lower salaries
regardless of the effect of unemployment on the wage rate.
A second problem is that turnover/unemployment may be
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picking up unmeasured productivity differences between
workers which would affect wages. In our work, as a partial
solution to this problem, we shall use growth in log wage
rate rather than level of log earnings. Since "unmeasured
characteristics" that remain constant in every year should
affect the log wage the same in every year, their effect
should be cancelled out by subtracting log wage in one year
form log wage in another year.
Louis Jacobsen 15 divided his sample 16 into those
workers who changed industries between 1962 and 1964 and
those who did not. Then, he divides industry leavers into
those whose initial industry had grown in total employment
in their SMSA of residence and those for whom this
employment had shrunk. This first group of industry leavers
is called rise leavers; most of them have presumably left
due to quits, illness, retirement or firing for cause.
Jacobsen refers to industry leaving voluntarily or by
illness or firing for cause as attrition.
The group who left a shrinking industry is called fall
leavers. Many of the workers in this group left the
industry because of layoffs solely due to industry
contraction. Such workers are, in Jacobsen's terms, subject
to displacement. Similarly, those who did not change
industry, (industry stayers) are divided into rise-stayers
and fall-stayers. using prime age males from the Social
Security System's Leeds file and disaggregating by industry,
Jacobsen regressed earnings in 1965 on:
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1) earnings one year before leaving the industry
2) earnings two years before leaving the industry
3) earnings three years before leaving the industry
4) dummies denoting year worker left industry (1960-65)
5) race dummy
6) dummies for being a rise leaver, fall leaver and fall
stayer.
A separate regression was run for each industry. From
these regressions, Jacobsen calculates the loss in earnings
due to displacement for each industry. It turns out that in
industries where losses of fall-Ieavers were large, those of
rise-Ieavers were too and vice-versa. In 8 out of 11
industries, rise leavers lost more than fall leavers which
suggests that workers who quit or were fired for cause had
lower alternative wages than those who were displaced. This
is not altogether surprising as workers fired for cause are
probably, as a rule, less able than the average displaced
person, but it seems odd that quitters would ever do worse
than displaced workers. possibly, some voluntary industry
leaving is self-selection out by less able workers.
Finally, correlations were calculated between
percentage income losses of industry fall leavers and: the
attrition rate in that industry, or ATTRITION (i.e.,
percentage of workers that leave that industry by attrition)
percent prime age male employment in that industry
(PRIMALE), and average earnings in that industry (EARNINGS).
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The results are shown below:
Table 2.5: Correlation Between % Loss and Attrition
Rates, Earnings and % Prime Age Miles
% LOSS ATTRITION PRIMALE EARNINGS
------ --------- ------- --------
% LOSS 1.000
ATTRITION -.821 1.000
PRIMALE .774 -.760 1.000
EARNINGS .435 -.550 .598 1.000
% LOSS was positively correlated with PRIMALE.
Jacobsen claims that industries in which a large percentage
of employees are prime age males contain a large proportion
of production workers and that production workers invest
most heavily in specific training. If so, this positive
correlation is consistent with the theory that loss from
displacement is directly related to industry specific OJT
investment.
% LOSS was negatively correlated with ATTRITION. Since
it is well documented in theory that job attachment should
be directly correlated with quantity of specific training,
we would expect the industry attrition rate to be negatively
related to specific training. This is consistent with a
negative correlation between ATTRITION and % LOSS.
A drawback of this simple correlation is that nothing
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is held constant. Jacobsen also performs a multiple
correlation of earnings, ATTRITION and PRIMALE with %
LOSS. The results are not shown, but he reports that the
correlation of EARNINGS and % LOSS become insignificant in
the multiple correlation. Jacobsen speculates that this is
evidence that loss of specific human capital is responsible
for the earnings loss rather than an indication that workers
displaced from a job with high earnings have difficulty
finding another high wage job. It seems as likely, however,
that multicollinearity is responsible.
Unlike the other authors mentioned, Jacobsen takes
account of the year of the job separation. Also, the
disaggregation by industry does take some account of
specific capital differences of individuals since some
industries provide more industry specific capital than
others. The division of workers between industry stayers,
displaced workers, and workers who had attrition is useful
since it seems unlikely that displacement is a signal that a
worker is incompetent. Displaced workers left their
industry because of economic conditions although it is true
that in hard times, poorer workers may be let go first,
union rules permitting.
Unfortunately, nothing can be said from these results,
about people who change job/occupation but not industry,
differences between the effects of layoffs and quits, or how
the number of job changes affects income loss. We shall
address all of these issues in our empirical work.
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Note that the dependent variable in the regressions is
yearly earnings rather than hourly wage as in the other
articles we examine here (except Cooke). This means that
loss due to displacement includes not only loss in the
hourly wage, but also loss due to decreased hours of work or
to unemployment.
It is surprising that inclusions of earnings in all
three years prior to leaving does not render all
coefficients insignificant, since past income levels are
bound to be correlated with each other. However, these
lagged income variables do control for personal
characteristics that may not be picked up by the other
variables.
Blau and Kahn, 17 (1981) investigate the consequences
of layoffs. They use the 1969-73 NLS for young men and
young women (14-24 years old) and are interested not only in
the effects of layoffs on current wages but also on long run
income prospects.
Their
2.44A .6ln
J( ~
r'I'ot1iP 1(, 1 1'/-1 'bJ ,.",~ ~,L- 'J
modellBS9.~4g (Z, L)
2Y aee = g (Z, L)
where Z is a vector of various exogenous
characteristics (e.g., education, experience, tenure).
L = 1 if the person had a layoff between 1970 and the
second survey date (which was in 1972-73)
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WI = 1970 wage rate
W2 = 1972 or 1973 wage rate
Aln Y acc = log of median 1970 earnings in the
individual's t 2 occupation-log of median 1970 earnings in
the individual's t l occupation.
According to search theory, the expected return to
searching, net of search costs, is likely to be negative for
those laid off, as otherwise the worker would have quit.
However, it is possible that the absolute wage change is
positive. So the regressions coefficient of L may not be
negative.
Those who quit during the survey period are excluded
from the sample as it was impossible to tell if they would
have been laid off had they not quit.
The resulting coefficients 18 of the layoff dummies
are:
Table 2.6: Effects of Layoffs by Sex and Race
Demographic Group Coeffi cients
AlnW A In Y acc
white males -.0981 -.0567
black males -.0420 -.0341
white females .0152 .0221
black females -.0373 .1127
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Both coefficients are significant at the 1% level for
white males and the one for ~ln y acc is significant at
the 5% level for black females. Thus we have evidence that
layoffs hurt both short run and long run incom~ prospects
for white males, and long run income prospects for black
females •
. Having the change of In Wand In YOCC as dependent
variables eliminates one source of bias, i.e., wages being
correlated with unmeasured characteristics that also may be
related to layoffs (a problem with the Cooke article). If
such characteristics exist but do not change between 1969
and 1973 for any individual and affect both the initial and
end log wage equally, their effect will be cancelled when
first differencing.
Also, these regressions are confined to a certain age
group which controls somewhat for the effect of age on
accumulation of specific human capital and remaining length
of work life.
These regressions do not take into account the number
of layoffs or examine the effects of quits on wage growth.
Our study will include regressions with numbers of quits and
layoffs.
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PART 2
Empirical Evidence on Relation of Turnover
To OJT Accumulation
George Borjas 19 (1978) examines how the pattern of
lifetime mobility influences OJT accumulation. In
particular, he attempts to show that individuals with many
job changes tend to acquire less OJT than less mobile
individuals.
He hypothesizes that men do not have OJT profiles that
are continually declining through life even though most OJT
is accumulated when young. This is because those who change
jobs also may start on a new course of OJT as ~ifferent jobs
provide different training opportunities. Most training
will be concentrated at the beginning of any particular job
since the earlier training takes place, the more time the
worker has on the job with enhanced productivity. Even if
periodic retraining ,is necessary some time after, (when job
tenure is already long) this retraining is unlikely to be as
extensive as the initial training.
Borjas models Kit' the ratio of dollars of investment
to potential earnings in year t of the ith job.
2.45 KIt = K . - B. (t)
01 1
where:
Koi = proportion of potential earnings spent in
investment activities on the first year of the ith job.
Bi = rate of decline per year (on the ith job) of the
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proportion of potential earnings spent on investment in new
OJT.
Koi measures the intensity of OJT investment on the ith
job and Bi measures the tendency to decrease investment in
OJT with each successive year on the ith job.
Borjas tries to estimate Koi for workers with different
patterns of job mobility. He hypothesizes that Koi is a
function of timing of the job in the life cycle (measured by
amount of labor force experience prior to the ith job) and
expected completed duration of the ith job (because some OJT
is firm specific and not worth acquiring for short tenure
workers). Specifically:
where: a. is a constant
1
t* is expected completed duration of the ith job
n is labor force experience prior to starting the ith
job.
So: for any time t on job i, ratio of investment in OJT
to potential earnings is:
*2.47 Kit = a· + p. t. - aiRi - B.t1 1 1 1
So current OJT accumulation is a positive function of
current tenure on the current job because current tenure is
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positively correlated with *t. and negatively with past work
1
experience, including that on the current job.
The relationship of OJT to potential earnings is:
2.48
t
= In E + r L
s t=O
where:
Et = earnings capacity at time t
r = ra te of return on OJT
ES = earnings capacity at t=O (t=O when the individual
enters the labor force after completing s years of school)
Kt = ratio of OJT investment to potential earnings in
time t.
Substituting 2.47 into 2.48 and integrating, Borjas
gets an equation that suggests (see Borjas for mathematics)
that earnings in time t are a function of:
(1) duration of each job in the life cycle, ei'
*(because ei is positively related to t i which is positively
re la ted to Koi)
(2) the square of duration on each job 2e.
1
(because as
tenure increases prior work experience increases which
decreases Koi)
(3) interaction of duration of ith job and experience
prior to the ith job (because increases in experience prior
to ith job decreases Koi)
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When we adjusted the model to estimate actual rather
than potential earnings 20 (see Borjas, p 368-69) we see
that actual earnings in time t are a function of tenure (and
tenure squared) on each job held up to and including time t
and the interaction between tenure on each job and past work
experience.
Further, Borjas's mathematics implies that when actual
earnings in time t are regressed on the above variables
(plus control variables, e.g. education) and values are
assumed for Band r, the Koi for different jobs can be
calculated from the coefficients of the above tenure and
experience variables (see Borjas for method).
The data are taken from the NLS Survey of Mature Men
(45-59 years of age) and are restricted to white men who are
working, but not self-employed, in 1966. Borjas divides the
men into the following four mobility patterns. An
individual followed either: mobility pattern 1 if his first
job after leaving school, his longest and his current jobs
are all the same job, pattern 2 if longest and current job
are the same but first job was different, pattern 3 if his
first and longest job were the same but current job was
different and pattern 4 if all three jobs were difference.
The dependent variables are RATE = usual log wage rate
in 1966 and the independent variables include:
EXPER = experience since completion of school, in years
FIRST = duration of first job after completion of
school, in years, if first job is different from current one
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GAPA = time between completion of first job and start
of longest/current job
LONGEST = duration of longest job ever, if longest job
is different from first and current job
GAPB = time between end of longest job and start of
current job
INTER (i) = interaction term pertaining to the ith job;
tenure on the ith job multiplied by experience prior to the
ith job
and other personal characteristics
Regressions were run separately on each of the mobility
groups and also pooled. From these, values of Koi are
calculated assuming r = .10 and rB/2 = .0010, .0015 and
.0020. These estimates cover the range of those found in
the literature of unsegmented earnings functions (see
Mincer).
- 66 -
As expected, he find that the less mobile groups have
higher Koi
Table 2.7: Intensity of Investment by Mobility Pattern
Segment rB/2 = .001 rB/2 = .0015 rB/2 = .002
------------------- -----------
Pattern 1 .180 .180 .180
Pattern 2
First .159 .175 .191
GAPA .098 .159 .220
Current (same as
longest) .157 .198 .239
Pattern 3
First (same as
longest)
-.204 -.114 -.025
GAPA .032 .069 .106
Current .072 .045 .024
Pattern 4
First
-.279 -.265 -.250
GAPA
-.096 -.046 .004
Longest
-.023 .038 .099
GAPB
-.086 -.009 -.034
Current
-.076 -.107 -.137
For every job, under every assumption about rB/2, Koi
is largest for pattern 1 individuals, next largest for
pattern 2 individuals and least for pattern 4 individuals.
From this, Borjas concludes that more mobile individuals
invest the least in OJT. Recall that Koi is an estimate of
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the proportion of potential earnings invested in OJT at the
start of each job
It is unclear how to interpret negative values of
Koi. Borjas suggests that these arise because the ratio Koi
is net of depreciation, but there is insufficient
information to determine this.
The most striking problem with this analysis is that it
takes no account of the fact that firm specific OJT is lost
when an individual changes jobs. Therefore, the regressions
of the actual 1966 log wage rate on tenure and experience on
past jobs fail to pick up specific OJT; consequently, most
of the Koi ratios are net of specific OJT. Remember that
truly firm specific capital from past jobs will be
completely irrelevant to the current wage rate. The fact
that the Koi are smallest for the most mobile is evidence
only that the more mobile accumulate less general human
capital, as the estimated values of Koi are based on the
1966 log wage regression coefficients.
Tenure on a particular job should be correlated with
the amount of specific OJT on that job, but it is not an
exact measure. Other factors besides large stocks of firm
specific OJT could keep a worker on one job for most of his
life, such as inertia or attachment to co-workers. Also,
there are factors other than tenure that affect specific OJT
such as occupation and ability. Borjas does not take these
into account. Still, he does consider the effect of a
personal characteristic (i.e., job mobility) on OJT. He
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also recognizes the effect of age on OJT investment in
restricting the sample to mature men.
Borjas' model of OJT assumes that Koi decreases by the
same amount each year on a job---an assumption that seems
questionable. Also, it would be useful to know the timing
of changes in jobs other than the three mentioned here
(although that is not given in the NLS) as well as what went
on in the gaps between the three jobs (employment, training,
etc) and whether or not the job separations were .
voluntary. Further, since the data cover the life history
of labor for older men, it perhaps should be recognized that
some OJT in early years is subject to significant
depreciation. This depreciation could, as Borjas suggested,
have something to do with the negative value of Koi for some
jobs for the more mobile groups. Our work will include
regressions of change in log wage on different measures of
turnover (among other variables). This confronts loss of
specific capital from a job change. In our OJT model, we
have no such restrictive linear decline in OJT acquisition
with each year on the job as Borjas does. We do not have
data over the entire work cycle as in the NLS, but we do
have approximate timing of job changes in our sample and we
distinguish between layoffs and quits.
In an NBER working paper, Borjas and Bartel 21 do
several tests of the proposition that mobility is inversely
related to specific OJT and therefore to wage growth. Also,
their data (NLS older and young men) allow them to analyze
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pffect of quits by reason for quit.
Their theory of OJT accumulation is identical to that
in the Borjas article reviewed earlier, but the empirical
work is more solid. Their dependent variables are wage rate
growth and growth in log wage rate rather than wage level,
and they distinguish between quits and layoffs.
Their independent variables include
PER = 1 if the individual quit a job for personal
reasons
PUSH = 1 if the individual quit because of
dissatisfaction with current job
PULL =1 if the individual quit because he found a
better job
LAYOFF = 1 if the individual changed jobs involuntarily
067 = 1 if observation refers to 1967-69
069 = 1 if observation refer to 1969-71
and other individual characteristics.
Bartel and Borjas focus on the time period 1967-73.
The interval between 1967 and 1973 is partitioned into three
two year intervals, 1967-69, 1969-71, and 1971-73.
In the first group of (table 2.8) regressions,
information in each of these intervals is pooled across the
intervals in their sample, tripling the number of
observations. It is not obvious that this improves the
quality of the results since labor market conditions were
very different in the three periods. The regressions do, at
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least include dummies (067 and 069) for the information from
the 1967-69, 1969-71 periods.
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Table 2.8: The Effects of Turnover on Wage Growth Across
Jobs Comparing Movers and Stayers (Dependent variable
= /J.W or /J.lnW)
Absolute Growth Percentage Growth
--------------- -----------------
( 1 ) ( 2 )
A. NLS Young Men (n = 3,665)
LAYOFF -.0485 -.0322
(-.64) (-1.72)
PERS -.3605 -.1284
(-3.19) ( -4 .59)
PUSH .0540 .0055
( • 72 ) ( .30)
PULL .2984 .0688
(4.09) (3.81)
B. NLS Mature Men (n = 4.745)
LAYOFF -.1927 -.0982
(-2.13) (-4.04)
PERS
-.4651 -.1953
(-2.82) (-4.43)
PUSH
-.0973 -.0283
(-.79) (-.85)
PULL .5999 .0711
(3.46) (1.53)
The values in parentheses are t statistics.
In regressions (1) and (2), there are three quit
dummies, PUSH = 1 if the individual had a job-related quit
that was motivated by dislike of the job, PULL = 1 if a job
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related quit was motivated by a higher wage offer from
another firm, and PERS=l if a quit occurred for personal
rather than job related reasons
It is expected that PULL will have a positive
coefficient.
These expectations are borne out by the regressions
coefficients for both the younger group and the older
group. LAYOFF has a negative, significant coefficient for
the older workers, but is insignificant for the younger
workers in equatin 1.
In the second group of regressions (table 2.9) for
which coefficients of the turnover variables are shown in
Table 2.2, wage growth is examined before and after a 1969-
1971 job change. The purpose is to compare the wage
progress on a new job with that a worker would have obtained
had he stayed at the old job, for mobile and immobile
individuals.
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Table 2.9: The Effects of 1969-71 Mobility on Wage Growth
(Dependent variable =~W or ~lnW)
Absolute Growth Percentage Growth
LAYOFF
PERS
PUSH
PULL
LAYOFF
PERS
PUSH
PULL
67-69 69-71 71-73 67-69 69-71
A. NLS Young Men (n = 392)
.0885 -.0391 .0579 .0785 .0201
(.57) (-.23) (.47) (1.24) (.39)
-.1250 -.3029 .2169 -.0320 -.1223
(-.59) (-1.34) (.80) (-.37) (-1.75)
-.2455 .3083 -.0440 -.0693 .1105
(-1.66) (1.94) (-.23) (-1.15) (2.26)
-.1027 .6174 .3287 .0384 .1784
(-.57) (3.23) (.144) {.53) (3.02)
B. NLS Mature Men (n = 1,016)
.2111 -.5501 .1534 .0802 -.1818
(.99) (-2.80) (.69) (1.75) (-3.45)
-.2156 -1.1024 -.1143 -.0301 -.3780
(-.44) (-2.46) (-.23) (-.29) (-3.13)
.1202 -.0932 -.2345 .0129 -.0437
(.32) (-.27) (-.59) (.16) (-.47)
.1083 -.6126 -.7372 .0407 -.0656
(.22) (-.137) (-1.45) (.39) (-.54)
71-73
.0575
(1.14)
.1347
(1.95)
.0153
( .32)
.0599
(1.03)
.0579
( .95 )
.0062
( .04 )
-.0098
(-.09)
-.1102
(-.79)
t-statistics are in parentheses.
I t is hoped tha t wage growth on the old "j obIt i. e •
1967-69 will proxy tendency to accumulate OJT investment on
the old "j obIt whi ch may be corre la ted wi th tendency to
change jobs in 1969-71.
The samples in panel A and B of table 2.2 consist of
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respectively younger and older workers who either did not
change jobs between 1967 and 1973 or changed only between
1969 and 1971. Wage growth equations similar to those is
the first group (but excluding D67 and D69) are estimated
for each of the subperiods 1967-69, 1969-71 and 1971-73.
Presumably wage growth in 1967-69 is not directly affected
by job changes 1969-71 but rather by the firm's and worker's
expectations of the worker's total job duration and ability
of the worker to benefit from OJT on that job. The only
significant coefficient for the 1967-69 period is PUSH (=1,
if individual quit because of job dissatisfaction 1969-71)
for the younger group. Those younger workers with PUSH =1
apparently had lower wage growth in 1967-69 than the
reference group, higher wage growth in.1969-71 and wage
growth in 1971-73 that was not statistically different from
that of the reference group.
This suggests that the 1969-71 quit (for PUSH=l
individuals) was precipitated by a poor job-worker match and·
resulted in a better wage package for the individual.
Tentatively, we can conclude that for younger workers, PUSH
= 1 indicates a poor job-worker match rather than a worker's
lack of ability to assimilate OJT.
In the third group of regressions, (table 2.10) the
sample is restricted to those who stayed on the job between
1967 and 1973. (This certainly could cause selection
bias). The dependent variable is wage growth 1967 to 1969
and the independent variables are those used in the first
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group of regressions (excluding D67 and D69) plus: PREV =
number of years job experience previous to current job and
REMTEN = time remaining on the job measured as of 1967
(calculated in hindsight from eventual total job duration).
In table 2.10, the coefficients of PREV, REMTEN and JOB
(= current job tenure in 1967) are shown for the young and
older men.
Since REMTEN is an estimate of expected remaining job
duration in 1967, its coefficient is supposed to measure the
effect of expected remaining job duration on OJT
investment. As Gulbert Chez remarks (in a comment included
in the reprint of this working paper) actual remaining time
on the job is not necessarily a perfect estimate of the
expected remaining timing on the job.
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Table 2.10: Effects of "Time Remaining on the Job" on 1967-
69 Wage Growth
( 1 )
Absolute Growth
(2 )
Percentage Growth
PREV
JOB
REMTEN
PREV
JOB
REMTEN
Y69 - Y67 In Y69 - In Y67
A. NLS Young Men (n = 156)
-.0120 -.0109
(-.56) (-1.53)
-.0500 -.0225
(-1.47) (-2.00)
.0837 .0238
(.87) (.76)
B. NLS Mature Men (n = 747)
-.0144 -.0045
(-2.13) (-1.62)
-.0195 -.0062
(-2.90) (-2.25)
.0245 .0013
(1.26) (.16)
The coefficients of REMTEN are not significant at the
10% level for either group. Bartel and Borjas however,
estimate the increase in lifetime earnings from an increase
in one year of remaining job tenure as follows: Over the 2
year period, an extra year of job tenure in the older men
sample appears to increase the two year growth in hourly
wage rate about 2.5 cents. Therefore, over a 1 year period,
the extra year would increase the wage rate by 1.25%. So we
mUltiple .0125 by 2000 (assuming 2000 hours a year of work)
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and find the increase in yearly income is $25.70. From an
ex ante point of view, this implies staying an adoitional 20
years on the job is equal to an increase of $514 per year in
earnings. Assuming an interest rate of 10%, the present
value of this increase in annual earnings over the 20 year
span is $4,446. Bartel and Borjas realize that this
conclusion is tentative, particularly since the coefficients
of REMTEN are insignificant. They calculate that the
present value for young men of staying on the job 6.6 years
(the largest tenure for the young men) is $2700.
Despite exclusion biases, these results are quite
interesting. Ghez suggests that inclusion of effects of
timing (when the layoff or quit took place) and the number
of layoffs and quits could improve the analysis. Our
empirical work will incorporate both of these suggestions.
In Earnings Growth on the Job and in Between Jobs,22
(1980) Bartel breaks wage growth into earnings growth on-
the-job (J) and earnings growth between jobs (M). Some
portion of J and M is due to economy wide increases in labor
productivity. The remaining growth is largely due to the
individual's acquisition of human capital over time.
She hypothesizes that total on-the-job growth will be
smaller for more mobile individuals. Such individuals tend
to have less tenure, which makes specific OJT an
unprofitable investment. Conversely, workers with little
specific OJT have little incentive to avoid mobility.
Therefore, the more mobile an individual, the less specific
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OJT s/he acquires on each job and thus, the smaller J will
~.
Bartel recognizes that timing is a factor in wage
growth, i.e., that turnover close to time of entry into the
labor market has a very different effect on J (and its
effect on current earnings) than later turnover. If
turnover only occurs very early in one's worklife, one still
may have a job with long tenure, which is conducive to
accumulation of large amounts of specific OJT (and large
J). Moreover, none of this OJT will be lost due to job
change.
Bart~l used the Coleman-Rossi Retrospective Life
History Study to study males who were age 30-39 in 1969.
For different race/education groups she found average on-
the-job earnings growth and average between-jobs earnings
growth. It turned out that for the average white male, 26%
of earnings gains took place between jobs when earnings
gains were deflated for economy-wide productivity gains.
For the average black male, 64% of earnings growth took
place between jobs. This occurred despite the fact that
blacks in the sample were only slightly more mobile than
whites, having worked at 4.6 firms on average since labor
force entry compared to the white average of 4 firms.
Next, Bartel ran regressions with total earnings gains,
J and M as dependent variables, controlling for education,
race, geographic mobility, wife's labor force
characteristics, age, experience, tenure and job mobility.
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She used 2 measures of job mobility. First, the number of
firms with which an individual has worked (NFIRMS) and
second, dummies for 3 mobility patterns (similar to Borjas')
in which the individual could fall. These patterns are:
pattern 1:
pattern 2:
pattern 3:
worker has had same job since start of
working life (ONEFIRM = 1)~
changed jobs at least once but current
job is one held longest (CLONG = l)~ and
current job is neither only job ever held
or longest job.
Since specific training is positively correlated with
tenure, J is hypothesized to be largest for individuals who
fit pattern 1 and least for individuals that fit pattern 3.
It seems that actual tenure on each job would be more
to the point than one's mobility pattern as labelled in this
paper. It is possible to have the current job be the same
as the longest job even if tenure on current job is very
small (as long as tenures on-other jobs are smaller).
In tables 2.11 and 2.12 selected regression
coefficients are shown for whites and blacks with NFIRMS as
the mobility variable. For whites, education has a positive
effect on J but not on M, even holding constant NFIRMS. For
black males, the effect is not as clear. Also, when
earnings are deflated for productivity increases, J
increases with experience, but less for blacks than for
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whites.
For white males, J is negatively related to NFIRMS
(confirming the specific OJT/mobility hypothesis). For
blacks, the coefficient of NFIRMS is positive (!). Bartel
claims that it becomes negative when a quadratic is added,
but it is strange that it is not negative on its own.
Unfortunately, NFIRMS tells us little about OJT for each
firm. It is conceivable that blacks (due to discrimination)
have to invest more in job-shopping than whites do; that is,
they must be willing to try various jobs and move until they
find one that offers them OJT.
Table 2.11: Results for Whites
t 'values are in parentheses
J
undeflated
Independent for J M M
Variable productivity deflated undeflated deflated
EDUC 492.21 189.88 -12.37 -18.26
(6.77) (3.28) (-.23) (-.34)
EXPER 493.22 110.76 53.52 48.28
(3.38) ( .95) ( .49) ( .44)
EXPER2 -8.65 -1.22 -3.13 -3.26
(-1.68) (-.30) (-.80) (-.84)
NFIRMS -126.01 -85.64 164.66 153.50
(-1.99) (-1.70) (3.45) (3.24)
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Table 2.12: Results for Blacks
Independent J ( not J M ( not M
Variable deflated) (deflated) deflated) (deflated)
EDUC 127.69 29.65 -38.73 -55.26
(2.88) ( .73 ) (-.83) (-1.18)
EXPER 166.89 34.50 -16.65 -37.77
(1.48) ( .34 ) (-.14) (-.32)
EXPER2 -5.23 -4.00 2.06 2.46
(-1.36) (-1.14) ( .51 ) (-.61)
NFIRMS 71.92 84.08 -42.19 -52.00
(1.74) (2.24) (-.98) (-1.20)
Table 2.13 shows coefficients of mobility patterns
ONEFIRM and CLONG in regressions in which the dependent
variables were J, M and total earnings.
It seems strange to use M as a dependent variable and
use ONEFIRM as an independent variable since M should be 0
for everyone who has only worked in one firm. As expected,
ONEFIRM and CLONG have positive coefficients in regressions
in which J is the dependent variable, ONEFIRM has a negative
coefficient in the regressions using M. The negative
coefficient of ONEFIRM in the M regression can be
interpreted as the negative of the increase in M that would
result if one moved, from having worked only in one firm
(ONEFIRM = 1) to being in the reference group (current job
is neither first or longest). Most coefficients are not,
however, significant at the 10% level. Note that for
whites, total earnings gains seem to be greater for those
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with some mobility, but with longest job as same as current
one.
Bartel and Borjas have the advantage of using mobility data
over the entire life cycle. Their disadvantage is that
information on timing of turnover is unavailable.
Table 2.13: Effects of Mobility Pattern on Earnings on the
Job and Earnings Between Jobs
WHITES
ONEFIRM
CLONG
BLACKS
CLONG
ONEFIRM
J (not
deflated)
603.66
(1.18)
605.04
(1.58)
324.40
(1.26)
1014.37
(2.21)
M (not
deflated)
-634.78
(-1.64)
146.25
( .50)
-146.63
(-.54)
-707.02
(-1.47)
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J
(deflated)
333.46
( .83)
341.95
(1.13)
162.49
( .69)
638.23
(1.52)
M
(deflated)
-557.81
(-1.45)
131.37
( .46)
-134.87
(-.50)
-603.68
(-1.25)
Same Problems with the Empirical Literature
The literature review uncovered a number of problems
with existing research. First, some of the empirical
literature about effect of layoffs and quits on financial
status uses as the dependent variable the level of post-
turnover earnings on wage rate (Cooke, Jacobsen). In order
to find loss (or gain) in wages, the post-turnover wage must
be compared to the pre-turnover wage for the job changers.
using levels implicitly assumes that pre-turnover wages are
identical for changers and non-changers. The possible bias
on coefficients of turnover variables is obvious: workers
who move a lot collect little specific OJT, their pre-
turnover wages are likely to be low and loss from a job
change minimal. Our independent variable will be the
difference in the log wage between t l and t2 (lnw2 -
lnwl). Another problem is that one author inputed a wage to
individuals and then used some form of the difference
between the imputed and actual wages as an estimate of
"rent" to their current job (Black). While it is true that
a worker may be in a job in which his marginal product is
not as high as it could be on another job, there is a danger
in assuming either that this is true or that he is paid less
than his marginal revenue product merely because the actual
wage is less than the imputed wage. It is not clear that an
imputed wage measures a workers actual marginal revenue
product. possibly, the actual wage picks up a worker's
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unmeasured characteristics (e.g. energy level) and therefore
is a better indication of productivity than the imputed
wage.
Borjas, as mentioned in the review of his article,
fails to measure specific OJT because his estimates of
investment on past jobs are calculated from the regression
of 1966 log wage on tenure on past jobs and previous work
experience. By definition of firm specific OJT, specific
training on previous jobs (which tenure and prior experience
are supposed to proxy) is completely irrelevant to the 1966
wage. By using log w2 - log WI' as a dependent variable, we
do relate specific OJT on the t l job to log WI.
Our empirical work will use log wage rate in 1980 - log
wage rate 1968 as the dependent variables, thus avoiding the
problems we discussed with using wage levels. Further, we
shall disaggregate our wage regressions by age, e~ucation,
race, and occupation to estimate the effect these variables
have on loss from turnover. (The theoretical justification
for this disaggregation is presented below in chapter 3).
Finally, we shall, in different regressions, take into
account not only the timing of the job change (following
Jacobsen) and tenure prior to the job change, but numbers of
quits and layoffs.
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Chapter III
Theory Chapter
A. Introduction
In chapter 1, we hypothesized that the gain from a job
change is inversely related to specific OJT accumulated on the
current job. In this chapter, we will construct a model of spe-
cific OJT accumulation incorporating determinants of both firm
and individual desires for training, and including the effect of
OJT on quit probabilities and layoff probabilities. Although we
do not have the kind of data required to measure OJT directly,
our model will suggest appropriate proxies for OJT based on
measurable, available variables. The purpose of the theoretical
model is to develop testable hypotheses about the relationship
between the effect of layoff and quit experiences and these proxy
variables. Variables positively related to expenditure on speci-
fic OJT should be inversely related to gains from job changing.
In chapter 4, we will present an empirical test of this proposi-
tion.
B. Model of OJT Accumulation
Throughout this chapter, we will assume the following:
(1) the worker is in the labor force for two periods, t l and
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(2) In t l , he accumulates C units of firm specific training
(i.e., OJT that raises productivity only within the firm with
which the worker is employed in t l ). This specific OJT acquired
in t l does not affect the worker's wage rate until t 2 •
(3) In t l , the wage rate is a constant, wI' and in t 2 , the
wage rate is w2 (c) (aw 2(C) >0) if the worker is still with the
a(C)
t l firm in t 2 • If the worker leaves this firm, his wage will be
Wj the highest available wage rate with an alternative firm; wj
is a random variable and is independent of C.
Since OJT makes employees more productive, it may benefit
the firm as well as the employee. Therefore, both the employer
and the employee may be willing to pay for part of OJT. In
general, specific OJT is paid for partly by the worker (through
fees and foregone wages in t l ) and partly by the firm (through
hire of instructors and foregone output in t l ). For the purpose
of this model, we view OJT as a good that the worker and firm
jointly purchase from a vendor for $1 a unit, a portion of which
is paid by the individual and a portion of which is paid by the
firm.
Since we want to show that an individual's OJT investment is
dependent on his personal characteristics (e.g., age, education,
occupation), we now divide workers into n groups, each of which
represents a unique combination of these characteristics (e.g.,
32 year old high school graduates with 2 years of job tenure.
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Each group p bargains individually with the firm
to determine cp ' i.e., the amount of OJT (C) per worker in group
p, and P~ which is the proportion of group piS OJT paid by the
firm (0 < pi < 1). The firm therefore pays a total of
$pPC per group p worker for OJT and the worker pays $(l-pP )Cf P f p.
Both firm and worker must agree on the amount of OJT investment
The optimum specific training investment, Cp ' from the
firm's perspective is that which maximizes profits given P~.
The optimum specific training investment, Cp ' from the point
of view of the individual in group p, is that which maximizes
utility given 1-P~.
The model presented below has two parts:
(1) a model of profit maximization for the firm, and
(2) a model of utility maximization for the individual.
The profit maximization model can be solved for a schedule
relating the quantity of specific OJT firms are willing to supply
group p to each possible value of pi. Similarly, the individual
utility maximization yields a schedule relating the amount of OJT
a worker from group p wishes to purchase to each value of
(l-P~). Assuming the market for OJT is competitive, each schedule
could, in principle, be aggregated to determine equilibrium
values of Cp and P~. It will turn out that the equilibrium
value of C , for any group p, depends on the characteristics ofp
that group. Since (as we will show below) the effect of job change
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on wage growth depends on cp ' we expect the effect of job change
to depend on the personal characteristics that affect Cp •
1. The Firm
We make the following assumptions about the firm.
(a) The firm exists for periods t l and t 2 • Its aim is to
maximize the present discounted value of profits over these two
periods. It is a price-taker in the market for its output, for
factors of production and for OJT.
(b) In t l , the firm decides how many workers to hire from
each group, and how much OJT to provide workers in each group p
given (P~ ••• P~ •.•• P~). Each worker in group p gets the same
amount of OJT.
(c) There is a lag of one period between a worker's acquisi-
tion of OJT and the resulting increase in his productivity; that
is, OJT does not affect production until t 2 • Since this is only
a two period model, the firm is only interested in subsidizing
OJT that takes place in t l •
(d) The screening process for hiring workers in
t l guarantees that all workers in group p are equally productive
in t l , but the firm cannot determine in advance the t 2 (post-
training) productivity of a given hiree.
(e) Each worker hired by the firm works H hours in t l (fixed
by custom. The t l wage, w, is different for each group. The
t 1 wage is wp for group p. At this wage, the firm can hire as
by both firm and worker
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many group p trainees as it wants.
(f) In t l , the firm promises that each group p worker still
with the firm in t 2 will work H hours in t 2 , and receive a wage
rate W~(Cp). The function W~(Cp) is predetermined and known
aw P2 >0.
ac P
(g) By t 2 , the firm can observe whether each worker has ade-
quately absorbed his training. Any workers that have not will be
dismissed. l Let the firm, from observing the workers, assign
each worker a competence score of a. a is a function of C, X(C).
Workers are fired who have a score less than a. Then the proba-
bility of a dismissal is
I(C) = J a f( cd , da
a min c
Let f(a,C) be a normal distribution with
I
lJ=lJ(C) 11 (C»O
(1=(1
1 (C) =prob ( a<;)
I(C) can be found by transforming X into Z the standard nor-
mal distribution
:;-;dC) is the liZ score" of ('Y" or the distance (in standard
dev ia t ions) between '.'I. and :d C) •
Clearly, since an increase in C increases ,'( C), it decreases
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the Z score of (( and therefore the probability of an individual
having a score <~. Therefore,
31(C) <0
~C •
(h) Between t 1 and t 2 , trainees may conduct job search and
therefore receive information about other job opportunities and
possibly receive job offers from other firms. If the highest
p
wage rate offer a trainee receives is greater than w2 (c p )' the
worker will quit. (This assumes no fixed costs associated with
a job change.) Hours of work per period are fixed at H, even for
job changers, so the wage rate is the sole criterion by which a
worker judges job offers. (Non-pecuniary advantages or disadvan-
tages are disregarded in this model.)
(i) The firm's production function in t 2 is
f(A1(C1).X1 ••• AP(C )·X •••A~C )·X ,K)P P n n
where: X =(l-IP)(I-qP)p
lP=layoff rate for group p
qP=quit rate for group p
K = units of physical capital.
In other words, xP is the total number of trainees from
group p still with the firm in t 2 , i.e., that have not quit or
been laid off. 2
X .AP(C ) can be thought of as the quantity of "augmentedp p
labor" from group p available to the firm in time t 2 • We use the
function X .AP(C ) to emphasize that the benefit of OJT to theP p
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firm in t 2 is contingent on the number of trainees from each
group still with the firm in t 2 as the skill is embodied in the
trainees. AP(C p ) is the average augmentation of the xP workers
from group p still with the firm in t 2 •
(AP (0)=1) 3AP (C p ) >0.
ac
(j) The expected value (in t 1 ) of the present discounted
profits is
w L Hp p
t 1 revenue t 1 wage bill
t 1 training costs non-human capital bill
t 2 revenue
n
- L
p=l
t 2 wage bill
where
non-human capital bill
P1= price of product in t 1
f{LI ••• Lp ••• Ln,K) is t 1 production function
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Lp = number of workers from group p hired in t l
K = unit of physical capital (fixed for t l ,t2 )
PK= rental price of physical capital (fixed for t l ,t2 )
Wp = tlwage of group p
H = hours worked by each worker each period
(fixed for all individuals)
pP= firm's contribution to OJT expenditures for group PF
Cp = specific OJT accumulated by each member of group p in t l
r is the discount rate
P2 = firm's product price in t 2
1 EnE .f(A (C)Xl, ••• A (C)Xn,K) 1S the firm's production function in t 2 •
AP(C) is expected average labor augmentation for each in-
dividual in group P remaining with the firm in t 2 •
x~ is the number of workers the firm expects to retain in t 2
from group p.
X~=(l-I~(C» (l-q~(C» • L p
E
where Ip(C) is the expected layoff rate for group p (as
perceived by both the worker and the firm). Both parties derive
IE(C) from observing firms similar to the one in question.
is the expected quit rate for group p.
w~(Cp) is the wage rate paid to each worker in group p who
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remains with the firm in t 2 •
In order to save space, we will drop the subscripts when
taking first order conditions. In other words, Lp will be
referred to simply as L, Cp as C, etc.
First order conditions for a short-run maximum are:
( 3 .2) an = P af -
aL 1 aL w H - P f
+
( X EA , (C) - LA ( C ) ( ( 1-1 E) ~ +' (1-q E) d1 E ) )
ae ae
E E E~ + (l-q ) al )] - PFL
de ac-
- W2 (C)H«l-lE(C)(l-qE(C»]
(3.3) h = - P Fac
+_l_[(P2 ll
l+r aB
- W;(C)HXE+w2 (C)(HL(l-lE)
with B=A( e) •X
The first full line of equation (3.3) represents additional
revenue from an increase of 1 unit in C. XEA'(C) represents a
function of the increase in production of each retained worker in
t 2 times the number of workers expected to be employed in t 2 •
-L A(e)«l-l)~6 + (l-q)~~)
is the increase in proportion of workers who stay with the firm
in t ( - ( 1-1)~2 ac dl(l-q)ac) times some measure of the productivity
of workers before the last unit of OJT was accumulated.
The second line of equation (3.3) represents additional
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costs of increasing C by another unit. These include:
a) the extra wage bill because workers are more skilled or
aw 2(c) - E
ac HX
b) the additional wages that must be paid because fewer
workers will quit or be laid off after the additional unit of OJT
is accumulated, or
c) the additional OJT costs in t l , or PF.L.
At this point, it seems advisable to distinguish our firm
profit model from that of Parsons (1972) since they are very
similar in their treatment of optimal layoffs and specific on-
the-job training.
First, the decision variables are different in the two
models. For Parsons, they are number of layoffs and the wage for
trainees and trained workers in each period. In our model, the
number of trainees in each group, and the amount of OJT given to
each worker are the decision variables; the functional forms of
w:(C), q:(C) and 1:(C) are determined outside of the model.
We are interested in determination of Cp (which Parsons regards
as given) because of its effect on an individual's financial loss
from a job change. Parsons is more interested in explaining
industry quit and layoff rates.
Secondly, Parsons allows the firm to rehire laid off workers
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in period 2. Instead, we assume that the firm commits itself to
each worker hired for at least one period. Workers laid off just
prior to t 2 are not rehired. Parsons has to recognize that
rehires may be desirable because he is explaining (among other
things) layoff behavior of the firm. However, in our model, it
is sufficient to point out that the expected 1055 to the firm
from a layoff increases with C.
Third, we, unlike Parsons, take account of the fact that
post-training alternative wage rates and marginal products (with
the firm that supplied the specific training) differ among indi-
viduals. This heterogeneity avoids two problems: (1) why it
should be profitable for one worker to quit if it is not for all
the workers, and (2) if layoffs are necessary, why is one worker
laid off rather than another.
Fourth, Parsons explicitly divides specific OJT into worker
owned and firm owned OJT. Our way of dealing with this is the
aw (C)function w2 (C). The greater 2 , the more OJT is worker
a(C)
owned, the more workers are willing to pay for OJT (cet. par.)
and the less firms are willing to pay.
2. The Worker
We make the following assumptions about the individual
worker.
(a) The individual works for two periods, t l and t 2 • He
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knows that the t l wage will be wand that hours of work in both
periods will be H.
(b) Consistent with the firm model, the worker acquires, in
t l , C units of OJT and pays $(l-PF ) for each of these units.
(Since we are discussing only one worker in this section, we drop
the p subscript and superscript whenever possible.) The worker
knows that if he is still with the t l firm in t 2 , his t 2 wage
rate will be w2 (C); he is also aware of the possibility that he
will not be with this same firm in t 2 because of a layoff or
quit.
(c) An individual takes his layoff probability to be
lE(C ), i.e., the "firm's anticipated layoff rate for his group.p p
IE
Recall that~ <0.
ac p
(d) The worker i perceives his probability of quitting prior
to t 2 as qi(C). A worker will quit to take another job in t 2 if
he receives a job offer for t 2 with a wage rate whigher than w2 (C).
The probability of such a job offer increases if the worker makes
an investment in some job search. However, in this model, we are
not interested in the job search decision per see Therefore, the
level of job search investment is taken to be exogenous at S
dollars for t l •
The probability distribution for the maximum alternative
wage offer (w ) the worker i receives for t 2 is3
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where S = dollar equivalent of resources spent on search.
zi is a vector of personal characteristics for worker i.
w is the maximum wage offer from other firms.
The quit probability of a representative individual is
therefore
i(3.4) q (C) =
< 0
The timing of all these actions and decisions is assumed to
be as follows:
(1) At the very beginning of t l , the individual decides on a
level of C, given I-PF and implements it. Simultaneously, the
individual invests S in on-the-job search.
(2) After OJT investment is obtained, the employer observes
its effect on each trainee and by t 2 can tell the true effect of
the training on a worker's productivity. Those with competency
score of less than ~ (see section above on firm) are not profit-
able to rehire in t 2 and will therefore be dismissed regardless
of the firm's prior expenditures on the worker's training, as
discussed above.
(3) After they find out whether or not they will be laid
off, workers receive job offers for t 2 from other firms as a
result of their prior job search. The workers who are going to
Assume
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be laid off accept the highest wage offer, which, we will say,
has an expected value of wL• Any worker who does not get a
layoff notice compares the best alternative wage offer w, with
w2 (C). If the best offer w is higher than w2 (C), the worker will
quit. Otherwise, he will stay with the firm.
The expected value of the wage rate in t 2 from a quit is
(holding 5 and Z constant)
Recall that fl(w) describes the probability distribution of
the maximum alternative wage offer wto the individual who has
not been laid off.
r
J
w2 (C)
This assumption is based on two factors.
(1) The wage rate from a quit will never be below w2 (C).
(2) If a layoff is viewed as a more negative signal than a
quit, the signalling effect may cause the wage distribution for
those laid off to be lower than for those who quit.
We are now prepared to evaluate the t 2 wage the individual
expects in time t l •
(3.7) E(W2 )=
(1-lE(C»(1-qi(C»w2 (C)
+ lE(C)wL
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J wfl(w)dW
w2 (C)
The first term is the wage from staying, w2 (C), times the
probability that the individual remains with the firm in t 2 •
The second term is the expected wage from a layoff wL times
the probability of a layoff lE(C).
4The third term is the sum of all the products for each m:
(probability that the maximum wage offer will be w ) times
m
(W
m
) for all w
m
>w2 (C)
Note that all the few )dw (for w > w2 (C) sum to qi(C). Som m m
this last term "incorporates" (l-IE(C»q(C) and the probabilities
of the possible events in 3.7 sum to 1.
Since q(C) = J fl(w)dw we can rewrite 3.7 as
w2 (C)
+ IE(C)WL + (l-IE(C» J fl(w)dw.w2 {C)
Finally, we are ready to model the individual's decision to
purchase specific OJT. His objective is to maximize lifetime
(two period) utility with respect to the budget constraint or to
maximize the Lagrangian:-
(3.9)~
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00
J wf(w)dw»)]
w2 (C)
where:
x = all consumer expenditures in t 1 other than on specific OJT1
X = all consumer expenditures in t 2 other than on specific OJT2
L = leisure in t 1 { exogenous since hours of work1
L = leisure in t 2 ! are fixed in both periods2
A is the Lagrangian multiplier
r is the discount rate
(l-PF)C = worker expenditure in t 1 on specific OJT
w = t l wage rate, assumed exogenous
s = search expenditures
The expression in brackets is, as discussed above, the
expected value of the wage rate in t 2 • Note that C only affects
the budget constraint in this model.
First order conditions for utility maximization with respect
to Care
(3.10)
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E· .
:\ • _1_ H( - l!- (l-q 1C) ) w i C) + (l-q 1C) ) (1-1 Et C) )
l+r ac
a~ (C)
ac
•
- alE f wf 1( w) dw
ac w2 (C)
- (1-l E (C»f(W2 (C»w2 (C) aw 2 (C) ]+ (l-P ) = °ae F
Collecting terms and assuming :\*0 yields:
00
(3.10') - 1 H [alE (w L- f wf(w)dw - (1- q i(C»W 2(C»l+r ac- w2 (C)
+( l'!q (C» (1~1 (C» aw (<2)
ac
00
The first term in parentheses wI - f w f(w)dw -
w2 (C)
i(l-q (C»w2 (C) can be interpreted as the expected decrease in
wages from a layoff.
ESo this first term in parentheses multiplied by al (the
ac
decrease in expected layoff probability given an increase in C)
gives the (positive) expected increase in earnings due to a
decrease in layoff probability that results from a small increase
in C.
The first term on the second line
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H(l-qi(C))(l-lE(C)) aw 2(C) is also positive. This is
ac
the increase in earnings from a marginal increase in C (given no
job change) times the probability of remaining with the t l firm.
The sum of the terms just discussed is the marginal benefit to
the worker from an extra unit of C. For the optimal amount of C
to be purchased, a necessary condition is that the sum equals the
marginal cost of C or 1-PF •
From the first order conditions in sections A and B, we
derived the two key equations in this model (equations 3.2 and
3.10).
( 3 .2) an = - p +
ac F
= 0
with B = A(C)·X
and
au =
ac
) ]
1 IE 00 i(3.10) - l+r H[~C (w1 - f w f(w)dW - (l-q (C))w2 (C))w2 (C)
+ (l-qi(C))(l-lE(C)) aw 2(C) ] + (l-P ) = 0
ac F
From these equations, we can derive the firm's willingness
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to supply OJT and the worker's demand for OJT given PF •
(Actually, it is a joint willingness to purchase OJT at prices
PF and l-PF ).
Summing OJT demand for all workers and firms will determine
aggregate demand and supply of OJT for any particular group p and
presumably, equilibrium values of C and PF for each group.
In the next two sections, we will show that these two main
equations imply that the equilibrium quantity of Cp is a function
of various parameters assumed exogenous to the model (i.e., cer-
tain characteristics common to everyone in group p). The empiri-
cal work focu$es on the role of these exogenous parameters in
relating observed wage changes to job changes.
3. Implications for Empirical Work
1. OJT Functions
The first order conditions in sections A and B of this
chapter (equations 3.2 and 3.10) implicitly define equations of
the following form for group p.
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(3.llA) CDworkerp
These two equations yield supply and demand schedules for
cp versus p~, holding other arguments constant. These other argu-
ments are shift parameters. The signs above each argument are
expected partial derivatives.
There is also the reduced form at equilibrium pi for which
(3.118)
Unfortunately, most of the arguments in (3.118) are not directly
observable. We will estimate CE by substituting the proxies age,p
education, tenure, and occupation and race to get
Let all the members of a particular group be identical as to their
age cohort, education and job tenure. We have divided our sample
into 2 age groups, 4 education groups and 3 tenure groups. So in
each occupation, there are potentially 2 x 4 x 3 = 24 different
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groups of workers and therefore 24 different OJT markets.
We use age, education, tenure and occupation to proxy the
above shift parameters by the following reasoning.
EDUCATION should be positively correlated with A(e) and A'(C)
because education increases an individual's ability to learn (at
least in theory) and therefore to benefit from training.
Education should also be positively correlated with w2 (C) (part of'
the return to C). It must be noted that education increases the
return to general OJT as well as to specific OJT (C). Given
limited resources, specific and general OJT are competing uses of
the resources, and whether education increases C or not depends on
how much an increase in education increases the returns to general
OJT relative to returns to specific OJT. Therefore, the effect of
education on specific OJT accumulation is ambiguous. We shall
find the same is true with other variables.
AGE decreases an individual's tendency to quit because the
closer he is to retirement, the fewer years he has on the "new"
job and therefore the less gain from the quit. 5
After a certain point, we expect f~rther aging to decrease a
worker's capacity for further training and therefore to decrease
A(C) and A'(C).
TENURE is inversely related to IE(C), qE(C), IE,(C) and
qE,(C) and positively related to w2 (C) holding C constant. Union
rules often require that earnings and job security be directly
related to seniority. Even non-unionized firms may relate wages
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and immunity from layoffs to tenure for the sake of morale.
occupations differ in their requirements for specific OJT.
In other words, we expect A(C) and A'(C) to be particularly high
in occupations which require much technical skill.
However, in the empirical literature the wage differences
between blacks and whites are not entirely explainable by dif-
ferences in general human capital variables. Part of the wage
differences could be due to "crowding" of minorities into occupa-
tions and industries that are relatively low paying and/or
unskilled. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to disaggregate
on the basis of three-digit occupation and industry; but we
hypothesize that blacks accumulate, on the whole, less specific
OJT than whites.
2. Wage Model
Now we offer a more detailed model of the wage rates in
where
e = base of natural log
a
o
= constant term in t l
Z = vector of personal characteristics unaffected by job
change in t l
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~l = error term in t l ~l - N(O,a~l)
a
ol = constant term in t 2
z+~z = vector of personal characteristics in t l
LOI = 1 if worker had at least one layoff between t l and t 2
Ql = 1 if worker had at least one quit between t l and t 2
a 2 and a3 measure effects of layoffs and quits aside from
loss of OJT (e.g. , negative signalling effects)6
C = amount of specific OJT accumulated in t l
S is a dummy variable which = 1 if the individual is with
the same firm in t 2 as in t l (in which case w2=w2 (C» and
5=0 otherwise
~2 - E ( 0 , a~2 )
Taking logs of wI and w2
(3.13) In wl = ao+alz+~l
(3.14) In w =2
. Subtracting
So besides change in the constant term and in white "noise",
. .
In w2-ln wI is a linear function of changes in personal charac-
teristics layoffs, quits, and quantity of specific OJT accumulated
in t l • This OJT is, however, irrelevant unless S=l, i.e., unless
the worker has not changed firms between t l and t 2 •
Before putting our equation into final form, let us trans-
form a 4SC as follows:
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Let S = (l-LOF) (l-QF)
where
LOF = 1 if worker left t l job by a layoff before t 2
and
QF = 1 if left by a quit before t 2 •
If LOF=l, QF=O and vice-versa, then:
(3.16)a4sc=a4 {1-LOF ){1-QF)C
= a 4C{ l-LOF-Qp+LOF·Q F)
= a4 C{ l-LOF-QF)
Then we can transform equation 3.15 to read
(3.17) In w2-ln wl=bo+bl~Z+b2LOl+b3Ql+~
where
bo = Aa o+a 4C
b l = aI'
b 2 = -a4C + a 2
b 3= -a4C+a 3
We expect b 2 < 0, b3 ) O.
Note that b 2 and b3 are dependent on C. Therefore, b 2 and
b 3 will vary among the different groups since each will have its
own equilibrium value of C. In particular, we wish to know how
the characteristics of each group that affect C (i.e., education,
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age, occupation and race) affect b 2 and b3 •
Below, in Chapter IV we estimate these effects by regressing
In w2 - In wI on layoff variables, quit variables and control
variables, disaggregating by age, education, race and occupation.
(Tenure is interacted with turnover variables in the equations.)
Regressions are also run with the pooled (non-stratified) sample.
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Footnotes
1. In practice, many dismissals reflect demand conditions in
the firm's labor market. In such cases, dismissals may have
nothing to do with the individual's competence. Such dismissals
are called layoffs rather than discharges for cause. (Layoffs
generally occur in order of seniority rather than of competence.)
We shall refer to all dismissals as layoffs. In theory, the
likelihood of being laid off due to demand conditions is inver-
sely related to specific training, (Oi, 1962). We show here that
probability of discharge for cause is also inversely related to
C.
2. Since this is only a two period model, we asume the firm
makes no attempt to replace workers who are laid off or who quit
in period one with new trainees in period two.
3. If the individual receives a sample of n job offers, ~,
the highest of these wage offers is a random variable at
least pro ante. ~ can be thought of as a sample statistic with
distribution fl(~).
4. The third term includes (l-l(C» because in our model it
is only possible to quit after a worker discovers he will not be
laid off. This assumption is made purely for the sake of mathe-
matical tractability.
5. We are relaxing the assumption that each individual has
the same amount of work time ahead in t , and also that a quit
involves no costs beyond on-the-job seatch. If job change was
costless the magnitude of the gain from quit would be irrelevant
to the quit decision as long as that magnitude was greater than
o.
6. A layoff may cause a decrease in wage growth not only
because it deprives the worker of firm specific OJT, but because
in some cases it may deprive a worker of monopoly "rents" that
accrue to employment in certain industries or occupations. This
type of wage mobility is shown in the empirical work of Jacobsen.
Laid off auto workers suffer a 40% loss in earnings after two
years. Displaced apparel workers show almost no loss and a gain
over non-laid off workers after six years. The reason may be
that there is rent to being employed in the auto industry but not
in the apparel industry.
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Chapter IV
Empirical Work
A. Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to investigate empirically the
effect that quits and layoffs have on wage growth.
In Chapter III, we discussed one theory with implications
for this effect, i.e., the theory of general and specific on-the-
job training. General OJT raises a worker's productivity with a
number of firms; specific OJT raises a worker's productivity only
with the firm that provided it. Consequently, any individual
with large investments in specific OJT on the current job will
earn more, cet. par., at that current job than he could with
other firms and hence will experience proportionately more loss
from a job change than workers with small investments in specific
OJT. In the previous chapter, we discussed the effect of age,
education, race and occupation on accumulation of specific OJT. l
If age, race, education and occupation influence specific
OJT, they should also, cet. par., make a difference in loss or
gain from a job change.
We predict that the loss from a job change will be par-
ticularly acute if the job separation results from a layoff
rather than a quit because:
(1) If the net gain from a prospective job change is posi-
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tive, a worker will quit to take the higher wage job. 2 In
contrast, if one changes jobs involuntarily, potential new jobs
are likely to be inferior to the old one.
(2) Some workers suffer a dismissal because they are incom-
petent. Therefore, potential employers may view some workers who
have experienced a non-temporary involuntary separation as
suspect and even more so workers with multiple non-temporary
layoffs. On the other hand, quits may in some cases reflect
self-selection out by incompetent workers. Employers may regard
those who have quit frequently as likely to continue this pattern
and thus as poor candidates for specific OJT. In such cases, the
loss from quits could be as large as that from layoffs.
In the theory chapter, we assumed that each worker has two
periods of work life remaining. In practice, at any point in
time, individuals vary in the length of remaining work life. The
greater the time until retirement, the more time a job changer
has (potentially) on the new job. This implies that:
(1) Younger workers accumulate more OJT immediately after a
job change than older workers since they have more years to
retirement and potentially longer tenure on the new job. This
means that we should observe, cet.par., greater wage growth for
younger job changers than for older job changers.
(2) Younger workers invest more in on-the-job search than
older workers, again because they have more time remaining to
receive the returns to search. (We are relaxing the assumption
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in the previous chapter that S, quantity of on-the-job search,
is fixed.)
Together (1) and (2) suggest that the gain (loss) from a job
change will be, on average, smallest (largest) for older workers.
Also employers may be reluctant to hire older workers, due
either to their shorter potential job tenure or to pure age
discrimination. This further decreases the gain from turnover
for older workers.
One proxy for specific human capital is job tenure. OJT
theorists agree that the longer an individual expects to be on a
job, the greater benefit specific training should be to himself
and his employer. Further, as we saw in the theory chapter, the
likelihood of quits and layoffs in a given period is decreased
by an increase in specific OJT. Therefore, an individual's job
attachment (and job tenure) should be directly related to speci-
fic OJT and to loss from a job change. Therefore, a correlation
between age and tenure contributes to the case for greater loss
from turnover by older workers.
If we use 1968 (first year of data) job tenure as a measure
of specific OJT acquired on 1968 job prior to the survey, we
should expect the loss from turnover to be directly related to
1968 tenure.
In summary, we expect the loss from a layoff to be greater
than that for a quit, and that financial loss from a job change
should be positively related to one's age and job tenure as well
-117-
as to other variables discussed in the OJT model in chapter 2.
In other words, if w2 is the wage in the second period and
LO is the number of layoffs and Q is the number of quits we
expect that
< 0, is of ambiguous sign
( 2)
and
I ~IaLO is greater for older workers
(3) I aw 2 , is greater for high tenure workers.
aLO I
Note that if (3) is true, this may reflect employees' ten-
dency to stay longest on jobs that have economic "rent," i.e.,
that are in industries in which wages are high due to the mono-
poly positions of firms rather than to large OJT investments.
If this tendency exists, those workers laid off with long job
tenure may be losing economic "rent" rather than firm sp~cific
OJT.
B. Empirical Methodology
A. Basic Regressions Model
In the theory chapter, we showed that the change in the log
w2
wage, (In w2-ln wI) (which equals In (W-», with respect to a1
layoff or quit is dependent on C, the quantity of specific OJT
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accumulated on the t l job.
We also demonstrated that C is a function of certain per-
sonal characteristics of the worker, e.g., tenure, education,
age, race and occupation. Let Xl be the vector of levels of
these characteristics. It follows that the change in wage growth
that results from a quit or layoff is a function of Xl.
More formally:
wIn w2-1n wI = f (X I ,X 2 ,X 3 )
where
Xl is the above-mentioned vector of characteristics that
affect C
X2 is a vector of key (turnover) variables, i.e., variables
describing quits and layoffs, and
X3 = a vector of other control variables.
be discussed below in greater detail.)
Let C = g(X I ).
Recall from Chapter 3 that
AZ = change in personal characteristics between t l ) and t 2
LOI = 1 if 'there were any layoffs
Ql = I if there were any quits
From equation (3.17):
with
(a 2 , a 3 and a 4 are coefficients
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from equation 3.15)
a 2 and a 3 are effects of layoffs and quits on growth
in the log wage aside from OJT effects.
or substituting, C=g(XI ) where Xl is a vector of personal
characteristics (i.e., age, education, race, occupation, tenure):
b 2 = -a4g(x1 ) + a 2
b 3 = ~a4g(XI) + a 3
So we hypothesize that b2 and b 3 are functions of Xl. We
shall test this hypothesis plus the hypothesis that b
o
and b 1 are
functions of Xl. This could be accomplished by interacting all
the other independent variables with Xl. Equivalently, we will
stratify our equations by each variable included in Xl' i.e., by
age, then by education, then race, then by one-digit occupation.
Each of the two age groups will be further stratified. by educa-
tion and then by race. We shall also run unstratified
regressions that include our entire sample.
c. The Data
The data for this empirical test are from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics conducted by the Institute for Social Research
Center of the University of Michigan. Since this is a panel
study, it follows each family from 1968 to 1981, interviewing the
family head in each year. The original 1968 survey consists of
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4802 families. Of these families, 1872 were drawn· from the 1967
Survey of Economic Opportunity, of which half the individuals
lived in predominantly non-white Census Tracts. All of the fami-
lies taken from the SEO had 1966 income equal to or below twice
th f d 1 t I ' h' 3e e era pover y lne at t at tlme.
Since the individuals we are examining are family heads, and
most variables refer to the characteristics of the head of a par-
ticular family at a particular point in time, it is important to
restrict the sample to families for which the head was constant
over the entire survey period. 4
One major problem with these data is that it is impossible
to tell exactly when a particular layoff or quit took place.
Turnover was reported as follows. The head was asked in each
year what his tenure was on the current job. In all relevant
years, if tenure was less than 12 months or if the head was
unemployed at the survey date, the head was asked: "What hap-
pened to your last job?" Following is an example of the problem
with this scheme of reporting. Suppose in the year 1972, the
head reported less than 12 months tenure on the current job and,
on further questioning, reported that he lost the last job by a
layoff. It is unclear whether the layoff took place in 1972 or
in 1971 even if the head was employed at the time of the 1971
interview. 5
In fact, if a layoff from the last job was reported in both
1972 and 1971 and the head was unemployed in 1971 at the time of
-121-
the survey, it is possible that the 1972 and 1971 layoffs
actually represent the same event. In other words, the worker
may have been laid off prior to the 1971 interview, been
unemployed until after the 1971 interview and become re-employed
less than a year before the 1972 interview. In this case, the
1971 layoff would be reported both in 1971 and in 1972, since in
1972 the individual had less than a year of job tenure and lost
the last job by a layoff. Therefore, anyone who reported having
lost the last job by a layoff in two consecutive years (or a quit
in two consecutive years) and did not work after the survey date
in the earlier of these years was dropped from the sample. This
ensures that quits and layoffs are not double counted. 6
There are some additional problems. When heads were asked:
"What happened to your last job?" the possible responses were
coded as follows:
(1) company folded, changed hands, moved out of town, went
out of business, employer died,
(2) strike or lockout,
(3) laid off or fired permanently,
(4) quit, resigned, retired or pregnant (or promoted if
response was obtained during 1969-74 or still had old job in
addition to new (main) job if response was obtained during
1969-1975),
(5) first full time or permanent job ever had, wasn't
working before this,
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(6) self-employed on the last job and unemployed at the time
of the survey. (From 1975 on, employed workers received code (6)
if they changed jobs by a promotion and received code (4) if they
were self-employed on the last job); for 1969-1974, workers
employed at the time of survey, and self-employed on the last job
received code (6),
(7) other, including being drafted,
(8) job was temporary,
(9) not available,
(10) inapplicable question.
There are two major problems with this coding for the pur-
pose of this thesis.
(a) Those who reported a voluntary job separation during the
period 1969-1974 are indistinguishable from those who reported a
promotion during 1969-74 as both kinds of workers are assigned
code (4) in the year in which the quit or promotion is recorded.
For 1969-1975, those who quit were indistinguishable from those
who kept the old job in addition to a new (main) job for the same
reason, i.e., both are coded as (4).
(b) Genuine layoffs (due to the firm's demand conditions
rather than incompetence on the part of the worker) are
indistinguishable from discharges for cause. Both are coded as
(3), despite the fact that the two kinds of discharges have very
different implications for signalling.
In the remainder of this thesis, we shall for convenience
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refer to codings of (1) or (3) in any year as "layoffs", and
codings of (4) as "quits".
Unfortunately, even with the best designed questionnaires,
the difference between quits and layoffs may sometimes be
blurred. For example, a worker who knows he is about to be fired
may resign instead. Sometimes the desire to terminate a firm-
worker relationship is mutual; the worker wishes to leave the
firm and the firm wants to be rid of the worker. Which party
actually initiates the termination (i.e., whether it is regarded
as a layoff or quit) is arbitrary in such cases. A third example
occurs when a worker who has a new job lined up for some future
time volunteers to be "laid off" from the old job knowing that in
the period between the old job and the new he can collect
unemployment benefits.
Further, quits as well as layoffs may result in negative
signalling. From the point of view of a prospective employer, a
worker who demonstrates, by frequent quits, an unwillingness to
commit himself to one job may be less desirable than a worker who
experienced a layoff due to poor luck.
Many quits are for non-pecuniary reasons, e.g., dislike of
the job. Ideally, we would consider effects of turnover on non-
monetary benefits as well as on the money wage rate. Unfortun-
ately, the data do not allow estimation of psychic benefits of a
job. Quits for purely non-money reasons would not be expected
to raise one's wage rate. The poss~bilities of quits with non-
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pecuniary motivation, of "quits" that are not entirely voluntary,
and of over-optimistic quitters (who have a lower alternative
wage than they believe) cause us to conclude that the expected
change in wage from quits is ambiguous.
D. Sample
Our sample is restricted to individuals who:
(1) are male family heads in the years 1968-1980,
(2) are without severe health limitations in 1968 and 1980,
(3) are in the labor force at the time of both the 1968 and
1980 interviews,
(4) are 23-53 years of age in 1968,
(5) have non-zero average hourly wage in 1968 and 1980,
(6) are not self-employed proprietors, farmers, in the armed
forces or police or of unknown or miscellaneous occupation in
1968 or 1980,
(7) are not among those deleted because of ambiguity in the
number of quits and layoffs (as explained above),
(8) do not have missing data on any of the variables used in
the regression.
The resulting sample size is 830 out of a data set of 6,620.
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E. Regressions Variables
1.A. The Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable is:
In w2-ln wI
where
In w2 = log of average hourly 1980 earnings
In wI = log of average hourly 1968 earnings.
The log specification follows treatment of Jacob Mincer
(1973).
In our chapter 3 wage model (eqn. 3.14) ,
Recall that S = 1 if there was no turnover 1969-79. C is
specific OJT.
The coefficients can be interpreted as the percent change in
w2 with respect to changes in the independent variables. Rather
than simply using In w2 as the dependent variable, we use
In w2-ln wI for the following reasons:
(1) The log wage rate at any period is a function of some
individual characteristics that we can measure and others that
are unobservable (such as the individual's fundamental per-
sonality which includes his intelligence, emotional stability and
energy level). If the unmeasurable variables are important and
correlated with included variables, their exclusion could bias
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the regressions coefficients. Assuming (as discussed above) that
the log wage is a linear function of all characteristics and that
the unobserved variables and their true coefficients are constant
over time, subtracting In wI from In w2 will cause their effect
to be cancelled out.
(2) In wI is a function of, among other investments, speci-
fic OJT investment as of t l on the t l job. This specific OJT
investment is part of the opportunity cost of changing jobs,
either by a quit or by a layoff. Therefore In w2-ln wI is a
measure of the net gain from a job change.
This, in turn,
If X is some independent variable in the regression, its
w
aln (__2
wIcoefficient can be interpreted as
ax
can be interpreted as the rate of change of w2 that results
wI
from a marginal change in X. Call this interpretation "a."
Unfortunately, most of our independent variables are dummies
which cannot change marginally, so care must be taken in using
this interpretation. This interpretation is equivalent to
interpreting the coefficients as the change in rate of wage
growth.
Another possible interpretation of the independent variables
follows from the functional form of the regression:
Is equivalent to:
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Our regression is equivalent to including In wI as an inde-
pendent variable in determining In w2 and constraining the coef-
ficient of In wI to be 1 (Leigh, 1978). In this case, the
coefficient on any independent variable X is the percentage
change in w2 (the 1980 wage rate) that results from a change in
X. Call this interpretation "b."
This interpretation has some dangers as well. The main
danger is that X and ln wI will be correlated. For instance,
those with UNI68=1 (who belonged to a union 'in 1968) can be
expected to have relatively high values of In wI. We will see
that those who were union members in 1968, put not in 1980
(CUNIN=l) have In w2-ln wI that is less than those who belonged
to a union in neither year. 1980 wages could be just as high for
union leavers as for those who never joined a union, but In wI is
higher so CUNIN causes a decline in In w2 - In wI.
We will use both of these interpretations. Sometimes, in
the text, we will assume that the coefficient of X is the percen-
tage change in w2 that results from a change in X (interpretation
b). However, we shall also, in presenting the results, interpret
the coefficient of X as the expected rate of change in the ratio
28. The Independent Variables,
a. The Turnover Variables
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Our chief independent variables in the regressions will be
those describing the individual's layoff and quit incidence,
although control variables will, of course, be included. The
turnover variables are designed to answer the following
questions:
(1) Are quits less financially damaging than layoffs?
(2) Do the number of layoffs and quits make a difference or
is only the fact of having~ layoffs/quits important?
(3) Does the proximity to t 2 of the year in which the
layoff/quit occurred matter in its effect on In w2-ln wI?
(4) Does tenure prior to the layoff/quit matter in the
effect of the layoff/quit on In w2-ln wI?
Before presenting the precise forms of the turnover
variables, we discuss these questions in detail.
Question (1) was mentioned in the introduction to this
chapter. We expect that layoffs will have a negative effect on
ln w2-ln wI because they may result in negative signalling and
because an involuntary job change suggests that the worker's
alternatives are inferior to the job from which he was laid off
as well as because of loss of OJT. The expected effect of quits
on financial compensation is ambiguous. A quit between t l and
t 2 may be a move to a higher paying job (in which case it would
increase In w2-ln wI) or it may occur for non-pecuniary reasons
or it may be a face-saving move by an employee who is about to be
fired. Recall that the distinction between quits and layoffs may
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be blurred. At any rate, we expect that if quits decrease
In w2-ln wI' they do so less than layoffs.
( 2 ) Is the number of quits and layoffs important or merely
the fact of any quit or layoff activity? An individual with a
history of many layoffs or many quits may be perceived as unre-
liable by employers. Therefore, we wish to examine how the
number of layoffs and number of quits affects In w2-ln wI. On
the other hand, only one job change is required to deprive an
individual of all the firm specific OJT acquired as of t l • Thus,
we also want to test the hypothesis that the existence of at
least one layoff or of at least one quit affects In w2-ln wI.
(3) Is the timing of the layoff/quit important? We hypothe-
size that the worker will, to some extent, recover from the
effects of layoffs and quits, but that such a recovery takes
time. Jacobsen (1976) illustrates this with the following
diagram.
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Graph 4.1 - Effects of Layoffs on Wage Growth by Timing of
Layoffs
Bl is the wage profile of an individual with no layoffs be-
tween t l and t 2 •
B2 is the wage profile of an individual with a layoff in
time t only. Note that the individual described by B2 has almost
fully "recovered" his wage rate by t 2 • In other words, by t 2 ,
his wage rate is nearly the same as it would have been had the
layoff never happened.
B3 is the wage profile of an individual who was laid off in
t', a time prior to t 2 but after t. The individual described by
B3 may also eventually recover from the layoff, but when we
observe him in t 2 , his wage rate will be much farther below the
wage rate of someone without a layoff (described by Bl than will
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be the wage rate of someone with a less recent layoff (describedby
8 2 >. We thus expect In w2-ln wI to be less for workers with a
recent layoff than for workers with a less recent layoff.
One rationale for eventual "recovery" from a job change is
that a worker who loses the wage benefit from specific OJT after
a job change may, in a few years, have a substantial amount of
new specific OJT. Another, is that the individual's employer
immediately following a layoff/quit may initially take the job
change as a negative signal but regard it as irrelevant ~fter
employing the individual for several years and observing his work
first-hand.
(4) Does job tenure prior to turnover matter? Various
authors (e.g., Bartel and Borjas) have suggested that job tenure
be used as proxy for specific OJT. The reason is that specific
OJT is relatively useless for individuals with short job tenure
and that (as modelled in chapter 3) the larger quantity of speci-
fic OJT a worker accumulates with a firm, the less likely he is
to be laid off or to quit" and therefore the longer he will be on
the job. It is unlikely, however, that the correlation between
job tenure and OJT is exact. Job attachments may be due to non-
pecuniary benefits rather than to possession of large amounts of
OJT.
To investigate these issues, five alternative specifications
of the turnover variables were used. In the following section,
we discuss each of them in turn:
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I. LO (= total number of layoffs reported 1969-1979)
o (= total number of quits reported 1969-1979)
In the first set of regressions. LO and Q are included as
independent variables. Unfortunately, as can be seen in the data
section, at most one layoff or quit is reported in any given
year. (The only information we have in any year on job changes
is the answer to the question: "What happened to your last
job?") So multiple layoffs or quits within a year are not
recorded. With this caveat in mind, LO and Q are still useful
variables: providing one measure of the frequency of quits and
layoffs. We expect the coefficient of LO to be negative, but the
sign of the coefficient of Q is ambiguous.
II. L01 (= 1 if reported at least one layoff 1969-1979)
01 (= 1 if reported at least one quit 1969-1979)
In the second set of regressions, we substitute the dichoto-
mous variables LOI and Q1 for LO and Q. The regressions in I and
II together are an empirical test of question (2): "Do number of
quits/layoffs matter or merely the existence of any
quits/layoffs?" We expect the coefficient of L01 to be negative
and have no a priori expectation about Ql.
III. LOE (= number of layoffs reported, 1969-1973)
LOL (= number of layoffs rep'orted, 1974-1979)
QE (= number of quits reported, 1969-1973)
QL (= number of quits reported, 1974-1979)
In the third set of regressions, LOI and Q1 are removed and
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LOE, LOL, QE, and QL (denoting early or late) are inserted. These
regressions address question (3): "Does the number of recent
layoffs/quits (those in 1974-1979) affect the wage in 1980, and
thus In w2-1n WI more than number of earlier layoffs/quits (1969-
1973)?" We hypothesize that LOE and LOL will both have negative
coefficients, with the coefficient of LOL larger in absolute value
than that of LOE. Again quits have an ambiguous effect and we do
not have an a priori notion of the signs of QE and QL.
IV. LOEI (= 1 if at least one layoff reported 1969-1973)
LOLl (= 1 if at least one layoff reported 1974-1979)
QE1 (= 1 if at least one quit reported 1969-1973)
QL1 (= 1 if at least one quit reported 1974-1979)
As in set III, LOEl, LOLl, QEl, QL1 denote timing of layoffs
and quits.
V. LOIS = interaction term between L01 and dummy denoting 1968
job tenure less than two years
L01MED = interaction between L01 and 1968 job tenure of 2-3
years
L01LG = interaction between L01 and 1968 job tenure of four
or more years
QlS = interaction between Q1 and 1968 job tenure of less
than 2 years
QIMED = interaction between Ql and 1968 job tenure of 2-3
years
Q1LG = interaction between Ql and 1968 job tenure of 4 or
-134-
more years.
In the fifth set of regressions, these interaction terms are
used. This set of regressions addresses question (4): What is
the influence of tenure prior to a layoff or quit on the effect of
the layoff or quit on In w2-ln wI? Ideally, we would have completed
job tenure at time of the layoff or quit as a proxy for total
OJT accumulated on the 1968 job. Data problems prevent us from
retrieving this information. On the positive side, these dummies,
which incorporate 1968 job tenure are an indication of specific
OJT in 1968 which would be a factor in explaining the 1968 wage
rate and thus In wI.
b. Control Variables
We want to test the effect layoffs and quits have on
In w2-ln wI controlling for as many other factors as possible.
The control variables can change between 1968 and 1980.
Recalling (from the theory section) that on average
In w2-ln wI = bo + bl~Z + b 2LO + b3Q
Where Z is a vector of control variables, we see that
including changes in the control variables in the regressions is
desirable. We also include the 1968 level of each control
variable.
The control variables are:
R.S. = 1 if had exactly 12 years of school in 1968
R.S.P. = 1 if had more than 12 years of school in 1968 but
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less than 16
CaLL = 1 if had 16 or more years of school in 1968
EDUP = 1 if individual increased his educational level be-
tween 1968 and 1980.
YOUNG = 1 if individual was 23-37 years old in 1968
WHITE = 1 if individual is white
UNI68 =1 if was a union member in 1968
CUNIY = 1 if was not a union member in 1968 but was in 1980
CUNIN = 1 if was a union member in 1968 but not in 1980
REG68 = 1 if worker was a resident of the South in 1968
CREGS = 1 if the worker moved to the South between 1968 and
1980
CREGNS = 1 if the worker moved out of the South between 1968
and 1980
HLIM68 = 1 if the worker had a health limitation in 1968
HEALTHB = 1 if the worker had a health limitation in 1968
but not in 1980
HEALTHW =1 if the worker had no health limitation in 1968
but had one in 1980
MARRY68 = 1 if worker was married in 1968
MARRY = 1 if worker was unmarried in 1968 but was married in
1980
UNMARRY = 1 if worker was married in 1968 but unmarried in
1980
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Explanation of "Control" Variables
1. Dummies for education completed by 1968 and for increase
in education 1968-1980 (H.S., H.S.P., COLL and EDUP). There are
several mechanisms through which education could influence
In w2-ln wI. First, education is a form of human capital
investment; part of the return on this investment will be an
increase in both In wI and In w2 over the log wage rates a worker
would receive without the investment. The effect this has on
In w2 - In WI depends on whether education increases In WI more
than In w2 or vice versa. Also, an individual's 1968 educational
level may be correlated with quantity of OJT and other investment
between 1968 and 1980. Education can be used as a proxy for
ability to the extent that highly educated individuals tend to
assimilate new information well; those with the most education
will benefit most from OJT. Employers may therefore use educa-
tion as a screening device to help decide in whom to invest OJT.
Further, the education itself may increase one's learning poten-
tial and thus be a complement to OJT. These factors imply that
human capital investment between-1968 and 1980 (and therefore,
cet. par., In w2-ln WI) is a positive function of education.
Therefore, we expect positive coefficients for R.S., H.S.P., and
CaLL with the coefficients increasing from H.S. to CaLL.
The dummy for increase in education 1968-1980, EDUP, should
also have a positive coefficient since the increase in education
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is a human capital investment and since the increase in education
may increase one's ability to benefit from post-school invest-
ments.
2. Age dummy - YOUNG (=1 if less than 38 years old). As
discussed above, we expect younger workers to acquire relatively
large amounts of OJT, and the same should apply for other kinds
of human capital as well. Thus, the fastest growth in log wages
should accrue to younger workers, and we expect a positive coef-
ficient on YOUNG.
3. Race dummy WHITE. This dummy measures labor market
racial discrimination in wage growth after controlling for other
variables. It may also measure discrimination in the market for
OJT. On both counts, we expect the coefficient of WHITE to be
positive.
4. Dummies for 1968 union status and change in union states
(UNI68, CUNIY, CUNIN). Unions are able to bargain monopolisti-
cally for wage increases. Therefore, 1968 union membership
should, cet. par., increase In wI; its effect on In w2 - In wI is
ambiguous. We expect CUNIY (=1 if became a union member over the
survey period) to have a positive sign and CUNIN (=1 if ceased
being a union member over the period) to have a negative sign.
5. Dummies for 1968 Southern residence and for movement in
and out of the South (REG68, CREGS, CREGNS). Since the Sunbelt
has been the most rapidly growing sector of the country in recent
years, we expect the sign of REG68 (=1 if lived in the South in
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1968) to be positive. However, in most of the South, wage levels
are lower than in the other regions. So we expect movement out
of the South (CREGNS=l) to increase In w2-ln wI and movement to
the South (CREGS=l) to decrease wage growth. This result for
CREGS is mitigated by the fact that any regional mobility is an
investment which should bring a positive return. 7
6. Dummies for health limitation and changes in health limi-
tation (HLIM68, HEALTHB, HEALTHW). A health limitation in time t
should, cet. par., decrease In wt • If a worker has a health
limitation in 1968 and in 1980, then the health limitation would
adversely affect both In w2 and In wI and perhaps have no direct
effect on In w2-ln wI. However, a health limitation that per-
sists . throughout the period t 1 to t 2 may discourage human capital
investment over the period which would decrease In w2-ln WI. So
we expect the sign of HLIM68 to be negative.
Improvement in a 1968 health limitation by 1980 has no effect
on WI (the 1968 wage). However, the 1980 wage, w2 ' should be
higher for the improvers. So HEALTHB is expected to have a posi-
tive coefficient.
On the other hand, those with no health limitation in 1968
but a health deterioration by 1980 should have lower 1980 wages
than workers with no deterioration. Therefore, we expect HEALTHW
to have a negative coefficient.
7. Dummies for marital status and changes in marital status
(MARRY68, MARRY, UNMARRY). Married men tend to have more finan-
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cial responsibilities than single men. Consequently, we would
expect those who marry to be those with the highest earnings
(growth) potential. We therefore can regard marriage as a proxy
for unmeasured characteristics (such as energy level) that
increase wage growth. MARRY68 should have a positive coefficient.
F. Results
In this section, we will present, for the most part, regre-
sions coefficients and t values only for the key variables. (The
appendix will contain all regressions coefficients for selected
regressions.) However, to give the reader an overview of the
equations as a whole, we present and discuss all the coefficients
(including key and control variables) of SET I regressions for
the following groups:
1. the entire sample (ALL)
2. the YOUNG sample (all workers ·23-37 years old in 1968)
3. the OLD sample (all workers 38-53 years old in 1968)
4. all WHITE workers
5. all BLACK workers
The Pooled Regression (ALL)
None of the education dummies or the increase in education
dummy or WHITE are significant at even the 10% level.
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Table 4.1
A. Pooled Sample
Dependent Variable = In w1980 - In w1968
n = 830
MARRY .189
(1.409)
MARRY 68 .189
(1.409)
VAR COEF
(t value)
HEALTH W -.089
(-1.191)
.09=
10% level significance
5% level significance
= 1% level significance
UNMARRY -.252
(-3.876)***
CONSTANT .836
(7.928)***
LO -.032
(-1.449)
Q -.018
(-1.012)
* =
** =
***
VAR COEF
(t value)
H.S. -.043
(-1.008)
H.S.P. .086
(1.595)
COLL -.024
(-.453)
EDUP -.043
(-.789)
YOUNG .107
(3.181)***
WHITE .007
( .168)
UNI68 .106
(2.441)***
CUNIY .110
(1.886)*
CUNIN -.309
(-4.715)***
REG68 .087
(2.280)**
CREGS .009
.071)
CREGNS .037
.244)
HLIM68 .176
(1.497)
HEALTHB -.009
(-.060)
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B. Young Sample
Dependent Variable = w1980 - w1968
n = 421
VAR COEF VAR COEF
(t value) (t value)
E3 -.024 HEALTH\'J -.109
(-.385) (-.914)
E4 .095 MARRY68 .448
(1.259) (2.945)***
COLL .010 MARRY .545
( .130) (2.780)***
EDUP -.009 UNMARRY -.255
(-.121) (-2.824)***
RA -.032 CONST .621
(-.532) (3.652)***
UNI68 .077 R2 = .1079
(1.136)
LO -.026
CUNIY .052 (-.760)
( .642)
Q -.029
CUNIN -.360 (-1.267)
(-3.891)***
REG68 .072
(1.310)
CREGS .173
(1.100)
CREGNS .143
.690)
HLIM68 .075
.403)
HEALTHB .165
( .654)
-142-
C. Older Sample
Dependent Variable = w1980 - w1968
n = 409
VAR COEF VAR COEF
(t value) (t value)
H.S. -.065 HEALTHW -.074
(-1.083) (-.764)
H.S.P. .052 MARRY68 -.221
( .661) (-1.770)*
COLL -.045 MARRY -.137
(-.638) (-.703)
EDUP -.070 UNMARRY -.237
(-.828) (-2.468)***
LO -.048
(-1.599)
WHITE .052 0 .011
.842) ( .327)
UNI68 .127** CONST 1.090
(2.212) (7.955)
CUNIY .162 R2 = .103
(1.887)*
CUNIN -.233
(-2.420)***
REG68 .094
(1.764)*
CREGS -.469
(-2.048)**
CREGNS -.085
(-.367)
HLIM68 .246
(1.622)
HEALTHB -.140
(-.749)
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D. Whites
Dependent Variable = w1980 - w1968
n = 614
VAR COEF VAR COEF
(t value) (t value)
H.S. -.034 HEALTHW -.021
(-.710) (-.227)
H.S.P. .117 MARRY68 .162
(1.984)** ( 1.455)
COLL -.023 MARRY .240
(-.407) (1.521)
EDUP -.026 UNMARRY -.175
(-.450) (-2.092)**
YOUNG .092 LO -.049
(2.439)*** (-1.902)*
Q -.012
(-.572)
UNI68 .064 CONST .770
(1.270) (6.374)***
CUNlY .124 R2 = .072
(1.784)*
CUNIN -.278
(-3.875)**
REG68 .077
(1.769)*
CREGS .033
.262)
CREGNS .021
.135)
HLIM68 .065
( .• 516)
HEALTHB .097
( .580)
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E. Blacks
Dependent Variable = w1980 - w1968
n = 193
VAR COEF VAR COEF
(t value) (t value)
B.S. -.090 HEALTHW
(-.860)
H.S.P. -.204 MARRY68 -.150
(-1.230) (-.731)
COLL .052 MARRY .010
( .189) ( .034)
EDUP -.144 UNMARRY -.352
(-.860) (-2.816)***
YOUNG .220 LO -.008
(2.521)*** (-.148)
Q -.041
(-.929)
UNl68 .236 CONST .964
(2.338)*** (4.312)***
CUNlY .095 R2 = .1549
( .766)
CUNlN -.399
(-2.242)**
REG68 .133
(1.341)
CREGS
CREGNS
HLlM68 .467
(1.460)
HEALTHB -.224
(-.609)
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YOUNG, UNl68 and CUNlY all have coefficients that are of the
expected positive sign and significant at the 10% level. Being
less than 37 years old in 1968 increased w2/wl by slightly more
than 10%. The same is true of union membership in 1968. Leaving
the union, however, decreased w2/wl by almost 31%. The coef-
ficients of UNl68 and CUNlN together imply that In w2-ln wI was
less for union leavers than for those who belonged to a union
in neither year (the reference group) by .309-.106=.203. 8
As expected, REG68 is positive. Southern residence in 1968
increases w2/wl by 8.7%. This coefficient does not necessarily
reflect a higher 1980 wage for Southerners. Since money wages in
the South have in the past been lower than in other areas of the
country, this result reflects in part low 1968 wages in the South.
As discussed above, the South has experienced a recent boom so
that regional wage differentials have narrowed.
Movement in and out of the South has little apparent effect
on the dependent variable. This may be because the number of
movers is small--only 14 individuals moved to the South and only
10 moved out between 1968 and 1980. Neither does health or
changes in health. Recall that no one with more than a moderate
health limitation was included in our sample, so we would expect
any health problems to have, at most, a mild effect.
Marital status in 1968 and marriage during the survey period
have no apparent effect on the dependent variable. Death or
divorce of a spouse, on the other hand, decrease In w2-ln wI by
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9
.252.
LO and Q are not significant at even the 10% level. It will
turn out when all regression sets are presented that the number of
layoffs and quits reported 1969-79 is not the best measure of tur-
nover activity. Although regression SET I using LO and Q provides
some interesting information, SETS II through V gradually refine
our turnover variables. SETS IV and V will yield the most
intriguing results.
YOUNG
For workers less than 37 years of age, UNI68 and CUNIY are no
longer significant, but CUNIN is still negative and is significant
at the 1% level. Insignificance of the UNI68 coefficient is not
evidence that union membership in 1968 does not increase wage
growth. According to statistical theory, the null hypothesis can,
in general, not be accepted just because we fail to reject it.
Southern residence and geographical mobility have no
apparent effect for this group, nor do health limitations. Marital
status does appear to affect wage growth. Being married in 1968
increases In w2-ln wI by .448.
The negative coefficient for UNMARRY on the other hand seems
to indicate that loss of a spouse decreases 1980 earnings by
25.5%.
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OLD
Union status and change in union status dummies are signifi-
cant at the 10% level (at least) for middle aged workers. 1968
union membership increases w2/w1 by 12.7%. Joining a union
during the survey period increases it by 16.2% and leaving the
union decreases w2/wl by 23.3%. Growth in the log wage is
smaller for 1968 union members who left than for those who
belonged to a union in neither period by .233-.127=.106
(coefficient of UNI68 minus coefficient of CUNIN). Here we can-
not interpret this result (i.e., use interpretation "b") to mean
that the 1980 wage rate is 10.6% less for union leavers than for
the reference group. Since these union leavers belonged to a
union in 1968, their wage rates in 1968 were, all else equal,
greater than that of the reference group. So In w2-ln wI should
be smaller for the union leavers even if their 1980 wage is the
same as those who never belonged to a union.
Southern residence in 1968 (REG68=1) has a positive and
significant (at the 10% level) coefficient as expected. Movement
into the South, however, seems to lower wage growth. Movement by
middle aged and older individuals to the South may be preparatory
to retirement and accompanied by a shift to an easier (and less
high-paying) job.
Being married in 1968 actually decreases In w2-ln wI by .221
for the middle aged workers. Those married in 1968 but unmarried
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by 1980 suffer a further loss as UNMARRY has a negative coef-
ficient that is significant at the 1% level. Given wI' an indi-
vidual married in 1968 but not in 1980 has a 1980 wage that is
22.1%+23.7%=45.8% less than that of the reference group! LO is
close to being significant at the 10% level; Q is completely
insignificant.
WHITES
For whites, it does pay to increase education over the sur-
vey period. Holding WI constant, the increase (EDUP=I) raises the
1980 wage by 11.7% (by interpretation "b" under which the coef-
ficient gives the percentage change in 1980 wage). Being under 37
in 1968 (YOUNG=l) increases w2/wl by 9.2%. Younger workers, as
expected r have the fastest wage growth.
Joining a union increases w2/wl by 27.8%. Union leavers have
w2/wl that is 21.4% less (21.4% = 27.8% - 6.4%) than workers who
belonged to a union in neither year.
REG68 is positive (.077) and significant at the 10% level.
We saw that in the regression for ALL workers and for older
workers that REG68 is also significant at the 10% level.
"However, whites in particular would be likely to receive a pre-
mium for being Southern residents if racial discrimination was
most strongly operative in the wage determination of Southern
firms.
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For whites, number of layoffs (La) has a negative coef-
ficient that is significant at the 10% level. This coefficient
suggests that if wI and La are unrelated, each additional layoff
decreases w2 for whites by 4.9%. This magnitude is quite close
to that of LO for older workers (-.048). This may mean that it
is older white workers who suffer from layoffs.
BLACKS
For blacks, w2/wl is larger for younger workers by 22.0%.
The coefficient of YOUNG is larger for blacks than for whites but
not significantly different at the 10% level. The same is true
for the coefficients of UNI68 and CUNIN. As expected, union mem-
bership increases In w2-ln wI and leaving the union decreases In
w2-ln wI. UNMARRY is negative and significant at the 1% level.
Holding wI constant, becoming single lowers a black worker's wage
by 35.2%. La and Q are both insignificant.
Chow tests were performed to test whether the YOUNG/OLD divi-
sion and the WHITE/BLACK division improved the regressions fit.
For the YOUNG/OLD division,
F(409,401) = 1.130
which is below the cutoff point for significance at the 5% level.
Disaggregation by age is not shown to improve the sum of squared
errors significantly.
For the BLACK/WHITE divisions,
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F(594,193) = 1.38
which is greater than the cutoff point for 1% level significance
(1.33). This suggests that disaggregation by race does improve
the regression results.
Further Disaggregation of Regression Results
Below we present and discuss key regression coefficients for
all regression sets. We have the following prior expectations
about our regressions results.
1. Layoff variables should have negative coefficients.
2. Variables denoting recent layoffs should have coef-
ficients that are higher in absolute value than those denoting
less recent layoffs.
3. Coefficients of layoff dummies interacted with 1968
tenure should increase in absolute value with amount of tenure.
,
The more 1968 tenure a worker has, the greater should be the loss
from a layoff.
4. Loss from turnover should increase with age; quit and
layoff variable should have coefficients that are smaller
(algebraically) for the older group.
5. The effect of education on loss from turnover is ambi-
guous. On the one hand, the more educated one is, the easier it
will be to "learn" OJT; this encourages specific OJT investment
for college graduates. On the other hand, the best educated
workers have large amounts of general human capital which could be
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substitutable for specific OJT. A priori, we would hypothesize
that workers with an average amount of education acquire the most
'f' 0 h 10specl lC JT and therefore suffer t e most from turnover.
6. We expect loss from turnover to be greater for whites
than for blacks. Assuming racial prejudice and "crowding" of
blacks into low wage industries, blacks have less to lose from
turnover than whites.
7. We expect skilled operatives, people who work with heavy
·machines to have more specific on-the-job training than workers
in other occupations. The skills they use are not easily taught
in classrooms and vary from firm to firm. We hypothesize that
firms in heavy industry also tend to be monopolistic so that their
employees may have few alternative firms that use their skills.
If this is the case, skilled laborers should be relatively
vulnerable to turnover.
For each set of regressions, the key coefficients will be
displayed in the following order:
The first page of the set (page A) will contain:
in column 1: the results for the entire sample (ALL)
in column 2: the results for all the younger workers (YOUNG)
in column 3: the results for all the older workers (OLD)
in column 4: the results for all workers with less than 12 years
of schooling « R.S.)
in column 5: the results for all workers with exactly 12 years
of schooling (H.S.)
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in column 6: the results for all workers with 13-15 years of
schooling (H.S.P.)
in column 7: the results for all workers with at least 16 years
of schooling (CaLL)
in column 8: the results for all whites (WHITE)
in column 9: the results for all blacks (BLACK)
The second page of the set (B) will contain results for
younger workers disaggregated first by education and then by
race:
in column 1: the results (repeated) for all the younger workers
. (YOUNG)
in column 2: the results for younger workers with less than 12
years of school (YOUNG WITH < H.S.)
in column 3: the results for younger workers with exactly 12
years of school (YOUNG WITH H.S.) .
in column 4: the results for younger workers with at least 16
years of schooling (YOUNG WITH CaLL)
in column 5: the results for younger whites (YOUNG WHITES)
in column 6: the results for younger blacks (YOUNG BLACKS)
The third page of the set C will contain results for older
workers disaggregated first by education and then by race:
in column 1: the results for all older workers (OLD)
in column 2: the results for older workers with less than 12
years of schooling (OLD WITH < H.S.)
in column 3: the results for older workers with exactly 12 years
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of schooling (OLD WITH H.S.)
in column 4: the results for older workers with at least 16 years
of schooling (OLD WITH COLL)
in column 5: the results for older whites (OLD WHITES)
in column 6: the results for older blacks (OLD BLACKS)
Page D of regressions sets II, IV and V will aid us in
interpreting the dummy regression coefficients that are signifi-
cant at the 10% level. Column (3) gives the expected 1980 wage
rate for a worker with the mean 1968 wage for his group, a value
of 0 for the appropriate turnover dummy, and average values for
all other characteristics. Column (4) gives the expected 1980
wage rate for a worker with the mean 1968 wage for his group, a
value of 1 for the turnover dummy and average values for all other
characteristics. In other words, the figure in Column (3) is the
expected wage for an individual without the layoff (or quit) and
(4) is the expected wage with the layoff or quit.
There are no special regressions for individuals who are
neither black or white. Neither were regressions run separately
for young workers with 13-15 years education and old workers with
13-15 years education due to the small sample sizes.
After the results and discussions of the five sets of
regressions, some further results are presented for regressions
disaggregating by 1968 one-digit occupation.
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Regressions Analysis
Regression Set I
key variables {LO=number of layoffs 1969-79
are { Q=number of quits 1969-79
Of the 21 LO coefficients in set I, 17 are negative. 10 How-
ever, LO is never significant at the 5% level and is significant
at ~he 10% level in only three regressions:
WHITES (page A, column 8)
OLDER WORKERS with exactly 12 years of education (page C,
column 3)
and
OLDER WHITE WORKERS (page C, column 5)
In each of these three cases, LO is negative as is con-
sistent with our prior expectations. Further, as we expected, it
is older workers, whites, and those with a middle level of educa-
tion are are harmed by layoffs.
If, using interpretation "b," we assume the coefficient of LO
is equal to the percentage change in w2 with respect to LO, we can
interpret these coefficients as implying:
(1) that each additional layoff decreases the 1980 wage of
whites by 5%
(2) that each additional layoff decreases the 1980 wage of
older white workers by 5.5%
(3) that each additional layoff decreases the 1980 wage of
REGRESSION SET I PAGE A
Table 4.2
Results for Turnover Variables
EDUCATION LEVELTURNOVER
VARIABLE
( 1 )
ALL
n=830
AGE
( 2 )
YOUNG
n=421
( 3)
OLD
n==409
( 4 )
<H.S.
n=322
( 5 )
H.S.
n==238
( 6 )
H.S.P.
n=117
( 7 )
COLL
n==153
(8 )
WHITE
n=614
RACE
( 9 )
BLACK
n==193
LO
Q
-.032
(-1.449)
-.018
(-1.012)
-.026 -.048
(-.760)(-1.599)
-.029 .011
(-1.267) (.327)
-.036 -.009 .016 -.085
(-1.087)(-.204) (.250) (-1.104)
-.011 -.040 .008 -.003
(-.344)(-1.315) (.151) (-.058)
-.049 -.008
(-1.902)*(-.148)
-.012 -.041
(-.572) (-.929)
I
I--'
U1
U1
I
-156-
REGRESSION SET I PAGE B
EDUCATION LEVEL RACE
( 1) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 )
YOUNG YOUNG
YOUNG WITH WITH YOUNG YOUNG
YOUNG <R.S. R.S. CaLL WHITES BLACKS
n=421 n=136 n=135 . n=81 n=307 n=100
La -.026 -.007 .008 -.217 -.048 .015
(-.760) (-.134) (.157) (-1.514) (-1.158) (.219)
0 -.029 -.017 -.047 .007 -.032 -.020
(-1.267) (-.422)(-1.301) (.086) (-1.200) (-.413)
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REGRESSION SET I PAGE C
EDUCATION LEVEL RACE
( 1) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4) ( 5 ) ( 6 )
OLD OLD
OLD WITH WITH OLD OLD
OLD <H.S. H.S. COLL WHITES BLACKS
n=409 n=186 n=103 n=72 n=307 n=93
LO -.048 -.054 -.144 .003 -.055 -.033
(-1.599) (-1.244)(-1.891)* (.034) (-1.711)*(-.424)
Q .011 -.004 -.092 .005 .033 -.163
(.327) (-.080)(-1.447) (.059) (.960) (-1.515)
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older high school graduates by 14.4%.
There is less evidence about Q's effects although most of the
Q coefficients are negative.
Regression Set II
L01 (=1 if worker had at least one layoff)
Q1 (=1 if worker had at least one quit)
In regression set II, we test whether the presence of~
layoffs or quits is harmful for workers. The specification in
set I was more conducive to testing for negative signalling; any
employers who have doubts about job changers should be par-
ticularly wary of those who frequently quit or lose their jobs.
L01 and Ql are more representative of loss of specific OJT from
1968 job.
L01 is significant at the 10% level for:
ALL (page A, column 1)
OLDER WORKERS (page A, column 3)
WHITES (page A, column 8)
The WHITE coefficient is significant at the 5% level.
Given In WI' at least one layoff:
(1) decreases the 1980 wage for a worker in the pooled sample
by 7.4%
(2) decreases the 1980 wage for older workers by 9.3%
(3) decreases the 1980 wage for whites by 9.1%
Table 4.2 (continued)
SET II PAGE A
( 1 )
ALL
AGE
( 2)
YOUNG
( 3 )
OLD
(4 )
<H.S.
EDUCATION LEVEL
(5) (6)
H.S. H.S.P.
( 7 )
CaLL
( 8 )
WHITE
RACE
(9 )
BLACK
L01 -.074 -.055 -.093 -.088 -.037 -.029
(-1.895)* (-1.024)(-1.645)* (-1.483) (-.540)(-.246)
-.057
(-.514)
-.091 -.044
(-2.044)**(-.498)
Q1 .022
(.617)
.037 .016
(.723) (.296)
.048 -.052 .267 -.081
(.760) (-.853) (2.63)***(-.891)
-.002 .101
(-.038) (1.094)
I
I--'
U1
1..0
I
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SET II PAGE B
EDUCATION LEVEL RACE
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 )
YOUNG YOUNG
YOUNG WITH WITH YOUNG YOUNG
YOUNG <H.S. H.S. CaLL WHITES BLACKS
L01 -.055 -.058 -.005 -.123 -.088 -.011
(-1.024) (-.674) (-.051) (-.711) (-1.375) (-.100)
Q1 .037 .063 -.032 -.151 -.024 .254
(.723) ( .695 ) (-.378) (-1.081) (-.405) (2.177)**
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SET II PAGE C
EDUCATION LEVEL RACE
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 )
OLD OLD
OLD WITH WITH OLD OLD
OLD <H.S. H.S. COLL WHITES BLACKS
LOI -.093 -.114 -.150 .029 -.096 -.117
(-1.645)*(-1.344) (-1.382) (.181) (-1.560) (-.821)
Ql .016 .050 -.108 -.004 .030 -.134
(.296) (.545) (-1.225) (-.031) (.531) (-.820)
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REGRESSION SET II
PAGE D
( 1 ) ( 2) ( 3) (4) ( 5~ ( 6 )
GROUP TYPE OF 1980 WAGE RATE 1980 WAGE RATE h. %h.d,e
TURNOVER WITH DUMMY = 0 WITH DUMMY = 1
ALL L01 a $10.50 $10.30 -$.20 -2.0%
YOUNG .. b N.S. N.S.N.S. N.S.
OLD " $10.89 $ 9.93 -$.96 -8.8%
<B.S. .. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
R.S. " .. II .. ..
COLL. .. II II " "
WHITE .. $11.53 $10.55 -$.98 -8.5%
BLACK .. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
a
LOI = 1 if individual had at least one layoff, 1969-1979
b
coefficient not significant at 10% level
c
quantity in column (3) minus quantity in column (4)
d
quantity in column (5) divided by quantity in column (3)
e
this would actually be equivalent to the regression coefficient of
the appropriate due if we were dividing the quantity in column 5 by
the midpoint between the quantities in column (3) and column (4)
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REGRESSION SET II
PAGE D, continued
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 )
GROUP TYPE OF 1980 WAGE RATE 1980 WAGE RATE
URNOVER WITH DUMMY = 0 vvITH DUMMY = 1
YOUNG L01 N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
<H.S.
YOUNG n II II II II
W HS
YOUNG " II II II II
W COLL
OLD < n .. II .. "
H.S.
OLD W L01 $10.77 $9.33 -$1.44 -13.4%
H.S.
L01 not significant 10r any age race group, Q1 only significant for
YOUNG BLACKS.
YOUNG
BLACKS
Q1 $6.57 $7.67 $1.10 16.7%
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Out of 21 LOI coefficients, all are negative except for
older workers who have at least a college degree.
Page D of regression set II shows the effect of at least one
layoff on the 1980 wage of members of each of these groups using
interpretation "a," that is, using the fact that In w2 - In wI
for a given individual is the log of (w2/wl ). According to Page
D, the loss in the 1980 hourly wage is
$.20 for ALL (2%)
$.96 for OLDER WORKERS (8.8%)
$.98 for WHITES (8.5%).
01 is positive and significant at the 5% level for workers
with some college (B.S.P.) on page A, column 6 and for young
blacks, page B, column 6. The H.S.P. group is difficult to fit
into any pattern either a priori or with regard to regressions
coefficients. It includes workers who have schooling past high
school that qualifies them for some trade as well as college dro-
pouts (workers who "quit" college). The non-academic schooling
received by some workers in this category could be close to OJT.
The result for young blacks is intriguing. Having at least
one quit over the period increases (from Page D) the 1980 hourly
wage by $1.10 for young blacks. No such result was evident for 0
(number of quits) from SET I. This is consistent with the
hypothesis that too frequent quits can be a negative signal. It
is also consistent with the presumed connection between tenure and
specific OJT. An individual who changes jobs too often will have
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short job tenure on each job and therefore accumulate limited
quantities of specific OJT.
The finding that young blacks in particular benefit from
quits is consistent with Ann Bartel's curious findings that for
blacks, earnings growth on the job was a positive function of
number of employers. One possible explanation is that specific
OJT is limited for blacks, by institutional and other factors so
that gains from quitting (especially for young blacks with least
specific training) are not offset by loss of OJT. A second
possible explanation is that institutional limitations on OJT for
blacks can be circumvented at certain firms. This implies that
blacks particularly benefit from "job-shopping", that is,
changing jobs until they find one which will provide them with
opportunities for OJT investment.
As we progress from regression set III .to set V, we shall
see a dramatic increase in the number of significant coef-
ficients. This improvement is a result of distinguishing job
changes by timing and tenure prior to turnover.
SET III
Key variables are:
LOE = # layoffs 1969-1974
LOL = # layoffs 1974-1979
QE = # quits 1969-1974
SET III PAGE A
AGE EDUCATION LEVEL RACE
( 1 ) ( 2) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 ) (8 ) ( 9 )
ALL YOUNG OLD (H.S. H.S. H.S.P. COLL WHITE BLACK
LOE .027 .062 -.034 .013 .108 .150 -.098 -.001 .077
(.754) (1.269) (-.644) (.229) {1.660)*(1.282) (-1.081) (-.027) (1.060)
LOL -.076 -.116 -.058 -.061 -.107 -.069 -.051 -.079 -.106
*** *** ***
(-2.520) (-2.346)(-1.498) (-1.469)(-1.577)(-.829) (-.369) (-2.329)(-1.351)
I
QE -.005 -.029 .075 -.042 .015 .042 .006 .005 -.025 r-'0'\(-.201) (-.905) (1.642) (-.995) (.324) (.602) (.084) (.181) (-.371) 0'\
I
QL -.034 -.015 -.089 .049 -.088 -.036 -.009 -.033 -.051
(-1.106) (-.394)(-1.519) (.829)(-1.818)*(-.398) (-.107) (-.987) (-.588)
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SET III PAGE B
EDUCATION LEVEL RACE
( 1 )
YOUNG
( 2 )
YOUNG
WITH
(H.S.
( 3 )
YOUNG
WITH
H.S.
(4 )
YOUNG
WITH
CaLL
( 5 )
YOUNG
WHITES
( 6 )
YOUNG
BLACKS
LOE .062 .070 .194 -.341 .031 .162
(1.269) (.867) (2.477)***(-1.627) (.537) (1.494)
LOL -.116 -.065 -.205 -.118 -.139 -.087
(-2.346) (-.957) (-2.177)** (-.632) (-2.213)** (-.903)
QE -.029 -.096 .001 .028 -.025 -.054
(-.905) (-1.789)* (.206) (.246) (-.678) (-.700)
QL -.015 .165 -.088 .025 -.031 .078
(-.394) (2.013)**(-1.607) (.185) (-.722) ( .740)
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SET III PAGE C
EDUCATION LEVEL RACE
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) (4 ) (5) ( 6 )
OLD OLD OLD
WITH WITH WITH OLD OLD
OLD <H.S. H.S. CaLL WHITES BLACKS
LOE -.034 -.050 -.102 -.008 -.075 .017
(-.644) (-.580) (-.825) (-.086) (-1.165) (.152)
LOL -.058 -.060 -.136 .200 -.046 -.124
(-1.498) (-1.089) (-1.353) (.649) (-1.176) (-.924)
OE .075 .047 -.029 .055 .087 -.077
(1.642) (.611) (-.299) ( .524) (1.855)* (-.518)
OL -.089 -.077 -.182 -.062 -.050 -.301
(-1.519) (-.842) (-1.518) (-.485) (-.829) (-1.802)*
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QL = i quits 1974-1979
Recalling the Jacobsen diagram that accompanied the intro-
duction of these variables, we see that recovery from early
layoffs may be almost complete by 1980. In fact, LOE (number of
early layoffs) has a positive, significant coefficient for high
school graduates as a whole and for young high school graduates
(with magnitudes of .108 and .194, respectively). Apparently,
early layoffs give young high school graduates some impetus for
improvement that eventually results in a higher paying job. On
the other hand, LOE is negative (although insignificant) for
every regression using older workers (on page C) except for older
blacks.
This is evidence, although admittedly weak, that older
workers tend not to recover from early layoffs.
We have much stronger evidence that LOL, the number of
recent layoffs, is financially damaging. The coefficient of LOL
is significant at the 5% level for:
ALL
YOUNG WORKERS
WHITE WORKERS
YOUNG, HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
and
YOUNG WHITES
For the first time, we have evidence that layoffs hurt
younger workers as a group. Surprisingly, LOL is not significant
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for any group of older workers. Apparently, the number of late
layoffs makes no more difference for older workers than the
number of early layoffs. It is true that LOL is negative for all
groups of older workers (SET III, page C) except for older
college graduates. In fact, every regression in SET III except
older college graduates has a negative coefficient of LOL. (In
SET IV, we will see evidence that the existence of late layoffs
hurts older workers.)
Every additional layoff decreases w2/wl by:
7.6% for the pooled sample
11.6% for YOUNG
7.9% for WHITE
20.5% for YOUNG WITH HIGH SCHOOL
13.9% for YOUNG WHITES
The QE coefficients yield no observable pattern. QL does follow
one tentative pattern; QL has a negative coefficient for every
regression on page C. This suggests that recent layoffs decrease
wage growth for older workers. Possibly, some of these recent
quits are moves to easier jobs (a form of semi-retirement).
SET IV
LOEl = 1 if had at least one early layoff
LOLl = 1 if had at least one late layoff
QEl = 1 if had at least one early quit
Table 4.2 (continued)
SET IV PAGE A
AGE EDUCATION LEVEL RACE
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5) ( 6 ) ( 7 ) ( 8 ) (9 )
ALL YOUNG OLD <H.S. H.S. H.S.P. COLL WHITE BLACK
LOE1
.033 .079 -.045 .032 .082 .189 -.125 .002 .095
(.684) (1.269) (-.587) (.410) (1.027)(1.231) (-.869) (.043) (.902)
LOLl
-.138 -.162 -.131 -.132 -.123 -.2.90 -.091 -.148 -.157 I
*** *** * * * ** ~
-....J(-2.869) (-2.365)(-1.925) (-1.896)(-1.309)(-1.895)(-.580) (-2.688) (-1.417) ~
I
QEl
.047 .009 .134 .039 .041 .245 -.047 .030 .126
** **
(1.186) (.178) (2.154) (.544) (.606)(2.143)(-.461) (.678) (1.207)
QL1
-.042 .015 -.139 .021 -.106 .060 -.060 -.047 -.028
**
(:....952) (.251) (-2.011) (.267) (-1.390)(.488) (-.544) (-.977) (-.239)
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SET IV PAGE B
EDUCATION LEVEL RACE
( 1 )
YOUNG
( 2 )
YOUNG
WITH
<H.S.
( 3 )
YOUNG
WITH
H.S.
( 4 )
YOUNG
WITH
COLL
( 5 )
YOUNG
WHITES
( 6 )
YOUNG
BLACKS
LOE1 .079 .098 .190 -.248 .038 .196
(1.269) (.956) (1.870)* (-1.010) (.516) (1.489)
LOLl -.162 -.120 -.254 -.167 -.200 -.135
*** ** ***
(-2.365) (-1.185) (-2.007) (-.771) (-2.385) (-1.000)
QE1 .009 -.045 .014 -.070 -.020 .119
(.178) (-.466) (.154) (-.456) (-.317) ( .967)
QL1 .015 .166 -.025 -.065 -.025 .190
(.251) (1.520) (-.253) (-.387) (-.380) (1.282)
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SET IV PAGE C
EDUCATION LEVEL RACE
( 1 )
OLD
( 2 )
OLD
WITH
<H.S.
( 3 )
OLD
WITH
H.S.
(4 )
OLD
WITH
COLL
( 5 )
OLD
WHITES
( 6 )
OLD
BLACKS
LOEl -.045 -.090 -.109 -.029 -.077 -.047
(-.587) (-.707) (-.740) (-.162) (-.859) (-.262)
LOLl -.131 -.164 -.095 .230 -.107 -.236
(-1.925)* (-1.671)* (-.641) (.742) (-1.468) (-1.222)
QE1 .134 .182 -.001 .125 .119 .060
(2.154)** (1.649)* (-.009) (.768) (1.859)* (.290)
QL1 -.139 -.178 -.193 -.115 -.093 -.390
(-2.011)**(-1.539) (-1.552) (-.627) (-1.304) (-1.716)*
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REGRESSION SET IV
PAGE D
( 1 )
GROUP
(2 )
TYPE OF
TURNOVER
( 3 )
1980 WAGE
DUMMY = 0
(4 )
1980 WAGE
DUMMY = 1
ALL a LOLl $10.50 $9.15 -$1.35 -12.9%
YOUNG LOLl $10.15 $8.63 -$1.52 -15.0%
OLD LOLl $10.89 $9.51 -$1.34 -12.4%
<H.S. LOLl $ 8.52 $6.90 -$1.62 -19.0%
H.S. LOLl b N.S. N.S. N.S.N.S.
COLL LOLl N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
WHITE LOLl $11.53 $9.95 -$1.58 -13.7%
BLACK LOLl N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
YOUNG LOEI N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
< HS LOLl
YOUNG LOEI $ 9.02 $10.46 $ 1.44 16.0%
W HS LOLl $ 9.64 $7.48 -$2.16 -22.4%
YOUNG LOEI N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
W CaLL LOLl
OLD W LOE1 N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
< HS LOLl $ 8.10 $6.89 -$1.21 -15.0%
OLD LOE1 °N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
W HS LOLl
OLD W LOE1 N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
CaLL LOLl
aLOE1=1 if individual had at least one layoff 1969-1973
bLOL1 = if individual had at least one layoff 1974-1979
coefficient not significant at the 10% level
~ (4)-(3) .
quanti~y in column (3 )quantity in column (5) divided by
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REGRESSION SET IV
PAGE D continued
( 1 )
GROUP
( 2)
TYPE OF
URNOVER
( 3 )
1980 WAGE
DUMMY = 0
( 4 )
1980 WAGE
DUMMY = 1
( 5 ) ( 6 )
YOUNG LOE1 N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
WHITES LOLl $11.04 $8.70 -$2.34 -21.2%
QE1 N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
QLI N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
OLD LOE1 N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
WHITES LOLl N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
QEI $11.55 $13.00 $1.45 12.6%
QLI N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
YOUNG Nothing Significant
BLACKS
OLD LOE1 N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
BLACKS LOLl N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
QE1 N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
QLI $6.80 $4.62 -$2.18 -32.1%
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QLl = 1 if had at least one late quit.
We believe that the key variables for this set are far
superior to those of the previous sets; the existence of any
recent layoffs is what lowers wage growth for many groups.
The existence of early layoffs (LOEl=l) appears to increase
In w2-ln wI for YOUNG high school graduates as LOE does. LOEI is
,negative for every group of older workers. LOLl is negative and
significant at the 5% level for:
ALL
YOUNG
OLD
HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUTS
WORKERS WITH MORE THAN HIGH SCHOOL BUT NO COLLEGE DEGREE
YOUNG WHITE HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
YOUNG WHITES
OLD HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUTS
Before we distinguished turnover by when it occurred, we
found no evidence that younger groups suffered from turnover. In
SET III, when we started to distinguish layoffs and quits by
timing, we found no evidence for older workers. A new pattern
emerges when we consider existence rather than number of
early/late quits and layoffs. For each age group, loss from a
recent layoff appears to be a function of one's education. Among
the younger workers, the high school graduates are vulnerable to
recent layoffs. Among the older workers, it is the high school
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dropouts who suffer. It must be noted that we are not observing
(in the young and old groups) the same group of workers at dif-
ferent points in their life cycle, but two entirely different
cohorts. In other words, our young groups in this sample will
not necessarily have the same experience when they reach middle
age as the old group did at the time of this survey. For
instance, when the older group was in school, dropping out of
high school carried less of a stigma than when the young group
was in school. This suggests that the older high school dropouts
had the opportunity to invest more in all types of human capital
(relative to other individuals in their cohort) than the younger
high school dropouts. So older dropouts may have substantial
specific OJT investments which are lost if the worker is laid
off. Younger workers, on the other hand, will not have jobs
requiring specific OJT unless they have graduated from high school.
This explains why LOLl is negative and significant for young
workers with high school diplomas but not for young dropouts. We
would expect LOLl to also be negative and significant for older
high school graduates, but it is not. We shall find additional
evidence regarding this group in the fifth regression set.
Given wI' and interpreting the coefficients as the percentage
change in the 1980 wage, a recent layoff decreases the 1980 wage:
(1) 13.8% for ALL
(2) 16.2% for YOUNG
(3) 13% for OLD
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(4) 13.2% for HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUTS
(5) 29% for those with some college, no degree
(6) 14.8% for WHITES
(7) 25% for YOUNG HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
(8) 20% for YOUNG WHITES
(9) 16.4% for OLD HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUTS
From Table 0, a recent layoff decreases the 1980 hourly wage
by
$1.35 for ALL (12.9%)
$1.52 for YOUNGER WORKERS (15%)
$1.34 for OLDER WORKERS (12.4%)
$1.62 for HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUTS (19%)
$1.58 for WHITES (13.7%)
$2.16 for YOUNG HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES (22.4%)
$2.34 for YOUNG WHITES (21.2%), and
$1.21 for OLD HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUTS (15.0%)
QEl is positive and significant at the 10% level for older
workers as a whole, old high school dropouts and old whites.
This suggests that older workers may be experienced at turning
quits to long run advantage. QLl is negative for every older
group although it is never significant except for older workers
as a whole and old blac~s.
SET V
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LOIS =(1 if laid off and 1968 tenure < 2 years)
L01MED =(1 if laid off and 1968 tenure 2-3 years)
L01LG = (1 if laid off and 1968 tenure> 4 years)
Q1S = (1 if quit and 1968 tenure < 2 years)
Q1MED =(1 if quit and 1968 tenure 2-3 years)
Q1LG = (1 if quit and 19~8 tenure> 4 years)
When we interact layoffs and quits with 1968 tenure, we find
interesting results only for L01LG (being laid off with 4 or more
years tenure in 1968).
L01LG is negative and significant for:
ALL
YOUNG
OLD
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
COLLEGE GRADUATES
WHITES
YOUNG HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
YOUNG COLLEGE GRADUATES
YOUNG WHITES
OLD HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
For high school dropouts (who seemed to suffer from layoffs
undifferentiated by 1968 tenure) and blacks, tenure seems to make
no difference in loss from layoffs. It is only relatively
"privileged" individuals, i.e., whites and those with a high
school education or better who are hurt by layoffs after at least
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Table 4.2 (continued)
SET V PAGE A
AGE EDUCATION LEVEL RACE
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 ) (8 ) ( 9 )
ALL YOUNG OLD (H.S. H.S. H.S.P. COLL WHITE BLACK
LOIS
-.034 -.061 .043 -.082 -.047 -.281 .244 -.091 .062
(-.520) (-.736) (.404) (-.831) (-.392){-1.369){1.389) (-1.191) { .459
L01MED
.007 .048 -.058 .018 .129 -.062 -.124 -.001 .015
( .091 ) (.523) (-.448) (.144) (1.123) (-.263) (-.601) (-.007) ( .091
L01LG
-.155 -.164 -.130 -.119 -.208 .158 -.295 -.145 -.194
*** * * * * **(-2.613) (-1.800){-1.655) (-1.404) (-1.856) (.678){-1.661){-2.167) (-1.408
Q1S
.039 .102 -.109 .076 -.022 .520 -.077 .027 .114
***(.657) (1.365) (-.991) (.706) (-.231){2.55) (-.519) (.406) ( .803
Q1MED
-.043 .019 -.119 -.081 -.037 .315 -.237 -.096 .123
*(-.658) (.225) (-1.033) (-.759) (-.334){1.660){-1.232) (-1.313) { .7':
Q1LG
.039 -.003 .099 .114 -.081 .173 -.032 .022 .044
( • 799) (-.043) (1.473) (1.292) (-.972){1.319){-.277) (.415) {.291
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SET V PAGE B
EDUCATION LEVEL RACE
( 1 )
YOUNG
( 2 )
YOUNG
WITH
<H.S.
( 3 )
YOUNG
WITH
R.S.
( 4 )
YOUNG
WITH
CaLL
( 5 )
YOUNG
WHITES
( 6 )
YOUNG
BLACKS
LOIS -.061 -.112 -.130 .386 -.111 -.047
(-.736) (-.829) (-.954) (1.480) (-1.091) (-.278)
LOIMED .048 -.033 .314 -.218 .024 .213
**
(.523) (-.217) (2.257) (-.791) (.218) (1.085)
LOILG -.164 -.025 -.268 -.700 -.183 -.112
(-1.800)* (-.184) (-1.663)* (-2.192)**(-1.683)* (-.567)
QlS .102 .159 -.020 -.072 .038 .357
(1.365) (1.104) (-.181) (-.362) ( .432) (2.100)**
QIMED .019 .054 -.022 -.339 -.060 .245
( .225) (.378) (-.167) (-1.153) (-.605) (1.292)
QILG -.003 -.010 .012 .011 -.047 .133
(-.043) (-.073) (.095) (.056) (-.584) (.570)
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SET V PAGE C
EDUCATION LEVEL RACE
( 1 )
OLD
( 2)
OLD
WITH
<H.S.
( 3 )
OLD
WITH
H.S •
( 4 )
OLD
WITH
COLL
( 5 )
OLD
WHITES
(-6 )
OLD
BLACKS
LOIS •043 -.035 .549 .227 -.007 .067(.404) (-.227) (1.927)* (.838) (-.057) (.277)
LOIMED -.058 .126 -.263 .130 -.069 .038
(-.448) (.556) (-1.357) (.249) (-.477) (.103)
LOILG -.130 -.183 -.305 -.028 -.102 -.347
(-1.655)* (-1.635) (-2.030)* (-.114) (-1.228) (-1.593)
Q1S -.109 -.078 -.281 -.285 -.059 -.204
(-.991) (-.438) (-1.480) (-.887) (-.490) (-.677)
QIMED -.119 -.207 -.268 -.196 -.183 -.173
(-1.033) (-1.164) (-1.120) (-.586) (-1.515) (-.475)
Q1LG .099 .192 -.146 .119 .120 -.108
(1.473) (1.599) (-1.361) (.722) (1.775)* (-.469)
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REGRESSION SET V
PAGE D
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 )
GROUP TYPE OF 1980 WAGE 1980 WAGE /1 %/1
TURNOVER DUMMY = 0 DUMMY = 1 (4)-(3) (4)-(3) = ( 5 )
( 3 ) TIT
ALL L01LG $10.49 $8.98 -$1.51 -14.4%
YOUNG L01LG $10.05 $8.38 -$1.67 -16.6%
OLD L01LG $10.85 $9.51 -$1.34 -12.4%
< HS L01LG N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
H.S. L01LG $10.06 $8.18 -$1.88 -18.7%
COLL L01LG $15.49 $11.66 -$3.83 -24~7%
WHITE L01LG $11.49 $10.03 -$1.46 -12.7%
BLACK L01LG N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
YOUNG
< HS LOILG N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
YOUNG
W HS L01LG $ 9.50 $7.46 -$2.04 -21.5%
YOUNG
W COLL LOILG $14.72 $7.49 -$7.23 -49.1%
OLD
< HS L01LG N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
OLD
W HS LOILG $10.73 $8.02 -$2.71 -25.3%
OLD
W COLL L01LG N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
YOUNG
WHITES LOILG $10.88 $8.97 -$1.91 -17.5%
OLD
WHITES L01LG N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
YOUNG
BLACKS L01LG N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S.
OLD N. S•. N.S.BLACKS LOILG N.S. N.S.
or
-.70 - .6257066 to -.70 + .6257066
-1.326 to -.074
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A 99% confidence interval for the true coefficient of L01LG is
-.70 - .8220381 to -.70 + .8220381
or
-1.522 to .122.
This shows that the unusual magnitude of this estimated coef-
ficient may be a statistical artifact. From Page D we see that a
layoff with at least 4 years of tenure decreases the 1980 hourly
wage by
$1.67 for YOUNGER WORKERS (16.6%)
$1.34 for OLDER WORKERS (12.4%)
$1.88 for HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES (18.7%)
$3.83 for COLLEGE GRADUATES (24.7%)
$1.46 for WHITES (12.7%)
$~.04 for YOUNG HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES (21.5%)
$7.23 for YOUNG COLLEGE GRADUATES (49.1%)
$2.71 for OLD HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES (25.3%)
$1.91 for YOUNG WHITES (17.5%).
Results for Disaggregation by Occupation
We expect that the quantity of specific OJT investment (and
therefore of potential loss from a layoff) depends on the nature
of one's job. We only have one digit occupation for 1968, and no
estimate of OJT required for particular occupations, but we
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Table 4.4
Disaggregation by Occupation
A. Turnover Variables
Distinguish Job Changes by Timing
Pro-
fessionals Managers
n=164 n=88
Sales
and
Clerical
n=89
Crafts-
men
n=189
Opera-
tives
n=184
Unskilled
labor
n=116
LOE1 -.176 -.074 .093 .146 .069 -.031
(-1.371) (-.311) (.574) (1.373) (.872) (-.217)
LOLl -.198 .022 -.546 .036 -.187 -.234
(-1.595) (.109) (-2.743)*** (.311) (-2.400)***(-1.74)*
QE1 -.080 .014 .138 .042 .039 .044
(-.850) (.105) (1.089) (.458) (.569) (.334)
QL1 -.007 -.077 .118 -.295 .108 .134
(-.068) (-.510) (1.697)* (-2.883)***(1.353) (.832)
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B. Turnover Variables
Distinguish Job Changes by Amount of Job Tenure in 1968
Sales
Pro- and
fessionals Managers Clerical
Crafts-
men
Opera- Unskilled
tives labor
LOIS .024 .306 -.343 -.175 -.051 -.289( .153) (1.108) (-1.699)* -(1.049) (-.433) (-1.656)*
L01MED -.320 .078 .042 .252 -.055 -.055
(-1.443) ( • 290) (.115) (1.318) (-.503) (-.263)
L01LG -.243 -.389 -.142 -.077 -.194 -.235
(-1.613) (-1.196) (-.602) (-.637) (-2.09l)**(-1.191)
Q1S -.069 -.333 .310 .006 .160 .148
(-.522) (-1.518) (1.494) (.042) (1.469) (.822)
QIMED -.114 -.286 .370 -.167 .045 -.196
(-.634) (-.980) (1.312) (-.974) (.431) (-.927)
QILG -.078 .050 .026 -.136 .075 .368
(-.684) (.338) (.153) (-1.267) (.819) (1.982)*
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hypothesized that skilled laborers will have the most specific
OJT. As expected., operatives have coefficients of both LOLl and
L01LG that are negative and significant. Recent layoffs decrease
w2 by 18.7%. A layoff after four or more years of tenure for
this group decreases the dependent variable by .194.
LOLl is significant for two other occupational categories--
sales and clerical and unskilled labor. Unfortunately, the sales
and clerical ~ategory is too broad for us to be able to interpret
the LOLl coefficient as it includes jobs that range from sales of
sophisticated computer technology to file clerks. The result for
the unskilled workers is surprising. By definition, unskilled
workers have little firm specific OJT. Loss from layoffs cannot
be due to loss of specific training. It is possible that layoffs
cause negative signalling and loss of job "rents" for this group.
Years of tenure are positively related to loss from a layoff
for operatives as expected. Operatives with at least four years
of tenure have In w2 - In wI decreased by .194 by a layoff.
G. Summary of Results
We have found that:
(1) Layoffs do decrease wage growth for most workers.
Exceptions are young high school dropouts, older college gra-
duates and blacks. We would expect young high school dropouts to
have menial jobs and very little to lose by a layoff. Most
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blacks in our sample (71% in our sample) had not finished high
school. Some blacks are probably mired in dead-end jobs
throughout their career. Older college graduates have presumably
made their mark in their careers; they seem impervious to
layoffs. Besides only 3 workers in this group had recent layoffs
and 4 had a layoff after at least 4 years of tenure.
(2) .Recent layoffs (since 1974) have a more serious effect
on the 1980 wage than layoffs prior to 1974, particularly for the
younger workers. There are hints (although the evidence is weak)
that older workers are less resilient. Not only do the LOE and
LOEI coefficients tend to be negative for older groups, but LO
and LOI (variables for layoffs undifferentiated by when they
happened) are negative and significant for (at least subsets of)
older workers.
(3) For many workers, In w2-ln wI is decreased most by
layoffs if the worker had at least 4 years of tenure on the 1968
job (as of 1968). This is consistent with the hypothesis that
job tenure and specific OJT investment are highly correlated.
There is an alternative explanation for these results. This is
that long job tenure is a result of some monopoly advantage to
holding a particular job or a "rent". A layoff from such a job
would certainly be disastrous, but not necessarily as a result of
OJT loss.
The estimated LOILG coefficient for young college graduates
(-.70) is particularly striking. Although this suggests that
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either this group accumulates enormous amounts of OJT or its mem-
bers tend to work at jobs with high "rent," our 95% confidence
interval for the true interval includes more moderate values.
(4) The younger workers who suffer from layoffs tend to be
better educated than the older workers hurt by layoffs. Recent
layoffs hurt (among the young) high school graduates and (among
the old) high school dropouts. Layoffs after at least four years
of tenure hurt (among the young) high school and college grad-
uates and (among the old) high school dropouts and high school
graduates. This may be a cohort effect. Younger high school
dropouts probably are more "inferior" compared to the average
member of their cohort than older high school dropout are in rela-
tion to theirs.
(5) There is not much evidence on the effect of quits. They
seem to help young blacks. Recent quits appear to decrease
In w2-ln wI for older workers but the evidence is rather weak.
-191-
Footnotes
1. These variables
general OJT investment.
fact, can be applied to
restrictions:
(1) The proportion
o.
should likewise affect accumulation of
Our model in the theory chapter, in
general OJT with the following three
of general OJT for which the firm pays is
(2) General OJT may increase the wage rate by the same
amount whether or not the worker changes jobs.
(3) An increase in general OJT does not alter the worker's
2. In practice, a worker may quit without knowing the con-
ditions of his next job or even whether he will be able to find a
new job. The quit is prompted by an expectation of a subsequent
gain. The actual gain may be negative. So in practice, we
expect the effect of quits on wage growth to be ambiguous.
3. This over-sampling of poor families and blacks ensures
that these groups can be studied. However, it may cause bias on
our turnover coefficients if poor people are affected differently
by quits and layoffs than the non-poor.
4. If a married man left home forever, his wife was (if she
had been part of the original 1968 sample) interviewed as the new
head of the original family and the husband was considered head
of a new family. If this same wife remarried, her new husband
was interviewed as head of the original family. Thus, I must
eliminate from my sample all individuals for which the 1968
family head died or left the family between 1968 and 1981 (the
year in which the 1980 wage was reported).
5. If we had exact job tenure on current job in 1972 (at
date on 1972 interview) and the date of the 1972 interview, we
would be able to determine whether the individual was already at
the 1972 job in 1971. However, we do not have the exact date of
the interview in any year. Moreover, from all interviews until
the 1976 questionnaire, the only information we have about
current job tenure is whether it is (a) less than a year, (b)
I-lIn years, (c) 2-3 years, (d) 4-9 years, (e) 10-19 years, or (f)
more than 20 years.
6. In most cases, the surveys were completed before the 40th
week of the year so we assumed that anyone who worked more than
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40 weeks in any year worked after the survey date. So indivi-
duals were deleted from the sample who had reported a quit or
layoff in two consecutive years, were unemployed in the first of
these years, and worked less than 40 weeks in the first year as
they had ambiguity in the number of quits and layoffs reported.
A total of 21 observations were deleted in this fashion.
7. Specifically, since the cost of living is lower in the
South, real wages may be higher there even if money wages are
lower. In this case, moving to the South could cause a real
income gain.
8. This was calculated by subtracting the coefficient of
UNI68 (.106) from that of CUNIN (-.309) and taking the absolute
value. Individuals with UNI68=1, CUNIN=l belonged to a union in
1968 but not in 1980.
9. Using the approximation
w2In w2-ln w = In ( --1 wI
and the constant term in the pooled regression .836,
we see that the reference worker has
.836
~ e 2.31. This means that in 1980 the wage was
2.3 times the 1968 wage.
So the ratio of 1980 wage to 1968 wage for the reference
worker (someone with less than 12 years education, 38-53 in 1968,
black, belonging to a union neither in 1968 or in 1980, living in
the South in neither period, married in neither period with no
layoffs or quits 1968-1979) is 2.31. An individual identical to
the reference worker except for being married in 1968 and
w
unmarried in 1980 would have ~ that was 25.2-18.9 or 6.3%
wI
less than the reference individual if the approximation
~ % change in w2 with change in xl
wI
were correct for non-marginal changes in X.
10. Average number of years of school is 11.69 for older
workers and 12.19 for young workers.
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11. If the true coefficient of LO is 0 in every equation, the
probability of any regression coefficient being negative is .5.
If the regressions were independent of each other, the number of
negative coefficients out of 21, Y, would be a binomial random
variable with probability distribution
_ 211 Y 2l-Y 211 21p(Y) - (21-Y)1Y1 (.5) (.5) and p(17) = 17141 (.5)
= 0
So the probability of getting 17 negative values of LO is almost
impossible if the true coefficients are all O.
12. If X (the number of negative coefficients of LOE on page
C) is a true binomial random variable, the probability of 5 out
of these 6 coefficients being negative is .094 if the true LO
coefficient is always O.
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Chapter V
Summary and Conclusions
We began this dissertation by reviewing the theoretical and
empirical literature dealing with on-the-job-training and its
relation to layoffs and quits. None of the articles that
modelled on-the-job-training dealt with the firm's decision to
invest in worker on-the-job-training. We attempted to fill this
gap with our OJT model.
Although various authors recognized that OJT investment is
related to age (Borjas and Bartel), tenure (Borjas, Bartel), race
(Bartel) and education (Knapp and Hansen), none brought all these
variables together as arguments in an OJT investment function.
Further none made the transition from the effects of these
variables on specific OJT accumulation to investigation of their
effects on returns to layoffs and quits.
In Chapter III, we derived the equilibrium quantity of spe-
cific OJT purchased jointly by the individual and firm given pro-
fit maximization behavior of the firm and utility maximization
behavior of the individual. It was demonstrated that the
equilibrium quantity of firm specific training depended on the
individual's age, education, race, tenure and occupation. We
then developed a wage model which demonstrated that potential
financial loss from a layoff or quit is related to the
individual's specific OJT investment and therefore to the
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variables that affect this investment.
In Chapter IV, we tested the hypothesis that an individual's
age, education, tenure, race and occupation affect loss from job
changes. Our method was disaggregation of the wage regressions
by these variables. Various specifications of the turnover
variables were tried in order to determine:
(a) Is loss in wage growth greater from layoffs than from
quits?
(b) Is loss from recent turnover greater than that from
early turnover?
(c) Is there a relationship between tenure on the current
job and loss from turnover?
Below, we summarize our findings.
Quits
We have little evidence that quits affect the wage growth of
younger workers. One intriguing exception to this generalization
is the evidence for young blacks. For this group, having at
least one quit increases wage growth (Regression Set II). A
young black who earned the mean wage for young blacks in 1968
increased his 1980 hourly wage by $1.10 if he had any quits be-
tween 1968 and 1980 (page D of the Regressions Sets in Table
4.3). When we differentiate quits by tenure (Regression Set V)
for blacks with
we see evidence that quits increase wage growth
less than two years of tenure on the 1968 job. The implication
is that "job-shopping", (i.e., voluntary investment in mobility
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to improve the job worker match) pays for young blacks, par-
ticularly those with little job tenure.
The paucity of significant results for other young workers
is not terribly surprising considering the variety of situations
that might prompt an individual to quit. Unfortunately, our data
provides no information on reason for quit.
Borjas also found that a quit reduced wage growth
workers. As discussed above, their data (the NLS) allowed decom-
For the older workers as a group, recent quits appear to have
consistently negative effects on wage growth although very few
quit coefficients are significant at the 10% level. Bartel and
for older
position of quits by reason for quit--personal reasons, dissatis-
faction with the job or receiving a superior job offer. They
found that of older workers, those who quit for personal reasons
were hurt more than those who were immobile. Further, they found
that a quit is more likely to be due to finding a better job at
younger ag~s while at older ages, quits are mainly due to dissat-
isfaction with the current job. (Considering that unemployment
benefits are generally unavailable to workers who quit, the
dissatisfaction must be extreme.) If this is the case for the
older men in our sample, the negative coefficients on recent
quits seem reasonable. The insignificance of these coefficients
may result from the fact that the sample includes those who quit
to take a better job and those who quit due to job dissatisfac-
tion. Note that for older workers the loss from quits does not
appear to be proportional to tenure prior to quit. In fact, all
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the coefficients denoting a quit with less than 2 years tenure in
1968 or a quit with 2-3 years tenure are negative for older
workers but there is no pattern for the coefficients denoting a
quit with at least four years of tenure. This suggests that for
older workers, quits affect wages more adversely if they occur
after a short time on the job than after at least four years
tenure. This is mild evidence that older workers who quit fre-
quently tend to suffer decreased wage growth because they never
accumulate much OJT.
Layoffs
Layoffs reported six years previously have no negative and
statistically significant effects on wage growth measured over
the period (Regression Sets III and IV). This suggests that for
most people any damage done by layoffs is overcome within 6
years. There is some weak evidence to the contrary for the older
workers in Regression Sets III and IV as LOEI (=1 if had at least
one layoff prior to 1974) is negative (although insignificant)
for all groups of older workers and LOE (number of layoffs prior
to 1974) is negative for all older groups except older blacks.
Those with a high school education, especially young high school
educated workers actually appear to benefit from early layoffs.
Workers in this last group who earned the average 1968 wage for
the group ($3.43) and experienced at least one layoff up to 1974
had a 1980 wage rate (on average) that was $1.44 (16%) higher
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than that of the control group. Perhaps an early layoff forces a
young worker to invest in job search and in finding a more
appropriate job match.
As expected, recent layoffs never seem to benefit workers.
Both young workers as a whole and older workers as a whole appear
to suffer substantially from a recent layoff. The average
younger worker loses $1.52 (15% from Table D) from the 1980 wage
if he had any recent layoffs and the average older worker loses
$1.34 (12.4%). For younger workers, those with exactly 12 years
of education appear to lose the most from a recent layoff. They
lose (from Table II) $2.16 (22.4%) from the 1980 wage if they had
recent layoffs.
For older workers, those with less than a high school educa-
tion appear to forfeit earnings growth as a result of layoffs. A
likely explanation is that the average worker from the older
cohort has less than 12 years education (as discussed in Chapter
IV) while the average worker from the younger cohort has slightly
more than 12 years of education. For the older cohort, high
school dropouts are not necessarily below average in education
and are therefore considered potentially trainable by employers.
The specific component of their training is lost if they are laid
off. Those with a high school education or above are somewhat
above average and thus may have the flexibility to acquire
general training that renders them less vulnerable to layoffs.
Education itself is a form of general human capital which presu-
mably boosts the worker's productivity on a number of jobs.
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Younger high school dropouts, on the other hand, are
somewhat below average in education and employers may consider
them poor risks for training. Younger workers with a high school
diploma have an opportunity to invest in specific OJT and there-
fore to bear the risks of losing it if laid off.
The specificiations which denote the existence of at least
one layoff or quit in each period provide a better fit than the
specification in which the turnover variables are number of quits
and layoffs in each period. The reason may be that few indivi-
duals had more than one layoff or quit and fewer had more than
two.
In turn, the turnover variables that distinguish layoffs and
quits by when they happened provide a much better fit than quits
and layoffs that are undifferentiated by time of job change.
This suggests that the effect of a layoff on the current wage
rate depends on when it occurs.
When we interact turnover dummies with dummies for 1968
tenure (Regression $et V), we find that young workers lose
substantially from a layoff after at least 4 years of tenure if
they have a high school diploma or even a college degree. The
average worker from the younger cohort with a high school degree
had his 1980 wage rate decreased by $2.04 (21.5%) if he had a
layoff after at least 4 years of tenure. The loss for young
workers with a college degree is even more striking.
Although these findings are interesting in "themselves, they
also suggest which groups accumulate the most specific OJT. They
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should be the ones that lose most from a layoff since loss from a
layoff should be directly related to firm specific training. It
must be cautioned, however, that financial loss from a layoff may
reflect not only loss of specific on-the-job-training but loss of
"economic rent"that accrued to the individual from belonging to
a high wage industry or occupation.
Our results do not seem to show that older workers as a
whole have more firm specific OJT than younger workers.
They do suggest that certain educational groups within each age
cohort specialize in specific OJT, e.g., young workers of high
school age and older high school dropouts. Tenure seems to be
highly correlated with firm specific OJT investment for high
school graduates in both age groups and young college graduates.
Whites seem to acquire more specific OJT than blacks.
Possibilities for Future Work
There would appear to be five possible extensions of this
research:
(1) Investigation of tenure effects on the psychic wage
(including non-pecuniary components).
We were only able to measure effects of job turnover on the
monetary wage rate. However, the quit decision ordinarily takes
into account all changes in job benefits some of which are non-
monetary, e.g., working conditions. Bluestone has constructed
meaningful estimates of non-pecuniary job factors from available
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information about working conditions in each occupation. Since
we only have I-digit occupation for the 1968 job, we could not do
that in this dissertation.
(2) Investigation of the relationship between hours worked
per period and OJT investment.
The wage rate may be a function of hours worked for two
reasons. First, OJT requires time-on-the-job as an input.
Secondly, the benefit of OJT is positively related to expected
hours of work in the future which may be related to hours worked
today. One possible line of research would be to estimate the
relationship between the current wage rate and past yearly hours
or weeks of work.
(3) Investigation of the effect of firm characteristics on
OJT accumulation and worker loss from turnover.
As discussed above, firms in some industries pass on some
monopoly profits to workers in higher-than-competitive wages.
This suggests that some workers in these industries receive
"rents" that are lost if the worker leaves the industry.
One possible extension of Jacobsen's work is to model move-
ment between high wage and low wage industries after a job
change.
(4) Investigation into the relationship of turnover to con-
sequent unemployment.
The coding of our data makes it impossible to know exactly
when turnover occurred and therefore its relationship to weeks
unemployed in a given year. To make matters worse, weeks
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unemployed per year are indistinguishable in our data from weeks
on strike (until the 1974 survey). The NLS (Parnes) survey does
not have these problems and could be used to study the effect of
layoffs on earnings through its effect on unemployment.
(5) Investigation of the effects of quits and layoffs on the
wage rates for women.
Repeating this study for females would no doubt be
interesting and useful. There would be an additional compli-
cating factor which is the effect of childcare responsibilities
on the female labor supply. Any study on the effects of turnover
on women's wages should include modelling of their labor force
participation.
Two distinct policy conclusions follow from the results of
this research. First, the regressions indicate that mobility is
good for young blacks and high school graduates under some cir-
cumstances. Hence, it might well be useful to improve the job
information available to them and to aid their search for the
best possible job. Moreover, if quits are beneficial to young
blacks in part because early jobs turn out to place them in
racist environments, then efforts to improve employer attitudes
would be appropriate. This latter point is, of course, highly
speculative.
Secondly, we found that older high school dropouts and young
high school graduates appear to be hurt by recent layoffs. If
the layoff is after four years of tenure, young college graduates
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and older high school graduates suffer. This indicates that job
retraining programs could be helpful. If this appears too
unwieldy, an alternative would be to subsidize those who wish to
acquire formal training in the private sector.
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Means of Control Variables
and Dependent Variable
When variable is a dummy, the mean refers to fraction of
the sample for which the variable equals 1.
ALL YOUNG OLD
n=830 n=421 n=409
DLW .982 1.026 .937
H.• S. .287 ·.321 .252
H.S.P. .141 .164 .117
CaLL .184 .192 .176
EDUP .100 .124 .076
YOUNG .507 1.000 .000
WHITE .740 .729 .751
UNI68 .308 .295 .323
CUNIY .092 .107 .076
CUNIN .086 .097 .073
REG68 .390 .423 .357
CREGS .017 .024 .010
CREGNS .012 .014 .010
HLIM68 .048 .036 .061
HEALTHB .049 .019 .039
HEALTHW .029 .043 .056
MARRY68 .941 .938 .944
MARRY .029 .036 .022
UNMARRY .069 .078 .059
ii.
Means of Turnover Variables
ALL YOUNG OLD
LO .364 .399 .328
Q .563 .767 .352
LOI .242 .280 .203
Ql .345 .435 .252
LOE .170 .211 .127
LOL .194 .188 .200
QE .329 .449 .205
QL .234 .318 .147
LOE1 .139 .181 .095
LOLl .139 .145 .132
QE1 .242 .318 .164
QL1 .182 .233 .130
LOIS .088 .114 .061
L01MED .061 .081 .042
L01LG .090 .086 .095
Q1S .114 .171 .056
Q1MED .083 .112 .054
QILG .145 .152 .137
iii.
<H.S. H.S. H.S.P. CaLL
n=322 n=238 n=117 n=153
DLW .993 .946 1.067 .950
EDUP .078 .101 .094 .150
YOUNG .422 .567 .590 .529
WHITE .537 .828 .872 .928
UNI68 .398 .399 .214 .052
CUNIY .081 .122 .103 .059
CUNIN .087 .139 .068 .013
REG68 .562 .303 .256 .268
CREGS .003 .034 .009 .026
CREGNS .000 .008 .009 .046
HLIM68 .053 .029 .077 .046
HEALTHB .034 .017 .051 .020
HEALTHW .075 .042 .026 .026
MARRY68 .944 .962 .923 .915
MARRY .• 028 .029 .034 .026
UNMARRY .075 .046 .094 .072
iv.
<H.S. B.S. H.S.P. COLL
LO
.478 .311 .333 .229
Q
.531 .580 .615 .562
LOI .314 .210 .205 .170Q1
.320 .349 .385 .359
LOE .189 .172 .145 .144
LOL .289 .139 .188 .085
QE
.323 .319 .385 .314
QL
.208 .261 .231 .248
LOE1 .155 .151 .120 .098
LOLl .202 .105 .111 .078
QEl .224 .248 .274 .248
QLl .171 .189 .179 .196
LOIS .102 .071 .111 .065
L01MED .068 .067 .051 .046
LOILG .140 .067 .043 .059
QIS .093 .126 .128 .131
QIMED .096 .080 .094 .052
QILG .127 .139 .162 .176
v.
WHITE BLACK
n=614 n=193
DLW
.973 1.013
H.S.
.321 .202
H.S.P.
.166 .067
CaLL
.231 .021
EDUP
.114 .052
YOUNG .500 .518
UNI68 .305 .342
CUNIY .078 .140
CUNIN .094 .062
REG68 .279 .751
CREGS .021 .065
CREGNS .015 .000
HLIM68 .047 .057
HEALTHB .026 .041
HEALTHW .042 .078
MARRY68 .946 .922
MARRY .026 .036
UNMARRY .050 .119
vi.
WHITE BLACK
LO
.345 .435
0 .606 .456
L01
.230 .295
01 .370 .285
LOE
.155 .233
LOL
.191 .202
OE .347 .285
OL .259 .171
LOE1 .127 .187
LOLl .134 .155
OE1 .257 .207
QLI .202 .135
LOIS .080 .119
L01MED .060 .073
L01LG .088 .104
Q1S .114 .124
Q1MED .090 .073
Q1LG .163 .088
vii.
YOUNG WITH LESS THAN 12 YEARS EDUCATION
VAR COEF VAR COEF(t value) (t value)
HEALTHW -.142
(-.963)
MARRY68 .379
(1.090)
MARRY .492
(1.188)
EDUP -.173 UNMARRY -.320
(-1.209) (-2.058)**
LOE1 .098
( .956)
WHITE -.038 LOLl -.120
(-.409) (-1.185)
UNl68 .088 QE1 -.045
( .757) (-.466)
CUNlY .192 QL1 .166
(1.397) (1.520)
CUNlN -.468 CONSTANT .660
(-3.016)*** (1.814)*
REG68 .073 R2 = .252
( •70 3 )
CREGS
CREGNS
HLIM68 -.103
(-.203)
HEALTHB
j~
viii.
YOUNG WITH LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL
VAR COEF VAR COEF
(t value) (t value)
HEALTHW -.146
(-.964)
MARRY68 .535
(1.482)
MARRY .692
(1.628)
EDUP -.152 UNMARRY -.255
(-1.023) (-1.653)*
LOIS -.112
(-.829)
WHITE -.005 L01MED -.033
(-.054) (-.217)
UNI68 .092 L01LG -.025
( •771 ) (-.184)
CUNIY .185 QIS .159
(1.329) (1.104)
CUNIN -.429 Q1MED .054
(-2.664)*** ( .378)
REG68 .067 Q1LG -.010
( .634) (-.073)
CREGS CONSTANT .487
(1.297)
CREGNS R2 = .180
HLIM68 -.113
(-.218)
HEALTHB
ix.
YOUNG WITH HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA
VAR COEF VAR COEF
(t value) (t value)
HEALTHW -.226
(-.837)
MARRY68 .192
(-1.079)
MARRY .174
( .632)
EDUP .249 UNMARRY
(1.939)*
LOE1 .190
(1.870)
WHITE -.156 LOLl -.254
(-1.542) (-2.007)**
UNI68 .126 QE1 .014
(1.256) ( .154 )
CUNlY -.017 QL1 -.025
(-.144) (-.253)
CUNIN -.281 CONSTANT 1.133
(-2.174)** ·(9.401}~**
REG68 -.080 R2 = .172
(-.907)
CREGS -.156
(-.734)
CREGNS -.345
(-.779)
HLlM68 .171
( .547)
HEALTHB -.150
(-.359)
x.
YOUNG WITH HIGH SCHOOL
VAR COEF VAR COEF
(t value) (t value)
HEALTHW -.235
(-.875)
MARRY68 -.223
(-1.247)
MARRY .152
( .553)
EDUP .260 UNMARRY
(2.052)**
LOIS -.130
(-.954)
WHITE -.126 LOIMED .314
(-1.237) (2.257)**
UNI68 .143 LOILG -.268
(1.427) (-1.663)*
CUNIY .036 Q1S -.020
( .299) (-.181)
CUNIN -.336 Q1MED -.022
(-2.635)** (-.167)
REG68 -.052 Q1LG .012
(-.610) ( .095)
CREGS -.058 CONSTANT 1.104
(-.270) (9.292)***
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(-.753)
HLIM68 .149
( .482)
HEALTHB -.120
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xi.
YOUNG WITH COLLEGE
VAR COEF VAR COEF(t value) (t value)
HEALTHW -.018
( .040)
MARRY68 .343
(1.445)
MARRY .429
( .924)
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YOUNG WITH COLLEGE
VAR COEF VAR COEF
(t value) (t value)
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( .234)
MARRY68 .549
(2.288)**
MARRY .565
(1.226)
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(-1.077) (-.498)
LOIS .386
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( .222) (-.791)
UNI68 .043 L01LG -.700
( .146) (-2.192)**
CUNIY -.290 Q1S -.072
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CUNIN -.003 Q1MED -.340
( .005 ) (-1.153)
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CREGS .564 CONSTANT .478
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(1.187)
HLIM68 .147
( .330)
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xiii.
OLD WITH LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL
VAR COEF VAR COEF
(t value) (t value)
HEALTHW -.207
(-1.372)
MARRY68 - .. 227
(-1.148)
MARRY -.152
(-.484)
EDUP -.122 UNMARRY -.131
(-.772) (-.814)
LOE1 -.090
(-.707)
WHITE .019 LOLl -.164
( .226 ) (-1.671)*
UNI68 .108 QE1 .182
(1.229) (1.649)*
CUNIY -.243 QL1 -.178
(-1.541) (-1.539)
CUNIN -.032 CONSTANT 1.143
(-.044) (5.405)***
REG68 .089 R2 = .141
(1.058)
CREGS
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HLIM68 .451
(2.138)**
HEALTHB -.218
(-.830)
xiv.
OLD WITH < H.S.
VAR COEF VAR COEF
(t value) (t value)
HEALTHW -.154
(-1.000)
MARRY68 -.192
(-.956)
MARRY' .006
(.019)
EDUP -.140 UNMARRY -.153
(-.661) (- .954)
LOIS -.035
(-.227)
WHITE .029 LOIMED .126
( .344) ( .556)
UNI68 .142 LOILG -.183
(1.614) (-1.635)
CUNIY .017 Q1S -.078
( .103) (-.438)
CUNIN -.355 QIMED -.208
(-2.244)* (-1.164)
REG68 .121 Q1LG .193
(1.424) (1.599)
CREGS CONSTANT 1.054(4.951)***
CREGNS R2 = .135
HLIM68 .462
(2.192)**
HEALTHB -.227
(-.846)
xv.
OLD WITH HIGH SCHOOL
VAR COEF VAR COEF
(t value) (t value)
HEALTHW .270
(1.778)*
MARRY68 -.289
(-.991)
MARRY -.364
(-1.021)
EDUP -.130 UNMARRY -.834
(-1.007) (-4.198)*
LOEI -.109
(-.740)
WHITE .100 LOLl -.095
( .727) (-.641)
UNl68 .133 QEl -.001
(1.487) (-.009)
CUNlY .396 QLl -.193
(2.804)*** (-1.552)
CUNlN -.082 CONSTANT 1.061
(-.596) (3.325)***
REG68 .062 R2 = .363
( .609)
CREGS -.552 .
(-2.343)
CREGNS -.025
(-.064)
HLIM68 .356
( .950)
HEALTHB -.609
(-1.027)
xvi.
OLD WITH HIGH SCHOOL
VAR COEF VAR COEF
(t value) (t value)
HEALTHW .280
(1.879)*
MARRY68 -.280
(-.996)
MARRY -.302
(-.871)
EDUP -.132 UNMARRY -.865
(-1.049) (-4.491)*
LOIS .549
(1.927)*
WHITE .124 L01MED -.263
( .955) (-1.351)
UNI68 .186 L01LG -.305
(2.111)** (-2.030)
CUNIY .537 Q1S -.281
(3.806)*** (-1.480)
CUNIN -.126 Q1MED -.268
(-.923)* (-1.120)
REG68 .043 Q1LG -.146
( .434) (-1.361)
CREGS -.573
(-2.562)***
CREGNS -.004
(-.010)
HLIM68 .358
( .985)
HEALTHB -.216
(-.360)
xvii.
OLD WITH COLLEGE
xviii.
OLD WITH COLLEGE
VAR COEF VAR COEF
(t value) (t value)
HEALTHW
MARRY68 .480
( .706)
MARRY .741 .
( .902)
EDUP .147 UNMARRY -.865
( •7 46 ) (-1.345)
LOIS .227
( .838)
WHITE .192 L01MED .130
( .928 ) ( .249)
UNI68 .247 L01LG -.028
( .747) (-.114)
CUNIY .162 Q1S -.285
( .883) (-.887)
CUNIN -.155 Q1MED -.196
(-.250) (-.586)
REG68 .203 Q1LG .119
(1.399) ( .722)
CREGS CONSTANT .168
( .235)
CREGNS -.280
R2(-1.008) = .173
HLIM68 -.002
(-.008)
HEALTHB
